

Figurative meanings of the lexeme “face” and their Croatian equivalents

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SVEUČILIŠTE JOSIPA JURJA STROSSMAYERA U OSIJEKU

FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET

Diplomski studij engleskog i njemačkog jezika i književnosti

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Figurative meanings of the lexeme “face” and their Croatian equivalents

Diplomski rad

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1. Introduction

1.1. *Aim of the paper*

In this paper I will analyze figurative meanings of the lexeme *face* from a cognitive linguistic perspective and compare them with their Croatian equivalents in order to support the claim that the meanings are motivated by conceptual metaphor, general conventional knowledge and metonymy across languages, as in this case English and Croatian.

According to Katan (1999), languages do not reflect the world directly: they reflect human conceptualization of the world. The organization of experience is a simplification which changes from culture to culture. Each culture acts as a frame (the socio-cultural background) within which 'reality' is interpreted.

Conceptual mechanisms, such as conceptual metaphors and metonymies, play crucial roles in the way we conceptualise life. Their study is one of the most interesting fields in cognitive linguistics as they take many different forms. Conceptual metaphors can be universal, but they can also vary across languages, which I will also show on the examples from the English language and their Croatian counterparts.

The first or the theoretical part of this paper will provide the basic terminology for understanding the cognitive processes related to conceptual metaphors, kinds of conceptual metaphors, metonymies etc. I will explain terms like conceptual metaphor, source domain, target domain in order to provide theoretical framework for the later analysis.

The second part of the paper consists of the analysis of figurative meanings of a polysemous lexeme *face* and their Croatian equivalents, which have been categorized according to the type of mechanism at work in the extension of meaning. All people have bodies, therefore the experience of face is universal. Since speakers of both languages, Croatian and English, have the same concept of *face*, I expect to find similarities on the conceptual level. Faces are the most important parts of the human body in the sense that they identify us, for example photographs for documents identify us as individuals. Nevertheless, I expect to find some differences as well.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. *The traditional view of metaphor*

Encyclopaedia Britannica defines metaphor as “a figure of speech that implies comparison between two unlike entities, as distinguished from *simile*, an explicit comparison signalled by the words ‘like’ or ‘as.’”

Another definition of metaphor is that it is "a figure of speech in which an expression is used to refer to something that it does not literally denote in order to suggest a similarity."¹

Lakoff (1993) claims that in the classical theories of language, metaphor was seen as a matter of language, not thought.

Ning Yu (1995) says that metaphor is traditionally viewed as a matter of special or extraordinary language.

Metaphorical expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language: everyday language had no metaphor, and metaphor used mechanism outside the realm of everyday conventional language. (Lakoff 1993:202)

Charteris-Black and Ennis (2001) state that metaphor achieves its effect through comparing one thing with another.

According to the American heritage dictionary (2005), metaphor denotes the comparison of one thing to another without the use of *like* or *as*.

Kövecses (2002) subsumes the traditional view of metaphor by these five features:

1. metaphor is a property of words, a linguistic phenomenon
2. metaphor is used for some artistic and rhetorical purpose
3. metaphor is based on a resemblance between the two entities that are compared and identified
4. metaphor is a conscious and deliberate use of words

¹ <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=metaphor>

5. metaphor is a figure of speech that we can do without, we use it for special effects, and it is not an inevitable part of everyday human communication, let alone everyday human thought and reasoning

2.2. The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor

In the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. Kövecses (2002: 5) gives some examples:

AN ARGUMENT IS WAR: Your claims are *indefensible*.

LOVE IS A JOURNEY: Look *how far* we've *come*.

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: Is that the *foundation* for your theory?

IDEAS ARE FOOD: That's *food* for thought.

These examples illustrate how we think about arguments in terms of war, love in terms of journeys, theories in terms of buildings and ideas in terms of food. These and many more examples show that one conceptual domain is understood in terms of another conceptual domain, which is called a conceptual metaphor.

The cognitive linguistics focuses on the structure of metaphors and their usage. The theory of conceptual metaphor was developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, whose view of metaphor was quite different from the view of traditional linguists. They use the theory of conceptual metaphors to describe the way people think and talk about various concepts.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that the way we think and act is metaphorical in nature. They say that “metaphor is not just a way of naming but also a way of thinking; it is a figure of thought as well as a figure of speech”.

According to Kövecses (2010):

1. metaphor is a property of concepts, not of words
2. the function of metaphor is to better understand certain concepts, and not just some artistic or esthetic purpose
3. metaphor is often not based on similarity

4. metaphor is used effortlessly in everyday life by ordinary people, not just by special talented people
5. metaphor is an inevitable process of human thought and reasoning.

Johnson (1987) describes “the process of metaphorical mind as a process by which we understand and structure one domain of experience in terms of another domain of a different kind” (Yu 1995: 60).

2.3. Source and target domain

As already said, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain. These two domains are called the source domain and the target domain. Kövecses (2010) says that we use source domains in order to understand target domains: “the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called source domain, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the target domain” (Kövecses, 2010: 4).

Metaphor can be characterized with the formula *A IS B*, where A is the target domain and B the source domain. The metaphorical expression that characterizes *A IS B* formula is regarded as the linguistic realization of a conceptual metaphor:

We can state the nature of the relationship between the conceptual metaphors and the metaphorical linguistic expressions in the following way: the linguistic expressions (i.e., ways of talking) make explicit, or are manifestations of, the conceptual metaphors (i.e., ways of thinking). (Kövecses, 2002: 6)

To understand a metaphor “means to know the systematic mappings between a source and a target” (Kövecses 2010: 10), that is to understand the target domain with the help of the source domain. According to Kövecses (2010), people normally use concrete and physical concepts (for example *face*) to be able to understand the more abstract concepts (for example *dignity*). In the following part of the paper, I will discuss some common source and target domains.

2.3.1. *Common source domains*

There are some source domains which are commonly used in order to understand the target domains. Kövecses (2010) first lists the human body as the source domain, to which *face* belongs. Others are: health and illness, animals, plants, buildings and construction, machines and tools, games and sports, money and economic transactions, cooking and food, heat and cold, light and darkness, forces, movement and direction.

1. The human body

The human body is an ideal source because all people have it and believe to know it well. The various parts of the body are used to form metaphors, like head, face, legs, hands, back, heart, bones, shoulders, and so on. There are over two thousand body-based idioms (Kövecses, 2002:16), which shows that a great portion of metaphorical meaning derives from our experience of our own body. Kövecses (2010) lists the following examples:

the *heart* of the problem

to shoulder a responsibility

the *head* of the department

"Our body plays a crucial role in our creation of meaning and its understanding, and our embodiment in and with the physical and cultural worlds sets out the contours of what is meaningful to us and determines the ways of our understanding" (Johnson, 1987).

The "embodiment" of meaning is perhaps the central idea of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor and indeed of the cognitive linguistic view of meaning. As can be expected, the human body plays a key role in the emergence of metaphorical meaning not only in English and other "Western" languages and cultures, but also scholars [...] have abundantly demonstrated its central importance in human conceptualization in languages and cultures around the world. (Kövecses, 2002: 6)

Human understanding of the world is to a considerable extent metaphorical, mapping from the concrete to the abstract. Our body, with its experiences and functions, is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings onto more abstract domains. This is because humans, despite their differences, all have the same basic body structure.

Abstract complex systems can be conceptualized metaphorically as persons. It is not the entire person that serves as the source domain, but only the body of the person. Therefore, an abstract complex system is the human body. Spatial relations are abstract, so they derive from basic human experience. The basic human experience which leads to the conceptualization of spatial relations is the human body itself. The human body serves as the source domain. The main spatial reference points that seem to be recognized in most languages include our concepts of ON, UNDER, FRONT, BACK, and IN. In Heine's (1995) system, ON is typically expressed by such linguistic expressions as *up*, *above*, *on*, and *on top of*. Conceptualization is based on our understanding of the human body. In the figure below, we can see how abstract spatial relations are conceptualized as various body parts in hundreds of African and Oceanic languages:




Figure 1 (adapted from Heine 1995) Conceptualizing spatial relations through the body (Kövecses, 2005: 80)

2. Health and illness

Health and illness are aspects of the human body. Some of the examples for this productive source domain are:

a healthy society

a sick mind

She *hurt* my feelings.

3. Animals

Kövecses says that “human beings are especially frequently understood in terms of (assumed) properties of animals” (2010: 19). That means that people associate particular persons with some attributes of animals in metaphor. He gives examples, such as:

a *tiger*

a *dog*

a *sly fox*

a *bitch*

a *cow*

a *snake*

4. Plants

People cultivate plants for a variety of purposes. There are various parts of plants and actions used as metaphors. Kövecses (2010: 19) lists some examples:

a *budding* beauty

He *cultivated* his friendship with her.

the *fruit* of her labor

Exports *flourished* last year.

People know that there are different stages at which a plant must be before it flourishes, so they use these stages metaphorically to describe abstract concepts.

5. Buildings and constructions

“The source domain of buildings applies to a variety of targets. The target domains of theories, relationships, careers, economic systems, companies, social groups [...] all appear to

be complex abstract systems” (Kövecses 2010: 137). Some of the examples for this source domain are:

a *towering* genius

He is *in ruins* financially.

She *constructed* a coherent argument.

In these examples we can see that negative abstract concepts are being described as something ruined and the positive abstract concepts as something being built or constructed.

6. Machines and tools

There are many metaphors from this source domain that describe human activities by comparing them to machines and tools. Some of the examples are:

the *machine* of democracy

conceptual *tools*

She *produces* a book every year.

7. Games and sport

From the beginning of the humanity, people did some kind of sport and invented different games. With time, different sport activities and games became more sophisticated. People play games to entertain themselves. Games and sport are characterized by certain properties that are commonly used for metaphorical purposes. Many games have rules and this property occurs in examples such as “He *plays by the rules*” and “We want an *even playing field*.” Politicians often use metaphors from this source domain in their speeches. Further examples are:

to toy with the idea

He tried to *checkmate* her.

He’s a *heavyweight* politician.

8. Money and economic transactions

We live in a society where money is needed for all economic transactions and various kinds of commodities, so this source domain is used to describe abstract phenomena, such as time, energy, human relationships and so on, which is shown in the following examples:

Spend your time wisely.

I tried *to save* some energy.

She *invested a lot* in the relationship.

9. Cooking and food

“Cooking involves a complex process of several elements: an agent, recipe, ingredients, actions, and a product” (Kövecses 2010: 21). These elements are used to describe different abstract concepts, such as drive to succeed, a good or bad idea or making up a story, shown in the following examples because they are known to people as most of the people use them on a daily basis:

What’s your *recipe* for success?

That’s a *watered-down* idea.

He *cooked up* a story that nobody believed.

10. Heat and cold

Heat and cold are extremely basic human experiences. People feel warm or cold as a result of the temperature of the air that surrounds us. People often use the heat domain metaphorically to talk about their attitudes to people and things or about their emotion:

EMOTION IS HEAT: Behind his soft-spoken manner, *the fires* of ambition *burned*.

Further examples from this source domain, which show that heat is seen as anger, passion, love, and cold, are:

in the *heat* of passion
a *cold* reception
an *icy* state
a *warm* welcome

11. Light and darkness

This source domain can be compared to previously explained source domain. Light is seen as positive and dark as negative in explaining various abstract concepts, which is illustrated by following examples:

a *dark* mood
She *brightened up*.
a *cloud* of suspicion
She was in a *haze* of confusion.

12. Forces

There are various kinds of forces: gravitational, magnetic, electric, mechanical. We see these forces as operating on and affecting us in many ways. The forces take many shapes in the physical world: waves, wind, storm, fire, and agents pushing, pulling, driving, sending another thing. These forces effect various changes in the thing acted on. There are as many different effects as there are different forces. (Kövecses, 2002: 20)

The metaphorical conceptualization of several abstract domains in terms of forces is reflected in these examples:

She *swept me off my feet*.
You're *driving* me nuts.
Don't *push* me.

The stronger the force is, the stronger the realization of the abstract concept.

13. Movement and direction

According to Kövecses, “movement can involve a change of location or it can be stationary (as in the case of shaking)” (2010: 22):

He *went* crazy.

Inflation is *soaring*.

Our economy is *galloping ahead*.

2.3.2. Common target domains

Kövecses says that “target domains are abstract and diffuse” (2010: 23). They are understood in terms of previously explained source domains. The common target domains are emotion, desire, morality, thought, society/nation, politics, economy, human relationships, communication, time, life and death, religion, events and actions.

For example, “politics is conceptualized as exercise of power or physical force such as seen in games and sport, business, and war” (Kövecses, 2010: 24):

The president *plays hardball*.

In this case, politics is understood in terms of sport. Another example is time, which is a highly abstract concept to understand and therefore people tend to conceive it as a moving object:

Time *flies*.

2.4. Kinds of metaphor

There is a great variety of metaphors which can be classified in a number of ways. Kövecses (2010) sorts metaphors according to their conventionality, function, nature and level of generality. The conventionality of metaphor shows “how well worn or how deeply entrenched a metaphor is in everyday use by ordinary people for everyday purposes” (Kövecses,

2010:34). Kövecses (2010) agrees with Lakoff & Johnson (1980:14), that there are three fundamental types of conceptual metaphors: structural, orientational, and ontological metaphors.

2.4.1. *Structural metaphors*

„In structural metaphors, the source domain provides a rich knowledge structure for the target concept, so it enables speakers to understand target A by means of the structure of source B” (Kövecses, 2002:33).

An example of a structural metaphor is TIME IS MOTION metaphor, where the concept of time is structured in terms motion in space. We understand time in terms of physical objects, their locations, and their motion.

The TIME IS MOTION metaphor exists in the form of two special cases in English: TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT and TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER’S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE. For example:

TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT

The time will *come* when...

The time has long since *gone* when...

The time for action has *arrived*.

In the weeks *following* next Tuesday...

On the *preceding* day...

I’m looking *ahead* to Christmas.

Thanksgiving is *coming up* on us.

Time is *flying by*.

TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER’S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE

There’s going to be trouble *along the road*.

His stay in Russia *extended* over many years.

He *passed* the time happily.

We’re *coming up* on Christmas.

We’re *getting close* to Christmas.

In the first version of the TIME IS MOTION metaphor, the observer is fixed and times are objects moving with respect to the observer. Times are oriented with their fronts in their direction of motion. In the second version of the TIME IS MOTION metaphor, times are fixed locations and the observer is moving with respect to time.

2.4.2. *Ontological metaphors*

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) state that once we identify our experiences as substances we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, quantify them, and reason about them. “Our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:25).

Kövecses (2010) gives an interesting example “My mind is *rusty* this morning” (2010: 39), where we can conceptualize the mind as an object for which we can provide more structure by the “machine” metaphor.

Two important ontological metaphors are personification and the CONTAINER metaphor. Personification means that “the physical object is further specified as being a person” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 33). Lakoff and Johnson gave the following personification examples:

Inflation *has attacked* the foundation of our economy.

Inflation has *pinned us to the wall*.

Our biggest *enemy* right now *is* inflation.

Inflation *has robbed* me of my savings.

Inflation *has given birth* to a money-minded generation.

As seen from the examples above, people give human characteristics, also motivations and different activities, to abstract concepts. Lakoff & Johnson (1980:34) state that ontological metaphors “allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms - terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.”

Lakoff & Johnson (1980:29) argue that “each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical

objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside.” Lakoff (1980:24) gives some examples:

INFLATION IS AN ENTITY

Inflation is lowering our standard of living.

If there's much *more inflation*, we'll never survive.

We need to *combat inflation*.

Inflation is hacking us into a corner.

Inflation is taking its toll at the checkout counter and the gas pump.

Buying land is the best way of *dealing with inflation*. *Inflation makes me sick*.

“These extensions of ontological metaphors allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:34).

2.4.3. *Orientational metaphors*

Orientational metaphors use spatial orientation such as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral. “These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14).

“The UP orientation is connected with upright physical posture and a positive emotional state, while DOWN orientation is connected with drooping posture, sadness and depression“ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 16). The following examples are taken from Kövecses (2010:40):

I'm feeling *up* today. (HAPPY IS UP)

He's really *low* these days. (SAD IS DOWN)

2.5. Cultural variation in metaphors

Some conceptual metaphors are universal and occur in many languages and cultures, but some vary in different cultures. Some conceptual metaphors may be universal because the bodily experiences on which they are based are universal, but some may also vary.

Kövecses (2010: 215) distinguishes between two kinds of cultural variation:

1. cross-cultural (intercultural) variation
and
2. within-culture (intracultural) variation

Languages come in varieties reflecting differences in human experience. Metaphors vary because our experiences as human beings also vary. When we use metaphors, we are (mostly unconsciously) aware of the context around us, that includes the physical environment, social context, and the communicative situation.

Cross-culturally, metaphors vary because people can use alternative conceptualization for the same target domain. Metaphors vary not only cross-culturally but also within cultures. Within-culture variation occurs as a result of such subdimensions as the social dimension, regional dimension, subcultural dimension, individual dimension, and others.

Kövecses (2002: 186) claims that there are two large categories of causes that bring about cultural variation in metaphor. One is the *broader cultural context* (governing principles and the key concepts in a given culture) and the other is the *natural and physical environment* in which a culture is located.

Since this paper is concerned with realizations of figurative meanings of the lexeme *face*, I will compare them with their Croatian equivalents, so I will also discuss cross-cultural (intercultural) variation.

2.6. The relationship between metaphor, body and culture

The human body does not function in isolation, but in a variety of contexts. In addition to the body, the metaphors we produce are influenced by the environment. The social–cultural context provides individuals with experiences that are specific to them.

“Culture, by interpreting bodily experience, affects the formation of conceptual metaphors; body, by grounding metaphorical mappings, affects cultural understanding; and metaphor, by structuring cultural models, affects the understanding of bodily experience” (Yu, 2008: 389):




Figure 2 The “circular triangle” relationship between metaphor, body and culture (Yu, 2008)

As shown in figure 2, metaphor, body and culture form a “circular triangle relationship”. According to Yu (2008:405), this triangle-shaped diagram is interpreted as follows:




Figure 3 Triangle model for relationship between language, culture, body and cognition (Yu, 2008)

A stands for the bodily basis, which consists of our basic knowledge about the structure and function of our body. Line BC represents the level of language, with the distance between B and C representing the difference between two languages. Line DE represents the level of culture (including social and physical environment), with the distance between D and E representing the difference between two cultures. The distance between D and E is a variable, depending on how different or similar the two cultures are. The cultural distance between D and E affects the corresponding linguistic distance between B and C. No matter how far apart D and E may be, they always come down, respectively through B and C, and meet at A. Both cultures and languages have a basis in the human body. Line AF has a double function. First, it sets the boundary between the two languages and cultures. Second, it represents the commonality between these two languages and cultures, arising from the

common structure and function of human body. This means that however different two languages and cultures may be, they should always have a shared dimension that extends from point A to point F. It is impossible for them to be separated because they are all tied together by the humanness that exists in the common human body. Outlined above is the relationship between language, culture and body while cognition is the totality of the relationships between all the points and all the lines in this figure. Language and cognition are at the same time embodied and socioculturally situated.

2.7. Metonymy

‘‘It is believed that most of the basic insights into the tropes of metonymy started from Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, who subsumed metonymy and synecdoche under metaphor’’ (Panther and Radden, 1999:1). For him, metonymy is one category of metaphor.

In cognitive linguistics, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson first started with the study of metonymy in their work *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). They claim that metonymy, like metaphor, is not only a linguistic form as it was believed in traditional rhetoric research, but also a powerful cognitive tool for people’s conceptualization of the world: ‘‘Metonymy allows us to conceptualize one thing by means of its relation to something else; metonymic concepts structure not just our language but our thoughts, attitudes, and actions; Metonymic concepts (like THE PART FOR THE WHOLE) are part of the ordinary, everyday way we think and act as well as talk’’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 37).

Langacker explains metonymy as ‘‘a process [that] consists in mentally accessing one conceptual entity via another entity’’ (1993: 30), whereas Blank explains metonymy as ‘‘a linguistic device based on salient conceptual relations within a frame network’’ (1999: 174).

Radden and Kövecses define metonymy as ‘‘a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model’’ (1999:21).

Most cognitive linguists agree that metonymic process consists in mentally accessing one conceptual entity via another entity.

Kövecses (2002:143) gives the following examples of metonymy²:

² The examples were originally given by Lakoff and Johnson.

- (1) I'm reading *Shakespeare*.
- (2) America doesn't want another *Pearl Harbor*.
- (3) *Washington* is negotiating with *Moscow*.
- (4) *Nixon* bombed Hanoi.
- (5) We need a better *glove* at third base.

In the sentences above, the words in italics do not refer to the “things” they would normally refer to, such as:

- (1a) Shakespeare was a literary genius.
- (2a) We traveled to Pearl Harbor last year.
- (3a) Washington is the capital of the United States.
- (4a) Nixon is a former American president.
- (5a) This glove is too tight for me.

The paraphrases of the sentences are:

- (1b) I'm reading *one of Shakespeare's works*.
- (2b) America doesn't want another *major defeat in war*.
- (3b) *The American government* is negotiating with *the Russian government*.
- (4b) *American bombers* bombed Hanoi.
- (5b) We need a better *baseball player* at third base.

In these examples, the author used *Shakespeare*, *Pearl Harbor*, *Washington*, and *glove* to provide mental access to *one of Shakespeare's works*, *defeat in war*, *the American government* and *baseball player*. That confirms the view of other cognitive linguists: “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain” (Kövecses, 2002: 145).

Similar to metaphor, most metonymies come in groups that are characterized by a particular relationship between one kind of entity and another kind of entity. The metonymic linguistic expressions for the examples above are:

THE PRODUCER FOR THE PRODUCT (the author for the work)

I'm reading *Shakespeare*.

She loves *Picasso*.

Does he own any *Hemingway*?

THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT

America doesn't want another *Pearl Harbor*.

Let's not let *El Salvador* become another *Vietnam*.

Watergate changed our politics.

THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION

Washington is negotiating with *Moscow*.

The *White House* isn't saying anything.

Wall Street is in a panic.

Hollywood is putting out terrible movies.

THE CONTROLLER FOR THE CONTROLLED

Nixon bombed Hanoi.

Ozawa gave a terrible concert last night.

an object used for the user

We need a better *glove* at third base.

The *sax* has the flu today.

One kind of entity, such as the one referred to by the word *Shakespeare*, the author or producer, stands for another kind of entity, such as the one referred to by the expression *one of Shakespeare's works*, the work or product.

According to Kövecses (2002:145), metonymies, similar to metaphor, are conceptual in nature, and the conceptual metonymies are revealed by metonymic linguistic expressions. There are many other conceptual metonymies besides the ones above; for example, PART FOR WHOLE ("We need some good *heads* on the project"); WHOLE FOR THE PART ("*America* is a powerful country"); INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION ("She *shampooed* her hair"); EFFECT FOR CAUSE ("It's a *slow* road"); PLACE FOR ACTION ("America doesn't want another *Pearl Harbor*");

DESTINATION FOR MOTION (“He *porched* the newspaper”); PLACE FOR PRODUCT (“Give me my *mocca*”); TIME FOR ACTION (“The 8:40 just arrived”) etc.

In the metonymy PART FOR WHOLE, where just one part stands for the whole, the domain of people includes the subdomain of the face, which is mapped onto the whole matrix domain of people. In other words, we have a PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymy in which the face is mapped onto the person. For example, in the sentence *She is just a pretty face*, *face* stands for the person.

The entity that provides mental access to another entity is the *vehicle entity*, and the entity to which mental access is provided is the *target entity*. *Shakespeare*, *Washington*, *glove* and *face* from the examples above would be vehicle entities, whereas *one of Shakespeare’s works*, *the capital of the United States*, *a baseball player* and *a person* would be target entities.³

It is a basic feature of metonymically related vehicle and target entities that they are “close” to each other in conceptual space. Thus, the producer is conceptually “close” to the product (because he is the one who makes it), the place of an institution is conceptually “close” to the institution itself (because most institutions are located in particular physical places), gloves are conceptually “close” to baseball players (because some baseball players wear gloves), and so on (Kövecses, 2002: 145).

In the traditional view of metonymy, the two entities are in each other’s proximity. In the cognitive linguistic view, this claim is accepted, but cognitive linguists also suggest that a vehicle entity can provide mental access to a target entity when the two entities belong to the same domain, or as Lakoff puts it, the same idealized cognitive model (ICM). For example, an author and his works belong to the production ICM, which includes the producer (author), the product (the work), the place where the product is made etc.

“All of these form a coherent whole in our experience of the world as they co-occur repeatedly. Because they are tightly linked in experience, some of the entities can be used to indicate, that is, to provide mental access to, other entities within the same ICM” (Kövecses, 2002:145). From this, the definition of metonymy follows:

“Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or idealized cognitive model (ICM)” (Kövecses, 2002: 145).

³ This is not to be confused with “target domain” as used in connection with metaphor.

2.8. *The contiguity of metonymy*

“Contiguity” (i.e. nearness or neighborhood) is the key term in the understanding of the definition of metonymy, to which both traditional rhetorician and cognitive linguists agree. Traditional approaches locate contiguity relationship in the world of reality, whereas cognitive approaches locate them at the conceptual level.

Lakoff (1987) accounts for metonymic contiguity within the framework of idealized cognitive models (ICMs); Croft (1993) deals with contiguity relations in terms of encyclopedic knowledge representation within a domain or domain matrix; Blank (1999) and Panther and Thornburg (1999) describe the network of conceptual contiguity by using the notion of frame and scenario respectively.

According to Guan (2009), the ICMs are the static or dynamic mental representations of typical situations in life and their typical elements. Concepts within ICMs are related by “conceptual contiguity”. “An ICM concept is meant to include not only people’s encyclopedic knowledge of a particular domain but also the cultural model they are part of” (Radden and Kovecses, 1999: 20).

The content of an ICM depends on people’s everyday experience, their world knowledge: beings, things, processes, and actions that generally or ideally occur together are represented in the mind as ICMs. For example, people have *Possession* ICM, *Production* ICM, *Control* ICM, etc. When a specific ICM is opened or accessed, all concepts that by convention belong to this ICM are simultaneously activated. For example:

- (1) A: How did you get to the railway station?
B: I waved down a taxi.

Speaker B means to inform listener A that “ I got to the railway station by hailing a taxi, having it stop and getting into it, and then the driver drove me to the railway station and parked there, then I got out and arrived at the railway station”. The whole process is so complex that it is hard for the speaker to express it in just a few words. Traveling from one place to another can be regarded as a whole event or a *Travel* ICM. This *Travel* ICM contains a series of actions where people find some vehicle to take them to the desired location, get into the vehicle, ride in it to the destination, arrive and get out. This ICM includes the following (Lakoff, 1987: 78):

Precondition: You have (or have access to) the vehicle.

Embarkation: You get into the vehicle and start it up.

Center: You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.

Finish: You park and get out.

End point: You are at your destination.

In everyday life, people use only one part of an ICM, like the Precondition, Embarkation or Center, to evoke the entire series of events that make up the particular ICM, in this case Travel ICM. ICM, therefore, serves as a background for understanding of metonymy and it plays an important role in the human communication with the world.

2.9. Metonymy and meaning

Metonymy is one of the basic ways of cognition. It is common for people to take one well-understood aspect of something and use it to stand for the thing as a whole. A word referring to one aspect of something may have an extended meaning or may change its lexical class to stand for the whole event, thus metonymy causes meaning extension and lexical conversion.

2.9.1. Means of meaning extension

Metonymy plays an important role in meaning extension, what can be shown on examples with body parts. All people have bodies and different body parts can be used to refer to the actions, functions that are related to the body parts or the whole person. The underlying cognitive principle is CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT. The basic human experience relates to concrete physical objects, like body parts. People access various abstract human domains by referring to their body. For example (Guan, 2009: 181):

- (1) Her lovely voice caught my *ear*. (ear refers to the abstract function of being attentive)
- (2) She is a woman who has a *ready/silver tongue*. (people's way of speaking that charms or persuades people)
- (3) There are a lot of *good heads* in the university. (intelligent people)

- (4) We need a couple of *strong bodies* for our team. (strong people)
- (5) We need some new *blood* in the organization. (people with animating force)
- (6) They are taking on new *hands* down at the factory. (people who perform manual labor)
- (7) He's got five *mouths* to feed. (people viewed as consumers of food)
- (8) He has a good *ear* for music. (people's ability of appreciating music)

In these examples, different body parts are used to refer to human beings. People associate one abstract entity with concrete characteristics of it. In the case of the metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE, there are many parts that can stand for the whole, like *face*.

Which part the speaker picks out determines which aspect of the whole the speaker is focusing on. The underlying reason why different body parts are picked out is grounded in people's mental and physical experience with the world: different parts function differently. (Guan, 2009: 182)

The examples above are not just using a body part to stand for a whole person, but to select a relevant characteristic of the person to stress a specific function, for example *the hearing ability of a person, the intelligence, the laboring ability* etc.

2.9.2. Means of lexical conversion

'A conversion is a special case of derivational morphology: instead of adding an affix to a stem, the stem takes a zero form'' (Guan, 2009: 182). For example, the noun can become the verb, as in *face*. An interesting example is a soccer game, where players handle the ball with foot, head, chest, back and so on. When a player sends the ball into the goal, *head* can stand for the whole event, therefore we can describe the event as "The player *headed* the ball into the goal". Here *head* is converted from a noun to a verb to refer to the whole action with the body parts by an INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymy. In a cognitive linguistic view, such verbs are made by a process that implies a metonymic extension. Other examples (Guan, 2009: 182) are:

- (1) The librarian *shelved* the books. (put books on the shelves)
- (2) The maid *dusted* the table. (remove the dust)

(3) Semis *roared* past me, taking the curves at fifty. (move with a loud sound)

(4) She *grumbled* all the way up the stairs. (complain in a bad-tempered way)

“These metonymies are instances of the ACTION ICM. The particular significance of this is that the ACTION ICM and the metonymic relationships occurred in this ICM can account for literally thousands of noun-to-verb conversions” (Guan, 2009: 182).

2. 10. *Metaphor versus metonymy*

Metonymy is not just a matter of language, but a matter of thought as well. In that way it is similar to metaphor, but they also differ.

2.10.1. *Similarity versus contiguity*

The two concepts participating in metaphor stand typically in the relationship of similarity. Metaphor involves two concepts that are “distant” from each other in our conceptual system (although they are similar). The “distance” largely arises from the fact that one concept or domain is typically an abstract one, while the other is typically a concrete one. There are many sources for similarity: it may emerge from real similarity, but also from correlations in experience. Metonymy is based on the relationship of contiguity, as explained in the previous section. In metonymy we have two elements, or entities, that are contiguous in conceptual space. For example, a whole is closely related to its parts (whole for the part).

Ray Gibbs suggests a good test to determine whether we have a metaphor or a metonymy - the “is like” test. For example:

(1) The *creampuff* was knocked out in the first round of the fight. (metaphor)

(2) We need a new *glove* to play third base. (metonymy)

If we try to paraphrase the sentences by using “is like,” the comparison is meaningful only for metaphor:

- (1a) The boxer is like a creampuff. (metaphor)
(2a) *The third baseman is like a glove. (metonymy)⁴

This test has to be adjusted according to the grammatical category of the words and expressions. If the metaphor is not a noun, we have to make adjustment in order for the test to be applicable. For example:

- (1) “He is *on cloud nine*.”

In this sentence we have to change the sentence to be able to apply the test:

- (1a) *“He is like *on cloud nine*.”
(1b) “He feels as if he was *on cloud nine*.”

2.10.2. *Two domains versus one domain*

As already said, metaphor involves two concepts that are “distant” from each other in our conceptual system. For example, the concept of idea is distant from that of food (IDEAS ARE FOOD); the concept of love from that of a journey (LOVE IS A JOURNEY) and so on. In metonymy, as previously mentioned, we have two entities, that are closely related to each other in conceptual space. For example, the producer is closely related to the product made (PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT); a whole is closely related to its parts (WHOLE FOR THE PART), the place is closely related to the institution that is located in that place (PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION); and an instrument is closely related to the action in which it is used (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION) and so on.

In all these cases, we have a single domain or ICM (such as production, a whole entity, causation, control, institution, action) that involves several elements and the elements can stand metonymically for each other. The elements in a metonymic relationship form a single domain. By contrast, metaphor uses two distinct and distant domains or ICMs. (Kövecses, 2002: 147)

⁴ The * marks the sentence as unacceptable.

2.10.3. Understanding versus directing attention

The main function of metaphor is to understand one thing in terms of another:




Figure 4 Metaphorical relationship (Kövecses, 2002: 147)

Understanding is achieved by mapping the structure of one domain onto another. There is a set of systematic mappings between elements of the source and the target. [...] The main function of metonymy seems to be to provide *mental, cognitive access* to a target entity that is less readily or easily available; typically, a more concrete or salient vehicle entity is used to give or gain access to a more abstract or less salient target entity within the same domain. We can think of this process of affording access to a target as a kind of mapping. (Kövecses, 2002: 147).

In metonymy, on the other hand, there is a single mapping — a mapping that takes the listener from one entity (the vehicle entity) to another (the target entity):




Figure 5 Metonymic relationship (Kövecses, 2002: 148)

2.10.4. *Metonymic relationships and metaphor*

Many conceptual metaphors derive from conceptual metonymies. For example, in the metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, anger can be said to result in increased body heat. The kind of metonymy that applies to this example is EFFECT FOR CAUSE (BODY HEAT FOR ANGER). The metonymic vehicle (body heat) becomes the source domain of metaphor. The two general metonymic relationships among the metaphors are: cause and effect and whole and part.

Jonathan Charteris-Black (2003) examined how three concepts—MOUTH, TONGUE, and LIP—are used in English and Malay. He found similarities in metaphorical conceptualization, but he also found that the figurative expressions involving the three concepts were metonymic in English and metaphoric in Malay. In the later analysis, I will examine if that is the case with Croatian and English language concerning figurative meanings of the lexeme *face*.

3. Methodology

In the following part of the paper I will analyze the figurative meanings of the lexeme *face*. The examples were found on the Internet, in various books and articles in English. The Croatian equivalents of these examples were provided by the author of this paper and Croatian examples are taken from various dictionaries.

The overall number of examples used is 40 with their 35 Croatian counterparts, along with 34 Croatian examples and their 34 translations in English, which provides an adequate sample for the analysis. All the examples were selected manually and then divided into different categories, according to their meanings.

In the next step, examples from each category were analysed. The goal was not to simply translate examples found in the English corpus into Croatian, but to comment on their structure, usage, similarities or differences of metaphors and metonymies employed in the two corpora. The study provides an insight into similarities and differences between the meanings of *face* in both languages.

My aim will also be to determine whether there is a prevalence of a certain type of semantic extension in the two languages, i.e. whether we could say that metonymic extension is prevalent in one and metaphoric in the other language.

4. Analysis

As one of the defining characteristics of human beings, our faces are one of our most important body parts with which we deal with the external world. According to Barcelona (2000:8), the main problem of the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy is the question of the cognitive domain. Most cognitive linguists, like Langacker (1987:154-158) and Taylor (1995:83-87), describe it as an ‘encyclopedic’ domain, which includes all the knowledge a speaker has of some part of the experience. It differs from person to person, so it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the given mapping is metonymic or metaphorical, and there is often interaction of metaphor and metonymy. ‘Metaphor is a mapping of a domain onto another domain, both being conventionally and consciously classified as separate domains, i.e. not included in the same superordinate domain’ (Barcelona, 2000:9). Firstly, I explained literal meaning of *face* and then I divided figurative meanings of the lexeme *face* into metonymies and metaphors, which include proper metaphors and metaphors based on metonymies.

4.1. *Literal meaning of face*

The word *face* comes from Old French, from Vulgar Latin *facia*, from Latin *faciēs*, related to *facere* (to make). Unlike its Croatian counterpart that can only be a noun, *face* can be a noun and a verb. For example:

We saw many new *faces* on the first day of classes. (*face* as a noun)

The window *faces* the south. (*face* as a verb)

The literal meaning of *face* is the following:

face [feɪs], *n*

1. the front of the head from the forehead to the lower jaw

The literal meaning of the lexeme *face* is shown in the following examples:

- (1) He washed his *face*.

(2) I wish I had seen the look on his *face* when he got the news.

(3) She has a beautiful *face*.

4.2. *Figurative meanings of face*

4.2.1. *Metonymy*

In the following examples, one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain. The underlying cognitive principle is CONCRETE OVER ABSTRACT. The basic human experience relates to concrete physical objects, like *face*. People access various abstract human domains by referring to their *face*.

4.2.1.1. *Face as a person*

In the following examples, one conceptual entity (*face*) provides mental access to another conceptual entity (*person*) within the same domain:

(1) We saw many new *faces* on the first day of classes.

(1a) Vidjeli smo puno novih *lica* na prvom danu nastave.

(2) When he returned to work he met many new *faces*.

(2a) Kad se vratio na posao upoznao je puno novih *lica*.

In metonymy we have two elements, or entities, that are contiguous in conceptual space. In these examples, *face* and *person* are contiguous in conceptual space. *Face* is used as a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. The part of the person (FACE) provides mental access to conceptual entity of a whole PERSON. In the Croatian language, there is also the figurative

meaning of *face* as *a person*. English and Croatian speakers have the same conceptual understanding of *face* in both languages. In examples from both languages, *face* can be replaced with *people*.

4.2.1.2. *Face as an expression*

Face provides mental access to conceptual entity of *an expression of emotion*:

(1) She has a happy *face*.

(1a) Ona izgleda sretno.

Here we have the same case as in *face as a person*. One concrete conceptual entity provides mental access to an abstract conceptual entity within the same domain. The figurative meaning of *face* is realized the same in English and Croatian. We could also leave *face* out and say:

(2) She is happy.

(2a) Ona je sretna.

4.2.1.3. *Face as a grimace*

Face is used in this sense to show a distorted expression, especially to indicate disgust etc.:

(1) She made a *face*.

(1a) Napravila je grimasu.

The target is the same in both languages, but we would rather translate it into Croatian with a grimace, than with a face. We could also say:

(1b) Napravila je *facu*.

This sentence is informal. *Faca* also means lice, but in slang. The abstract concept is the same in both languages.

4.2.1.4. *Face as an outward appearance*

Face denotes the appearance and geologic surface features of an area of land:

(1) The modern *face* of the city is changing.

(1a) Mijenja se moderno gradsko *lice*.

In this example, *face* is the vehicle that provides mental access to the target within the same domain. The basic human experience relates to concrete physical objects, like *face*, so people access abstract entities, like *an outward appearance*, by referring to their *face*. The conceptual understanding of this figurative meaning of the lexeme *face* is the same in English and Croatian. Speakers of both languages think of the outward appearance of the city as an outward appearance of a person, but they add a metaphorical layer, because the HUMAN FACE and the CITY represent two different domains, whereby one is understood in terms of another.

4.2.2. *Metaphors*

In the following examples, one conceptual domain provides mental access to another conceptual domain. Metaphor involves two concepts that are “distant” from each other in our conceptual system. The “distance” largely arises from the fact that one concept or domain is typically an abstract one, while the other is typically a concrete one. Speakers understand target A by means of the structure of source B. Cross-culturally, metaphors vary because people can use alternative conceptualization for the same target domain.

4.2.2.1. *Metaphors based on metonymy*

Many conceptual metaphors derive from conceptual metonymies. The metonymic vehicle becomes the source domain of the metaphor.

4.2.2.1.1. *Face as make-up*

Face is used as facial cosmetic:

(1) She put her *face* on.⁵

(1a) Našminkala se.

This example is informal and it could also be translated by an informal phrase into Croatian:

(1b) Stavila je *žbuku*.

⁵ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/face>

Face and *make-up* can be seen as entities from the same domain, what serves as a source domain for this metaphor. Here is the source domain the same, but English and Croatian speakers use alternative conceptualization for the same target domain. In Croatian, *face* is conceptualized as a building where it has to be built, like a house. It is the process in building a house between the beginning and the end. Croatian speakers think of putting make up on as building one's *face*. This metaphor has a negative connotation in both languages, as it means to have too much make-up on one's face.

4.2.2.1.2. *Face as the front*

Face means the surface presented to view; the front; the main side of an object, for example, of a building:

(1) He saw the *face* of the palace.

(1a) Ugledao je *lice* palače.

This conceptual metaphor is also derived from conceptual metonymy, as the front is the part of the building, that is, the *face* is the front part of the *palace*. These two concepts come from the same domain. This metonymy becomes the source domain of the metaphor. This source domain provides mental access to the target domain (*the front of the palace*). The same figurative meaning of *face* is present in both Croatian and English language.

4.2.2.1.3. *Face as a surface*

Face as a surface is a very productive domain. *Face* has the following figurative meanings:

1. outer surface, the uppermost part or surface:

(1) The hotel vanished in a second from the *face* of the Earth.

(1a) Hotel je u sekundi nestao s *lica* zemlje.

2. the right side, as of fabric:

(1) the *face* of shirt

(1a) *lice* majice

3. an exposed, often precipitous surface of rock:

(1) He was hanging on to the cliff *face* by his nails.

(1a) Držao se noktima za *lice* stijene.

4. the surface of a coin, especially the one that bears the head of a ruler:

(1) The same letters were inscribed on the *face* of the coin.

(1a) Ista slova su bila upisana na *licu* kovanice.

As already seen in the previous examples, all these conceptual metaphors derive from conceptual metonymies because the metonymies become the source domains of the metaphors. The metaphors in English and Croatian are based on metonymic relationships between the entities from the same domain.

4.2.2.1.4. *Face as the functional side*

Another figurative meanings of *face* are:

1. the functional or working side of an object as of a tool or playing card:

(1) Turn (a playing card) so that the *face* is up.

(1a) Okreni kartu *licem* prema gore.

2. to expose (a card) with the face uppermost:

(1) He dealt the cards *face* down.

(1a) Podijelio je karte *licem* prema dolje.

In these examples, the source domain is a metonymy, as the (functional) side of an object is a part of an object, in this case a *face* of a card is a part of the card. This concept is the source domain in this metaphor based on metonymy and in this case *face* provides mental access to the target domain. These two concepts are “distant” from each other in our conceptual system because *face* is a concrete concept and the *functional side* a less tangible one. Speakers of both languages understand the target domain by means of the structure of the source domain.

4.2.2.1.5. *Face as the exposed area of a mine*

Face has also the figurative meaning of the exposed area of a mine from which coal may be mined:

(1) Managers have no idea how hard it is to work at the coal *face*.

(1a) Direktori nemaju pojma koliko je teško raditi na *ulazu* u rudnik.

This metaphor is also based on metonymy. *Face* in the Croatian language does not have this figurative meaning.

4.2.2.1.6. *Face as the part of an animal*

Face of the animal corresponds to the human face:

(1) She had the *face* of a cat.

(1a) Imala je *lice* mačke.

Face of an animal and *face* of a person can be seen as entities from different domains, what makes metaphor possible. The target domain is understood by the source domain. One can say that someone has a *face* of some animal, if one wants to attribute characteristics of that animal to that person.

4.2.2.2. *Metaphor proper*

The following examples are proper metaphors because one conceptual domain provides mental access to another conceptual domain. One domain is concrete and the other an abstract one. Speakers understand the target domain by means of the structure of the source domain. Metaphors can vary in English and Croatian because speakers of these languages can use alternative conceptualization for the same target domain.

4.2.2.2.1. *Face as pretence*

In this metaphor, *face* is seen as an appearance or pretence. Some of the examples are:

(1) Put a bold *face* on.

One conceptual domain provides mental access to another conceptual domain. One domain is concrete (*face*) and the other is abstract (*pretence*). Speakers of English understand the target domain by means of the structure of the source domain. I would not translate it with *face* into Croatian, but as:

(1a) Budi hrabra.

Face does not have this figurative meaning in Croatian i.e. Croatian resorts to a more literal counterpart.

4.2.2.2.2. *Face as dignity*

Face is conceptualized as dignity or how much the person is worth in the eyes of others:

(1) He saved his *face*.

(1a) Spasio je *obraz*.

This metaphor varies in English and Croatian. In Croatian, another part of the face used to express what is expressed by *face* in English. People in Croatia use cheek to say how much dignity a person has. *Face* can here be replaced by an adjective face-saving.

4.2.2.2.3. *Face as impudence*

It is informal and here *face* denotes impudence or effrontery:

(1) He had the *face* to question my judgment.

(1a) Imao je *obraz* propitivati moju odluku.

As previously mentioned, Croatian people often use a part of face to denote *face*. In this example, cheek in Croatian is used to express what is expressed by *face* in English. Cheek can also be used in English in this sense, which makes Croatian more limited.

4.2.2.2.4. *Face as the opposite*

Face can also be a verb and have various figurative meanings. The figurative meaning of the *face as the opposite* is to look or be situated or placed (in a specified direction). When it is intransitive, it is often followed by to, towards, or on. An example is:

(1) My house *faces* the park.

(1a) Moja kuća je okrenuta *licem* prema parku.

In this metaphor, English speakers understand the target domain with the help of the source domain. They conceptualize the abstract *face as the opposite* by means of *face* as a concrete domain. As *face* is only a noun in Croatian, we cannot use it as a verb in English, but it is used as “verb + face” in Croatian, and it has the same meaning as *face* in English. In Croatian, it would be enough to say:

(1b) Moja kuća je okrenuta prema parku.

or

(1c) Moja kuća gleda na park/prema parku.

In the last example, the word *face* is substituted with the word *gledati*. It means *to see*, which is connected with the eyes. We can conclude that in the Croatian language perception is connected to the eyes and seeing.

4.2.2.2.5. *Face as occupying a position*

Another figurative meaning of *face* is to occupy a position with the face toward:

(1) He stood and *faced* the audience.

(1a) Stajao je *licem* okrenutim publici.

(2) A window *faces* the south.

(2a) Prozor gleda na jug.

Face is a concrete domain and *face as occupying a position* an abstract one. Speakers of English understand the target domain by the source domain. As previously mentioned, *face* cannot be a verb in Croatian. Although Croatian has the meaning of *face* as the front side of something, other directions cannot be translated as *lice* into Croatian.

4.2.2.2.6. *Face as confrontation*

Along with the figurative meaning of *face as a surface*, the domain of *face* as ‘to confront someone with something’ is also very productive. *Face* means:

1. to confront something with complete awareness:

(1) He had to *face* the facts.

(1a) Morao se *suočiti* s činjenicama.

2. to meet or be confronted by something in his work:

(1) He *faces* many problems.

(1a) *Suočava* se s mnogim problemima.

(2) He *faced* the terrible consequences of his mistakes.

(2a) *Suočio* se s teškim posljedicama svojih grešaka.

3. to overcome something by confronting it boldly or bravely:

(1) What this generation must do is *face* its problems.

(1a) Što ova generacija mora učiniti je *suočiti* se s problemima.

In all these metaphors, concrete conceptual domain of *face* provides mental access to an abstract conceptual domain of *confrontation*. Speakers understand the target domain with the help of the source domain. *Face* in English is substituted with *eyes* in Croatian. A part of the face is used instead of the whole face.

4.2.2.2.7. *Face as an order*

Face is also used in military to order (a formation) to turn in a certain direction or (of a formation) to turn as required:

(1) Right *face*!

(1a) Na desno!

The target domain of *face as an order* is understood in this metaphor with the help of the concrete source domain. Speakers visualize the moving of soldiers after being given an order. In Croatian, *face* cannot mean ‘cause troops to change direction by giving a command’.

4.2.2.2.8. *Face as encountering*

In the following examples, the conceptual domain of *face* provides mental access to conceptual domain of *encountering*. *Face* means:

1. to be certain to encounter; have in store:

(1) An unskilled youth *faces* a difficult life.

(1a) Nevješta mladež se *suočava* s teškim životom.

2. to bring or to be brought *face to face* with:

(1) The prospect of military conflict *faced* us with nightmarish choices.

(1a) Mogućnost vojnog sukoba *suočila* nas je s teškim odlukama.

As *face* cannot be a verb in Croatian, the verb *suočiti se* is used in these metaphors.

4.2.2.2.9. *Face as furnishing*

Figurative meaning of *face* is also *to furnish with a surface* or *cover of a different material*:

(1) Bronze that is *faced* with gold foil.

(1a) Bronca koja je *optočena* zlatom.

The conceptual domain of *face* provides mental access to conceptual domain of *furnishing*. Speakers understand the target domain by means of the structure of the source domain. Speakers of Croatian and English use completely different domains. In English, *face* can be used to describe furnishing a surface of something, but in Croatian not, although in Croatian *face* can be used to understand surface of something.

4.2.2.2.10. *Face as lining*

The last figurative meaning of *face* is *to line or trim the edge of*, especially with contrasting material:

(1) You should *face* a hem with lace.

(1a) Trebao/la bi to *obrubiti* čipkom.

The conceptual domain of *face* provides mental access to conceptual domain of *lining*. *Face* does not have this figurative meaning in Croatian.

4.2.3. *Face as a phrasal verb*

Face can also be a phrasal verb, for example:

face down - to attain mastery over or overcome by confronting in a resolute, determined manner:

(1) He *faced* the enemy *down*.

Face can be translated as *suočiti se*, where it is evident that the speakers of Croatian language use domain of eyes, instead of the whole face.

4.2.4. *Face as an idiom*

Face can also be an idiom. Some of the examples are:

on the face of it - from appearances alone:

(1) *On the face of it*, the problem seems minor.

(1a) *Na prvi pogled*, problem se čini beznačajan.

show (one's) face - to make an appearance:

(1) Don't *show your face* on my property again.

(1a) Ne želim više *vidjeti tvoje lice* na mom posjedu.

to (one's) face - in the view or hearing of:

(1) He insulted me *to my face*.

(1a) Vrijedaó *me u lice*.

In the first example, we can translate the English idiom with the eyes domain. It is the look in this case that represents the conceptualization of the Croatian speakers.

4.3. *Face in Croatian*

As seen from above, *face* in English and Croatian have much in common, but there are also differences. In Croatian *lice* (Eng. face) is only a noun. It has less meanings than in English. *Face* in the Croatian language can be a metonymy and a metaphor based on metonymy, but not a proper metaphor, as in English.

4.3.1. *Metonymy*

4.3.1.1. *Lice as a person*

(1) Tamo je bilo puno novih *lica*.

(1a) There was a lot of new *faces*.

4.3.1.2. *Lice as a complexion*

(1) Ona ima lijepu kožu *lica*.

(1a) She has a beautiful *complexion*.

4.3.1.3. *Lice as an expression*

(1) Ima tužno *lice*.

(1a) She has a sad *face*.

4.3.2. *Metaphor based on metonymy*

4.3.2.1. *Lice as a front*

(1) Vidio je *lice* zgrade.

(1a) He saw the *face* of the building.

4.3.2.2. *Lice as a surface*

(1) Hotel je u sekundi nestao s *lica* zemlje.

(1a) The hotel vanished in a second from the *face* of the Earth.

4.3.2.3. *Lice as the part of an animal*

(1) Sarah Jessica Parker ima konjsko *lice*.

(1a) Sarah Jessica Parker has a horseface.

4.3.3. *Lice according to cases*

There are also some phrases and expressions in the Croatian language we categorize here according to cases:

1. *lice* (first person singular)

(1) *Lice* joj se oteglo.

(1a) Her *face* fell.

(2) *Lice* joj je zablistalo.

(2a) Her *face* brightened.

(3) Ona ima bucmasto *lice*.

(3a) She has a chubby *face*.

(4) Pokazala je svoje pravo *lice*.

(4a) She showed her true *face*.

2. *lica* (gen. sg.)

(1) Ugledao je dječaka crvenog *lica*.

(1a) He saw a red-*faced* boy.

(2) Stajala je tamo ozbiljnog *lica*.

(2a) She stood there with a serious *face*.

(3) Nije mogao pročitati ništa s njenog bezizražajnog *lica*.

(3a) He could not read anything from her poker-*face*.

(3) On je čovjek s dva *lica*.

(4a) He is a double *faced* man.

(5) Nestao je s *lica* zemlje

(5a) He banished from the *face* of the earth.

3. *lice* (acuss. sg.)

(1) Napravila je lijepo *lice*.

(1a) She put the best *face* on a bad affair.

(2) Rekla mu je sve u *lice* (otvoreno).

(2a) She told him everything to his *face*.

(3) Bacila mu je uvredu u *lice*.

(3a) She hurled an insult into his *face*.

(4) Gledala ga je ravno u *lice*/oči.

(4a) She looked him straight in the the *face*.

(5) Pogledaj istini/činjenicama u *lice*/oči!

(5a) *Face* the truth/facts!

(6) Smijala mu se u *lice*.

(6a) She laughed in his *face*.

(7) (Na)krivio je *lice*.

(7a) He made/pulled a *face*.

4. licu (loc. sg.)

(1) Vidi ti se na *licu*.

(1a) It's all over your *face*.

(2) Na njoj se vidi da laže.

(2a) You can see it in her *face* (that) she is lying.

5. licem (inst. sg.)

(1) Našli su se *licem* u *lice*.

(1a) They met *face to face*.

(2) Zakleli su se pred *licem* čovječanstva.

(2a) They took a vow in the *face* of mankind.

6. lica (nom. pl.)

(1) Gledala su ga mrka *lica*.

(1a) Gloomy, long *faces* were looking at him.

I also found some expressions where *lice* is used in Croatian, but cannot be translated as *face* in English:

(1) Sve ima svoje *lice i naličje*.

(1a) There are *two sides to everything*.

(2) Don Quijote je vitez tužnog *lica*.

(2a) Don Quijote is the knight of doleful *countenance*.

(3) Priča je ispričana *u prvom licu*.

(3a) The story is told in a *first-person account*.

(4) *na licu mjesta*

(4a) *on the spot*

(5) Plesali su *licem uz lice*.

(5a) They danced *cheek to cheek*.

(6) *On je glavno lice* romana.

(6a) He is the main *character* of the novel.

There are also some expressions where there are alternative translations of *lice*. It can be translated as *face* into English, but also with some other word. For example:

(1) Zakleli su se pred pred *licem* čovječanstva.

(1a) They took a vow in the *face* of mankind.

(1b) They took a vow *before* mankind.

5. Conclusion

People use figurative meanings of the different lexemes in everyday life, without even realizing that they are not using the literal meaning of the lexeme. They use figurative meanings of the lexeme *face* on daily basis. Examples of these meanings can be found in speech, heard on television, in songs, read in books, articles, newspapers, on the Internet etc.

The first part of the paper gives theoretical framework needed for the later analysis. It includes the traditional view, but also the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. Source and target domain were explained, and the most common ones listed. Kinds of metaphor were explained, as well as metaphors within culture, similarities and variation of metaphor across cultures. Metonymy was explained and compared to metaphor. At the end of the first part of the paper, the relationship between metaphor, body and culture was explained.

The second part of the paper was analysis of figurative meanings of the lexeme *face*. The corpora were analysed from the view of cognitive linguistics and examples were categorised, translated into Croatian and explained. In the following table, some the most relevant senses associated with the body part of face are given (the table is adapted from Yu) and I analyzed if they exist in both Croatian and English:

Relevant senses associated with the body part of face	English	Croatian
	<i>face</i>	<i>lice</i>
1. front of head from forehead to chin	+	+
2. a look on the face as expressing emotion, character, etc.	+	+
3. front, upper, outer, or most important surface of something	+	+
4. outward appearance or aspect; apparent state or condition	+	+
5. composure; courage; confidence	+	+
6. dignity; prestige	+	+
7. have or turn the face or front towards or in a certain direction	+	+

8. meet confidently or defiantly; not shrink from; stand fronting	+	+
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Table 1 Senses associated with the body part of face in English and Croatian (adapted from Yu, 2008)

As we can see from above, the main senses associated with the body part of face are universal in both languages. *Face* can not be a verb in Croatian, but *lice* (combined with a verb in Croatian) has the senses shown in the examples 7 and 8.

Like Yu, I also compared expressions of face in English with their Croatian counterparts:

- (1) staro lice (old face) old face
- (2) pokazati lice (show-face) show one's face
- (3) u lice (to-face) to one's face
- (4) licem u lice (face-to-face) face to face
- (5) dvoličan (two-faced) two-faced

We can see from above that expressions in the Croatian language correspond to expressions in the English language. Like English and Chinese in Yu's study, the figurative meanings of *face* in English and its Croatian counterparts

reflect the metonymic and/or metaphoric understanding of the face as “highlight of appearance and look”, “indicator of emotion and character”, “focus of interaction and relationship”, and “locus of dignity and prestige”. The commonality observed here, it is argued, is rooted in some biological facts and functions of the face as part of our body: namely, the face is the most distinctive part, on the interactive side, the front, of a person, which displays emotion, suggests character and conveys intention. (Yu 2008: 390)

The metaphorical and metonymic conceptualizations of *face* in Croatian and English indicate similarity, but also some differences. In Croatian *lice* (Eng. *face*) has less meanings than in English. *Face* in the Croatian language can be a metonymy and a metaphor based on metonymy, but not a proper metaphor, as in English. I also found the same conceptual metaphors and metonymies with equivalent linguistic expressions in both languages, but also the same conceptual metaphors and metonymies with different linguistic expressions in Croatian and English what reveals the similarities, but also subtle cultural differences between the speakers of the two languages.

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7. Summary and key words

This paper attempts to determine and classify figurative meanings of the lexeme *face* in the English and Croatian corpora. The aim was to explore cultural variation between English and Croatian in realizations of figurative meanings of *face*. The total of examples provides a basis for some generalizations to be made regarding similarities and differences between the realizations of abstract concepts in English and Croatian. The author of the paper found the same conceptual metaphors and metonymies with equivalent linguistic expressions in both languages, but also the same conceptual metaphors and metonymies with different linguistic expressions in Croatian and English what reveals the similarities, but also subtle cultural differences between the speakers of the two languages.

Key-words: cognitive linguistics, figurative meanings, conceptual metaphor, source domain, target domain, metonymy, body, *face*, *lice*, *eyes*