

Conditionals in political texts

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Doctoral thesis / Disertacija

2014

Degree Grantor / Ustanova koja je dodijelila akademski / stručni stupanj: **Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences / Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku, Filozofski fakultet**

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Download date / Datum preuzimanja: **2025-03-11**



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JOSIP JURAJ STROSSMAYER UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Adnan Bujak

Conditionals in political texts

A corpus-based study

Doctoral dissertation

Advisor: Dr. Mario Brdar

Osijek, 2014

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ABSTRACT

Conditionals proved to be a very interesting topic for various researches throughout history. They were the cause of many discussions in a number of scientific areas and have not been completely demystified yet. Conditionals are studied by linguists, philosophers, logicians, information technology (IT) scientists, and many others. The present dissertation presents another effort to present the background information about conditionals from linguistic but also from the viewpoint of logic and philosophy, because these disciplines very frequently overlap.

The aim is also to present a different division of conditional construction from the various aspects as well as provide basic details about conditionals. Due to the very nature of this dissertation, political discourse was the base for research work and thus some attention, though not in detail, is paid to the political discourse. The research involved political press releases and public announcements from two different sources: the European Parliament and the White House. The reason for this was the desire to achieve diversity in sources and to notice any potential difference with respect to the use of conditionals across the two major regional varieties of English as far as political discourse is concerned. Furthermore, most attention was focused on the pragmatic conditional, and its subclass of discourse conditionals was the focus of the research due to its connections with the political discourse. Finally, this dissertation is an attempt to connect grammatical, philosophical, logical and political viewpoints of conditional constructions in the English language.

Key words: conditionals, cognitive linguistics, political discourse, conditional construction, corpus research

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List of abbreviations, symbols and font styles

~p	alternative p
~q	alternative q
AdjP	adjective phrase
AmE	American English
	Note: Samples were collected from transcripts of presidential speeches found at: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches , as part of freely accessible transcripts or recordings of speeches by all American presidents
AV	auxiliary verb
CEC	course-of-event conditional
CGEL	The Cambridge Grammar of the English language
CP	prepositional complement
EUEng	English language used in EU institutions
	Note: Conditionals used as examples from EU institutions were collected from European Parliament press releases received by e-mail. E-mails were received via mailing list compiled by Žumer Klemen from EP Press Service.
FC	factual conditional
HC	hypothetical conditional
Iff	if and only if
ModE	Modern English
NP	noun phrase
P	protasis (in philosophy and logic)
p	protasis (in linguistics)
PC	pragmatic conditional
PP	prepositional phrase
Q	apodosis (in philosophy and logic)
q	apodosis (in linguistics)
RC	relevance conditional
S	subject
V	verb
Font	Times New Roman 12 pt
<i>Italic</i>	all of the examples
Bold	titles and subtitles and significant parts of text or examples

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The subject matter

In current research, different authors have used different viewpoints to address the issue of conditionals. Some of the authors use a general viewpoint, not favouring any of the viewpoints in particular.

Nicolas Rescher, in his book *Conditionals* besides general research about conditionals from traditional and philosophical standpoint mostly focuses on counterfactual conditionals.

Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser are definitely two most influential authors dealing with conditionals from the cognitive perspective. Dancygier (1998) observes conditionals as an individual category while still preserving the cognitive perspective and trying to explain how multitude of various conditional forms enable the creation of multitude of different meanings expressed through conditional sentences.

Conditionals are the point of interest for Cheng (2002) as well, who performed pragmatic analysis of the conditional marker *if*.

Merivale (2008) performed a semantic classification of conditionals, while Schlenker (2004) approaches conditionals as definitive topics. Conditionals were also the topic at the International Summer Institute In Linguistics (1992) where conditionals and their information status i.e. their significance in information transfer and in discourse were discussed.

If as a prototypical indicator of conditionality in English attracted interest from many scientists from various disciplines. Thus, Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2002) studied *if* and conditional reasoning from the psychological perspective. They dealt with issues such as reasons for misunderstanding conditionals, their true meaning, why do we find them easier to recognize if we have *if* or *only if* etc.

Iffines is another term directly related to conditionals which Gillies (2010) tried to explain in his paper. The basic problem set in this paper is the ability of conditionals to transfer in the indicative form the information about what could or has to happen if certain conditions are

met. There are many other ways for the use of conditionals which will be further discussed in this dissertation.

1.2. The structure of the dissertation

The present dissertation consists of eight chapters including references and the appendix. In the introductory chapter there are four sections explaining the basic reasons and motivation for choosing the topic of this dissertation.

Chapter 2 explains the basic theoretical background of the conditional constructions, including both traditional and cognitive standpoint, as well as some information about different types of implicit and explicit conditional constructions.

This chapter also deals with a sort of interdisciplinary approach connecting linguistics and logic regarding conditionals as their common topic of interest.

Chapter 2.4 deals with historical overview of the conditional construction from the old English to present day with a review of verbal forms.

Chapter 2.5 provides a detailed insight into the division of conditional constructions according to several criteria and further exemplifies each of the groups.

Chapters 2.5.1 through 2.5.9 provide the overview of the differences between different classes of conditional constructions. There are different classifications starting from traditional division of conditionals in chapter 2.5.1 to alternative conditional constructions in 2.5.9.

Chapters 2.6 through 2.12 deal with mental spaces, discourse and information status of conditional construction, an individual chapter about philosophical attitude towards conditional and particular one for pragmatic conditionals and political discourse.

This dissertation finishes with two chapters on research results and the discussion of results and the research questions. Afterwards, there are concluding remarks, appendix and references.

1.3. The Rationale

For a long time, conditionals have been a fascinating topic not only for linguists but also for philosophers. This stems from their ability to express many different interpretations of conditionals. One of the features that is very important for conditionals is the fact that they operate in two domains which are directly linked to the ability of humans to operate on two different planes. One is usually categorized as our everyday reality, while the other one is the propositional reality, which we tend to comprehend through the use of our imagination. In order to be able to express ourselves, "iffy" thinking is very common and conditionals are precisely "the tools" we use in that process.

Conditionality as such, apart from conditional assertions, covers a wide range of reasoning processes such as: conditional questions (*If winter comes, can spring be far behind?*), conditional commands (*If he comes late, give him hell!*), conditional directions (*If you just keep going straight, you'll find the town hall*), conditional promises (*If you do the work, you will be well paid for it*), conditional advice (*If ever in doubt, ask for directions*), and more.

The second important aspect of this dissertation involves political discourse which in a way presents an important part of our everyday lives. Most people perceive politics as something 'dirty' and they tend to avoid it as much as they can. However, in our everyday lives we are constantly under different political influences in broader sense. Namely, politics involves not only common political issues but also solutions to our everyday problems.

The combination of the two mentioned concepts, of conditionals and political discourse, each with its own set of rules is in fact the focus of this research. The intention was to research frequency of the conditionals in political speeches, what types there are and for what purpose they are used. It was also necessary to study the differences in the use of conditionals by Americans and Europeans.

1.4. Research questions

Research questions are an important aspect of every dissertation. They are meant to be guidelines for research and development of ideas through the work on the dissertation. For the purpose of this dissertation, the questions range from those concerned with number of conditional sentences to their frequency in political discourse.

RQ1 – What is the frequency of conditional clause in political discourse?

RQ2 – What is the difference in frequency of conditional clauses in American and European political discourse?

RQ3 – What types of conditionals can be found in political discourse and what are the most common ones?

RQ4 – What type of conditionals are the most influential ones in political discourse and why?

RQ5 – What is the use of conditionals in political discourse?

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Conditional sentence

“A condition is something that has to be fulfilled before something else can happen.” (Alexander 2007:273) A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which the first clause states a supposition or hypothesis and the second clause states the results if that condition is met. The hypothetical clause which states the condition (“If this . . .”) is termed the *protasis* and the conclusion clause is called the *apodosis* (“ . . . then this.”) (Elliott, 1981). “... the presence of *if* (or *unless*) as a clause's main operator, when the consequent has the appropriate aspect, suffices for that clause's being conditional.” (Lycan, 2001) There are various definitions of conditional sentences and among many some of the most frequent ones are listed below:

“Conditional sentences refer to what the speaker presents as possible/hypothetical situations and their possible/hypothetical consequences/outcomes. In their simple form they consist of a main clause [consequent clause, matrix clause] and an IF-clause [conditional clause, antecedent clause].” (Gramorak, 2010)

“Conditionals are sentences that talk about a possible scenario that may or may not be actual and describe what (else) is the case in that scenario; or, considered from “the other end”, conditionals state in what kind of possible scenarios a given proposition is true. The canonical form of a conditional is a two-part sentence consisting of an “antecedent” (also: “premise”, “protasis”) marked with *if* and a “consequent” (“apodosis”) sometimes marked with *then*.” (Fintel, 2011)

“Conditionals are used to express the cause-and-effect or temporal sequences of two events. The typical surface structure of conditionals is a bi-clause consisted of an antecedent clause and a consequent clause, that is, the *protasis* and *apodosis*, as they were termed technically. They often undertake the logical meaning -- “if p, then q” and perform various functions such as

reasoning, making inferences and imaging correlations...etc.” (Traugott et al., 1986).

The description of conditionals is a rather difficult task, and what we should begin with is the fact that conditionals are actually complex sentences composed of two clauses: the main clause and the subordinate clause. The subordinate clause is usually introduced with *if*. “A conditional clause is a type of adverbial clause. The event described in the main clause depends on the conditional described in the conditional clause.” (Leech et al., 2007). There are also many differences regarding the types of sentences as apodosis such as declaratives, questions and imperatives. The relationship between the protasis and apodosis, in other words, their order, is also an important criterion for the understanding and description of conditionals.

2.2. Conditional construction

Traditional grammarians use the term conditional adjunct when they talk about conditional constructions. Conditional adjunct is actually a prepositional phrase with *if* as a head and a content clause as a complement which can be seen in the following example:

1. *-If you touch that wire, you will get an electric shock.* (CGEL, 2010)

Conditional construction consists of both main and subordinate clause. Conditional clause can be either main or subordinate. In other words, conditional construction, in hierarchical sense, is superordinate category in comparison to conditional clause. This can be clearly exemplified by the following scheme using the previous example:




Figure 1 – Structure of the conditional construction

This distinction should be made in order to avoid the confusion between the conditional construction and the conditional clause. Furthermore, the subordinate clause functioning as a complement of *if* is usually called protasis, while the matrix clause minus adjunct is called apodosis. After these basic remarks it is important to note various definitions of conditionals from syntactic, logical, philosophical, semantic, etc. standpoint by some of the most influential authors.

Syntactically, conditionals have traditionally been considered to be a class of sentences which combine two constitutive sentences or clauses in a particular way. (Gudmundur, 2010)

Conditional structures involve an adverbial clause, often referred to as the conditional clause, antecedent or protasis, and a main clause, known as the consequent or apodosis (Bhatt, 2006).

There is also another claim (Diaconescu, 2011), according to which conditional construction consists of an *if*-clause and a result clause, in this case being the main clause. The *if* clause is adverbial clause of condition.

2. 3. Basic description of conditionals

As previously mentioned, conditionals stirred a lot of debate among many authors and one of the things that philosophers talked about was the criteria for the truth of a conditional. Philosophers have also taken different approaches to indicative, subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. However, they have, for the sake of the discussion about the

meaning of the conditionals, completely disregarded their linguistic form. More details about their view of the conditionals will be provided further in the text.

On the other hand, we have traditional grammarians who basically focus their description just on an analysis of verb forms, paying very little attention to the meaning. It is clearly understandable that due to these differences neither of the two approaches could give us a complete and clear picture about conditionals and their importance.

A further issue that causes a lot of debate concerns the question what conditionals actually are. There are some claims that conditionals belong to a special category, while some other researchers claim that conditional sentences are actually constructions as defined by Fillmore et al. (1986), who claim that “construction is... a conventional pattern of linguistic structure which is paired with features of interpretation.” Based on this, it can be concluded that constructions can be differentiated according to their lexical, morphological and syntactic features.

Fillmore, as stated in Dancygier (2004), makes a correlation between form and function in a way that he perceives conditional constructions as having two different interpretations, temporal and epistemic. In other words, the present tense form of the verb carries neutral epistemic stance towards the future event while at the same time the simple past form of the same verb will carry negative stance to it. And of course, the third form, the past perfect, according to Fillmore expresses negative stance towards a past event.

Another approach to conditionals is the theory of relevance. “The relevance-theoretic approach claims that utterances come with a guarantee of their optimal relevance, which means that they present the message to the hearer in the way which ensures maximal communicative gain (in Sperber and Wilson’s terms, maximal contextual effect) and at the same time minimizes the hearer’s processing effort (Dancygier, 2004:9).” According to this definition, we can clearly see the importance of context in mutual conversation because context is nothing else but the knowledge of the world that both of the participants share during their conversation.

2.3.1. Verb phrase in the conditional construction

The forms of the verb phrase in conditional clauses *p* and *q* are also important for the proper understanding and interpretation of conditional constructions. There are different numbers of combinations or patterns and they vary from three up to ten. The most common approach found in the majority of grammar books involves three patterns of verb forms.

2) *If we fail to pass this agreement, we will embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere* (Bush 37)

3) *If we failed to pass this agreement, we would embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere* (Bush 37)

4) *If we had failed to pass this agreement, we would have emboldened the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere* (Bush 37)

in the examples from (2) to (4) there is actually the representation of the three most common verb phrase patterns in most grammar books. In (2), we have a combination of the present tense form of the verb in *if p* and *will*+bare infinitive in *q*. In (3), we have the past tense form of the verb in *if p* clause and *would* + bare infinitive in *q* clause and finally in example (4) we have the past perfect form of the verb in *if p* clause and *would have* + past participle in the *q* clause. However, we have to bear in mind that apart from these two modal verbs (*will* and *would*) there is also a possibility of using other modal verbs as well, although some of the modal verbs are more frequent than others.

As previously mentioned, apart from most common modal verbs, almost all modal verbs can be found in some of the forms of conditional clauses. Modals can show up in all three basic types of conditionals, chiefly in main clauses as can be seen in the following examples (Alexander, 2007:275):

5) *If she is arriving today, she can/could/may/might/should/ought to/must phone me.*

6) *If he was/were ready I would/should go.*

7) *If he had known the facts, he could/might have told us what to do.*

However, modals can show up in *if* clause as seen in the following examples, but it is important to note that the ordinary *will* is not that common after *if* and it is usually used to emphasize that something is going to be done later as in example (9):

8) 25) *If you should see him, please give him my regards.*

9) 26) *If it will suit you, I'll change the date of our meeting.*

There is also an interesting possibility of using the imperative in either *if* or main clause. However, with the imperative in the main clause, the sequence of clauses remains unchanged as in the previous example in(7), but with the imperative in the *if* clause we happen to have a different conjunction between clauses and we mostly use it to express comment, request, threat or advice. This is clearly visible in the following examples (Alexander 2007:276):

10) *Fail to pay and they'll cut off the electricity. (comment)*

11) *Tell us what to do and we'll get on with it. (request)*

12) *Put that down or else I'll smack you. (threat)*

13) *Be there on time otherwise you'll create a bad impression. (advice)*

The conjunctions used in these examples involve *and*, *or (else)* and *otherwise* in different examples, respectively. These examples from (10-13) can be paraphrased with *if* as follows:

10a) *If you fail to pay, they'll cut off the electricity.*

11a) *If you tell us what to do, we'll get on with it.*

12a) *If you don't put that down, I'll smack you.*

13a) *If you are not there on time, you'll create bad impression.*

Inchaurrealde (2005) uses three different labels, yet he preserves the same forms for all the three basic types of conditionals. Namely, the first type, thanks to its grammatical structure and time reference, is called the future conditional, then type two refers to the present conditional, and type three refers to the past conditional.

However, according to Dancygier (2004), there is also a problem with the labeling of the verb forms in literature because different authors use different names for the same verb forms. Therefore, the verb *fail* (2) may be referred to as the present tense form of the verb or simply V-s (for descriptive purposes V usually stands for verb). On the other hand, *will embolden* (1) is sometimes called the Future tense or *will + V*.

In example (3), *failed* can be considered to be the past tense, hypothetical past, present subjunctive, or simply as V-*ed* for descriptive purposes. In the main clause, *would...embolden* can be named as past modal, conditional or again as *would + V* (bare infinitive).

Therefore, in the last example, i.e. (4), we may say that *had failed* is labelled as past perfect, past tense, hypothetical past perfective, past subjunctive or simply as *have + V-en* and in the main clause, *would have emboldened* can be referred to as past perfective modal, conditional perfect or *would have + V-en*.

2.3.2. Markers of protasis and apodosis

It is also very important to have the conditional construction clearly differentiated from other conceptual categories and in the majority of languages this is the case. Apart from verb forms in either protasis or apodosis we still need some other device to be completely sure that we are dealing with conditional construction. In English one of the most frequent overt markers of conditionals and conditionality is the conjunction *if*. However, in the English language apart from the conjunction *if*, we can mark the conditionality with the inversion of the subject and the verb as in (Comrie, 1986:87):

14) *Had he done that, I would have been happy.*

There is also the possibility of overtly marking not just protasis but also apodosis. In English the most frequent marker of the apodosis is *then* but it is not quite common.

2.3.3. *If or...*

If, being the most frequent conjunction used to introduce conditional clause, is not actually the only possibility. There is a whole range of expressions we may use to introduce conditional construction such as: *if, whether, even if, in case, in the event that, unless, if only, on condition (that), provided that, providing that, suppose that, supposing that, as/so long as, assuming (that), given (that), just so (that)*. The use of some of these expressions will be discussed further in the text.

If can also have the meaning that by its nature is very similar to the meaning of *although* and this happens frequently in formal English. This feature is usually apparent when we have *if* followed by an adjective (Swan, 1997:252) but the illocutionary force of *if* is not quite the same as the one of *although* as can be seen in the following example (Diaconescu, 2011):

15) *His style, if mannered, is pleasant to read.*

Besides previously mentioned facts about protasis and apodosis and *if*, frequently mentioned as either a part of clause or separate element, there are also *only if* and *even if* sequences that have their own rules of use, as in the example (CGEL, p. 746):

16) *I'll cook only if you clean up.*

In this example we have the entire *if* phrase under the scope of *only* which in a way predetermines that the most common combination includes *Q only if P*, but it does not rule out any other combination and order of the clauses. Characteristics of clauses with *only if* cluster involve:

- a) Invariant meaning: $P \text{ vs. } Q \Rightarrow$ it is possible in all combinations of clauses except those with P being false and Q being true
- b) Sufficient condition implicature $\Rightarrow Q \text{ if } P$

When we look at conditional constructions with *only if*, we may say that P expresses a necessary condition that should be satisfied in order for Q to be true.

If we look at our previous example, we may clearly see that it satisfies our invariant meaning condition because it is hard to believe that *I will cook if you do not clean up* and of course *your cleaning up* is also a sufficient condition for *me to cook*.

However, apart from being necessary, P is frequently a sufficient condition for Q (i.e. the only one that is needed), but we need to bear in mind that it does not entail *Q if P* as in the example because apart from witnesses there are also some other conditions that need to be fulfilled such as for example the sanity of the will maker in the following example (CGEL 2010):

17) *A will is valid only if it has been signed in the presence of two witnesses.*

In order to be able to make a combination and to make something both necessary and sufficient condition the only option we have is to use *if and only if*:

18) *I will accept your proposal if and only if my lawyer assures me that it's legal.*

If we turn to logic again and reconsider the invariant meaning, we may see that *Q only if P* is equivalent to *if not-P (then) not Q* and *if Q (then) P*.

Even if has much less complicated qualities and it is characterized by only two things:

- a) It entails Q if P
- b) It complicates Q further

Even if is mainly used in the context in which the truth of P is not questionable as in the example (CGEL 2010):

19) *Even if you are my elder brother, you haven't the right to tell me what to do.*

One of the features that should also be taken into consideration is the conditional *then*. This adverb is a constituent part of conditionals, and is quite frequent. However, we rarely talk about it when discussing conditionals. Namely, even when we talk about conditionals in their abbreviated form, we write *if p, q* completely ignoring the existence of this element of the construction.

Then as such, unlike *if* is more optional and we can frequently omit it, hence the lack of attention paid to it. Despite this fact, it can be a significant marker of sequentiality because it signals the existence of some sequence of events, or one event following the other, the result following the cause, and so on.

However, the occurrence of *then* is still highly dependent of the type of conditional. In inference conditionals it is rather common, while in the speech act conditionals it depends on the type of protasis. And finally in conditionals with *only if*, *then* is very rare, and even in the reversed order of the clauses, *then* is usually substituted by inversion within the clause such as when auxiliary verb and subject replace their positions, still gaining some stress on the apodosis as well.

There is also a possibility of using some other expressions instead of *if* in conditional constructions and they include (CGEL, p.758 et al.):

<i>Provided (that)</i>	<i>providing that</i>	<i>as/so long as – T</i>
<i>on condition (that)</i>	<i>unless</i>	<i>even if given (that)</i>
<i>Assuming</i>	<i>supposing (that)</i>	<i>in the event in case – T</i>
<i>Just so (that)</i>	<i>suppose (that)</i>	

20) *The meeting will start at 5.30, provided (that) there is a quorum.*

21) *You can go wherever you like, as long as you are back by 7.*

22) *You may borrow the book on condition (that) you return it tonight.*

23) *Assuming (that) everyone agrees, the project will get under way next month.*

24) *The announcement would look well in ‘The Times’, supposing (that) one were to waste money in that way.*

25) *Suppose that we miss the train, what shall we do?*

26) *In the event (that) they are again indicted their case will be randomly assigned to federal judge.*

27) *You can call this toll-free number in case you need emergency service.*

28) *You can borrow this book provided/providing that you bring it back.*

29) *Unless the strike has been called off, there will be no trains tomorrow.*

In this last example (29), *unless* is an adverbial of negative condition. There are also conditional constructions that have phrases rather than clauses.

In the previous examples with *in the event/in case*, they can take the role of PP complements and content clause. *Assuming* can take a role of NP. *Barring* also takes the role of phrasal complement in a conditional construction as well as *but + for*. PPs derive their conditionality from the meaning of their nouns such as *case* or *condition* as in examples (CGEL, p.758):

30) *Barring any further delays, the project should be completed on time.*

31) *But for this hitch, the project would have been completed on time.*

32) *In that case/ On that condition I will/would accept your offer.*

Relative constructions can also have conditional interpretations in the following cases:

- a) When relative clause is embedded within NP with *any* as determiner
- b) When we have modal preterites in relative and matrix clause

33) *Anyone who thinks they can take advantage of us will be disappointed.*

34) *Anyone who thought they could take advantage of us would be disappointed.*

These two examples can be paraphrased by the conditional construction with *if* in such a way that we put *if* at the front of clause and omit relative pronoun *who*. The same thing can be done in both of the examples without much of a change in meaning.

33a) *If anyone thinks they can take advantage of us, (he) will be disappointed.*

34a) *If anyone thought they could take advantage of us, (he) would be disappointed.*

2.3.4. Relationship between protasis and apodosis

The order of clauses and causality are also two important aspects we must take into consideration when we talk about conditionals because they influence our understanding. Iconic order, which is also part of our perspective, is previously mentioned *if p, q*. This order of clauses, putting the protasis in front of the apodosis is the most frequent order and it is pretty much related to the concept of causality as well because we normally understand the cause to be expressed in the protasis and the consequence in the apodosis.

Sweetser (1990) claims that causality depends on the domain the conditionals belong to. However, this order of clauses is not the most frequent, but simply the most typical one because it is also related to our understanding of the world. In our everyday world we first see the cause or the reason for something and then we witness the consequence or the result. Language as such depicts our reality and conditionals pretty much follow this *rule*.

The relationship between clauses in *if p, q* constructions, apart from causal, can be epistemic or inferential, speech-act and metatextual. In Dancygier (2004) we have two examples which clearly depict inferential or epistemic conditionals.

35) *If Mary is late, she went to the dentist.*

36) *If Ann is wearing a wedding ring, she and Bob finally got married.*

We can clearly see that we do not have a common causal relationship between the protasis and the apodosis because in example (35) Mary's being late did not cause her going to the dentist or in the example (36) Ann's wearing a wedding ring did not actually cause her to marry.

Inferential or epistemic conditionals, as they are referred to by Sweetser, enable the speaker to infer *q* based on the knowledge of the facts expressed with *p*.

Therefore, based on the fact that Mary is late, speaker in (35) concludes that she must have gone to the dentist. The second example is even more obvious because the fact that she is wearing a wedding ring definitely means that she's been married to Bob. However, in order for these inferences to be made, the speaker must have some certain shared knowledge or

there has to be a certain context involved that would enable the speaker to conclude that Mary went to the dentist and not let's say to work.

In example (36), the context is less needed because the speaker definitely either has seen Mary having a wedding ring, or somebody informed him about it. In any case, the proper conclusion can be inferred based on these assumptions. Of course, simply by seeing that she has a ring, we may say that she is married, but only based on our previous knowledge about her relationship with Bob, may we safely conclude that Bob and she got married.

When we talk about the relationship between the apodosis and the protasis it is important to note that in respect to time, the time of the apodosis situation is independent of that of the protasis situation which can be best illustrated in the following table, listing all the possible combinations of time reference in the protasis and the apodosis and their mutual dependence (CGEL, p.743):

Table 1 – Time relation between protasis and apodosis

Nr.	Conditional construction	Protasis	Apodosis
1	If she leaves, I leave too.	Future	Future
2	If they don't come, we're wasting our time.		Present
3	If it doesn't rise, you didn't put enough bicarb in.		Past
4	If that's Jill over there, I'll ask her to join us.	Present	Future
5	If she's here, she's in her office.		Present
6	If he knows the answer, he got it from you.		Past
7	If they batted first they will probably win.	Past	Future
8	If Kim said that, you're entitled to compensation.		Present
9	If Kim didn't do it, Pat did.		Past

There are several other notions related to the verb choice within the protases and the apodoses and in that respect, a future time protasis usually has a non-modal present tense (CGEL, p.744):

37) If it rains tomorrow, we'll postpone the match until next weekend.

When it comes to the verbal forms and tenses in the protasis and the apodosis, respectively, Diaconescu preserves the term real or open condition which is similar to the previously mentioned open conditionals, but when it comes to remote, she uses the term untrue (contrary-to fact) in the present/future/past. Verbal forms in real/open conditionals cover the following tense forms:

If clause	main clause
<i>the simple present</i>	<i>present indicative</i>
	<i>past indicative</i>
	<i>future indicative</i>
	<i>imperative</i>

Following these statements, the present tense in the conditional clause is used to express the simultaneity of actions, while the present perfect/past tense is used to express anteriority. Previously mentioned untrue or contrary-to-fact conditions in the present or the future can also be referred to as tentative, hypothetical or unreal. Verbal forms in these constructions come as follows:

If clause	main clause
<i>Past tense of the subjunctive mood</i>	<i>present conditional</i>

In these constructions, *were* is used for both singular and plural, while at the same time we may use *was* with *I, he, she, it* in informal speech because it is considered to be archaic as in

38) *If I was you, I'd go for it.*

Untrue (contrary-to-fact) in the past conditions contain following verbal forms:

If clause	main clause
<i>Past perfect of the subjunctive mood</i>	<i>past conditional</i>
<i>indicating past unreality</i>	

There is also a possibility of using progressive verbal forms in conditional constructions. “Even in conditional sentences, progressive verb forms are used in progressive situations”

(Schramper, 2002:423) which can be exemplified through the examples Diaconescu also uses in her work:

Table 2 - Progressive verbal forms in conditional constructions

True situation:	<i>It is raining right now, so I will not go for a walk.</i>
Conditional:	<i>If it were not raining right now, I would go for a walk.</i>
True situation:	<i>I am not living in Spain. I am not working at a bank.</i>
Conditional:	<i>If I were living in Spain, I would be working at a bank.</i>
True situation:	<i>It was raining yesterday afternoon, so I didn't go for a walk.</i>
Conditional:	<i>If it had not been raining, I would have gone for a walk.</i>
True situation:	<i>I was not living in Spain last year. I was not working at a bank.</i>
Conditional:	<i>If I had been living in Spain last year, I would have been working at a bank.</i>

Generally, epistemic modals are not used in the protases, but not exclusively. On the other hand, modals are very common in open apodoses. Protasis verb (due to its non-factual status) may be in the plain form in the subjunctive construction, but the constructions as such are very rare, formal, and are usually reserved to the verb 'to be' (CGEL, p745):

39) If such a demonstration be made, it will not find support or countenance from any of the men whose names are recognized as having a right to speak for Providence.

2.3.5. Clause order in the conditional construction

Clause order is another element in the description of conditionals which can affect our understanding of them. Greenberg (1963:84-5) says that in conditional statements, the conditional clause precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages. This order of clauses is common in most languages, although many languages allow for the vice versa order of clauses. It is also quite common for the protasis to be marked overtly as nonfactual rather than apodosis, while placing the overtly marked protasis in front of the unmarked apodosis avoids the apodosis being interpreted as a factual statement. (Comrie, 1986:84)

The second reason for the linear order (*if p, q*) is that this order reflects the temporal reference of the clauses. In other words, the event described in the protasis in temporal terms occurs before the event described in the apodosis. Following this pattern we might say that if we

reverse the temporal order of the events, we should also have our clauses in the reverse order. However, this situation, as Comrie states, is rather difficult to prove because the frequency of such cases in textual examples is very low.

The third reason for the linear order of conditional clauses is that they have to reflect the cause-effect relationship between two clauses since cause usually precedes the effect.

The fourth reason is suggested by Lehmann (1974). It is related to the discourse in which conditional constructions occur. He states that in this process of establishing common ground, a conditional protasis represents progress in its establishment in a disjunctive situation: there are two possibilities (namely p and $\sim p$) and before the communication can progress, it is necessary for the speaker to establish which of the disjuncts is to be considered; only then can the argumentation proceed. (Lehmann 1974).

Haiman (1978) stated the idea that is similar to this saying that conditionals are topics and as such, since topics tend to occur at the beginning of the sentence, conditional protases should also occur at the beginning of the sentence.

2.4. Historical overview of conditionals

In this chapter, one of the best resources available was the PhD dissertation written by Nils Rotingen (1972) entitled *On the Classification of Conditional Structures in English*. Rotingen provides, for the time period he lived in, a very modern analysis or overview of the theory of classification of the conditionals along with comments for each of the theories. His overview is organized according to individual authors he used and it includes an overview of the works by Henry Sweet, Charles Talbut Onions, Hendrik Poutsma, George Oliver Curme, Etsko Kruisinga and Johannes Meyer Myklestad.

In the second chapter of his dissertation Rotingen provides a tentative classification of conditional constructions. In his opinion conditional clause is “any adverbial clause introduced by structural signals: *but, but that, but only that, except, if, if ...not, in case, on condition that, only, so, so long as, suppose, supposing, unless, without, verb inversion.*” In

his work he used textbooks dating from 1891 to 1967, which from today's perspective provides excellent insight into old literature on conditionals.

Sweet (1871) perceives two categories of conditional constructions depending on the type of condition they express: open condition and rejected condition. Open conditions are "those which do not imply anything as to the fulfilment of the condition."

40) *If you are right, I am wrong.* (Sweet, p. 305)

Rejected conditions are "those which imply the rejection of the hypothesis:

41) *If you were right, I should be wrong....* (Sweet, p. 305).

Onions (1904) also introduced a formal criterion in his definitions of conditional clauses. According to him, there are two main classes of conditional clauses. He based his division on both the form and the meaning of the Principal clause.

Therefore, in the first category, the principal clause does not explain what would be or would have been, and the *if* clause implies nothing with respect to the fulfilment of the condition. This definition in its nature is very much similar to Sweet's open conditional and the example can be the same:

42) *If you are right, I am wrong.*

In the second category, the principal clause explains what would be or would have been, while the *if* clause implies negative to what is said in principal clause. This is just like with the first category, similar to Sweet's rejected condition because we see the negative implication of the *if* clause:

43) *If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.*

There is also a rule that says that the principal clause should be expressed through the use of *should* or *would* in order to show remoteness of the supposition as in the example:

44) *If you were right, I should be wrong.*

Onions went even further and introduced a third class of conditional sentences in which the principal clause is similar to the first category but the *if* clause expresses action that is contemplated or in a way expresses speaker's reserve on certain matter:

45) *If this be so, we are all at fault.*

It is also important to mention that none of the authors so far mentioned hypothetical conditionals.

Poutsma (1929) proposed a division of conditionals which was very much similar to Sweet. He mentions two classes of adverbial clauses of condition:

- a) Those that express the idea of mere condition with use of *if*
- b) Those that express the idea of condition and exception combined (*unless*)

Those that express the idea of mere condition with the use of *if* can be further divided into:

- Open condition – *If you are right, I am wrong.*
- Rejected condition

46) *If he were present, I would speak to him* – expressing contrary-to-fact supposition of a speaker

47) *If it should rain, we had better stay in-doors.* – expressing future supposition for the sake of argument

Kruisinga (1925) did not differ significantly from the previous authors: He simply kept the binary division into open and rejected conditions. Curme (1931) introduces practical condition comprising both open and uncertain conditionals. According to him, theoretical conditional is equivalent to hypothetical conditional. Meyer-Myklestad (1967) also

distinguishes between two classes of conditionals, open, and rejected or contrary-to-fact conditionals. Open conditionals are further divided into practical and theoretical.

When it comes to Rotingen, in his dissertation he used verbal pattern in conditional clauses to pinpoint various types of conditionals. He used P for protasis and A for apodosis which in a way resembles contemporary markings of the P and Q. Furthermore, in his classification he provides a detailed overview of all possible verbal structures in the protasis and the apodosis that he found in his corpus.

The following table lists all the verbal combinations he mentions in his work:

Table 3 – Verbal combinations in Rotingen's work

	Protasis	Apodosis
1.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	Present Simple Tense Indicative
2.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	Can/do/may/must/need/shall/will/had as leave/had best/would + plain infinitive
3.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	The imperative
4.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	The Passive voice present tense
5.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	Present tense of BE + prepositional infinitive
6.	Present Simple Tense Indicative	Should in emotional question
7.	Can/ do(does)/may/shall/will + the plain infinitive	Present Simple Tense Indicative
8.	Can/ do(does)/may/shall/will + the plain infinitive	Can/do(does)/may/must/need/shall/will/had rather/might/would + the plain infinitive
9.	Can/must/shall/will + the plain infinitive	The imperative
10.	Can/do/does + the plain infinitive	The Passive voice present tense
11.	Can/shall/will + the plain infinitive	Past simple tense
12.	Will + the plain infinitive	Did
13.	Does + the plain infinitive	Should in emotional questions
14.	The Passive voice present tense	Present Simple Tense Indicative

15.	The Passive voice present tense	May/shall/will + the plain infinitive
16.	The Passive voice present tense	The imperative
17.	The simple perfect tense	Present Simple Tense Indicative
18.	The simple perfect tense	Can/must/will + the plain infinitive
19.	The simple perfect tense	The imperative
20.	The simple perfect tense	The Passive voice present tense
21.	The simple perfect tense	The simple perfect tense
22.	The simple perfect tense	Should in emotional questions
23.	The Passive voice perfect tense	Will + the plain infinitive
24.	The present tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	Present Simple Tense Indicative
25.	The present tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	Shall + the plain infinitive
26.	The present tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	The Simple past tense
27.	Am going to	Will + the plain infinitive
28.	The Simple past tense	The Simple past tense indicative
29.	The Simple past tense	Shall + the plain infinitive
30.	The Simple past tense	The imperative
31.	The Simple past tense	The Simple past tense
32.	The Simple past tense	Should in emotional questions
33.	Did	Shall + the plain infinitive
34.	The past tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	The Simple past tense
35.	Should/would/could + the plain infinitive	Present Simple Tense Indicative
36.	Should/would/could + the plain infinitive	Can/do(does)/may/must/need/shall/will + the plain infinitive
37.	Should/would + the plain infinitive	The imperative
38.	Should + the plain infinitive	The Passive voice present tense
39.	Should + the plain infinitive	The simple perfect tense

40.	BE (all persons present tense)	Present Simple Tense Indicative
41.	BE (all persons present tense)	May/must/shall/will + the plain infinitive
42.	BE (all persons present tense)	The imperative
43.	BE (all persons present tense)	The simple perfect tense
44.	Ø ending in 3 p.sg. present tense	Present Simple Tense Indicative
45.	Ø ending in 3 p.sg. present tense	May/shall/will + the plain infinitive
46.	Ø ending in 3 p.sg. present tense	The imperative
47.	Ø ending in 3 p.sg. present tense	The simple perfect tense
48.	Past tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	Present Simple Tense Indicative
49.	Past tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	May/shall/will + the plain infinitive
50.	The Simple past tense or did + the plain infinitive	Could/might/should/would + the plain infinitive
51.	Past simple tense	Would + the perfect infinitive
52.	could/might/should/would/ + the plain infinitive	Could/had rather/might/should/would + the plain infinitive
53.	Would + the plain infinitive	Should + the perfect infinitive
54.	Paste tense of BE +the prepositional infinitive	Should/would + the plain infinitive
55.	The pluperfect	Could/had rather/might/must/ought/should/would + the perfect infinitive
56.	The pluperfect	Could/would + the plain infinitive
57.	The pluperfect	The pluperfect
58.	The Simple past tense or did + the plain infinitive	Could/must/should/would + the plain infinitive
59.	The Simple past tense or did + the plain infinitive	Could/must/should/would + the perfect infinitive
60.	Past tense passive voice	Past tense passive voice or Past simple tense
61.	Could/might/would (+ the perfect infinitive)	Could/might/would + the perfect infinitive

62.	Could + the perfect infinitive	The pluperfect
63.	Past tense of BE + the prepositional infinitive	Might/would + the plain infinitive
64.	Could/would (+ the plain infinitive)	Could/would + the plain infinitive

When it comes to the history of the English language, it is also important to note the types of conditional clause that we can find in Medieval English. This issue was discussed by Mitchell and Robinson (1992) and summarized by Inchaurrealde (2005). In Old English the distinction among conditional types is created by the following principles:

- I. Conceded and denied conditions
- II. Open conditions
- III. Unfulfilled or rejected or imaginary conditions

In all the three the common conjunction is *gif* (*if*) while *þær* (*if, there, where*) can be used in the third type of conditionals. Therefore we have the following examples of three basic conditional types (Inchaurrealde 2005):

- a) Type I conditional (indicative): *Ne þurfe we us spillan, gif ge spedap to þam.*
(ModE: *No need to slaughter each other, if you be generous with us.*-translated by Douglas B. Killings)
- b) Type II conditional: *...Gyf þu þat gerædest, þe her ricost eart...*
...on flot feran, and eow friþes healdan.
(ModE: *If you believe which of these is the noblest path...*
...Depart on the sea and keep peace with you. – D.B.Killings)
- c) Type III conditional (preterite subjunctive): *sec, gif þu dyrre.*
(ModE: *seek, if you dare.* – Beowulf, 1.1379-translated by Benjamin Slade)

Apart from *if*, as the most common conditional conjunction in modern day English, there are also some other ways to mark the conditionality in Old English such as *būtan*, *nymþe*, *nemne* or *nefn* which are used to express the terms such as *on condition that*, VS order, hypothetical

comparisons etc., but their use was rather scarce. The use of subjunctive was rather popular in Old English and even used a different conjunction *þæ r* was used for it.

2. 5. Classification of conditionals

The issue of classification of conditionals is a bit problematic because there are many different aspects that need to be taken into consideration. Thus, there are many different types of conditionals classified according to some common criteria. Classifications that will be used in this dissertation are represented in the following image:




Figure 2 – Classification of conditional construction

If we look at this image we may see that there are eight different subclasses of conditional constructions. Each of these subclasses is formed according to certain criteria, but they frequently overlap and may cover the same group of examples.

Namely, 0, I, II, III and Mixed type conditionals belong to a classification of conditionals that is quite common among traditional understanding and classification, and it is based on the difference between the verbal phrase within the main and the subordinate clause of conditional construction as in the following examples:

- *If I have enough time, I watch TV every evening. (0 type)*
- *If I am better tomorrow, I will get up. (I type)*
- *If I was taller, I would become a policeman. (II type)*
- *If we had gone by car, we would have saved time (III type)*

This traditional classification can be applied to open and remote conditionals because they are very similar to previously mentioned classes, but the issue here is that the possibility for satisfaction of the condition in these two categories is different and it can be satisfied in the real world (in open conditionals) or the alternative world (in remote conditionals) as in:

- *If you get it right, you'll win 100 \$ (open)*
- *If you got it right, you'd win 100 \$ (remote)*

The classification of conditionals into indicative and subjunctive is based on the verbal forms used in the main and the subordinate clause within a conditional construction but it also includes the difference in the meaning being conveyed by each of these types.

- *If he was here yesterday/today, he certainly helped/would help her.(indicative)*
- *If he were here today, he would help her. (subjunctive)*

Epistemic, speech-act, and content conditionals are classified according to the domain they belong to. Thus epistemic conditionals belong to the epistemic domain and involve reasoning process etc.

- *If she's divorced, (then) she's been married.*

- *There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.*

Classification of conditionals into consequential and non-consequential done by Dancygier and Mioduszevska (1984) are mostly based on the distinction whether there is a principle of causality between protasis and apodosis in conditional construction.

- *If I catch the train, I will come on time. (consequential)*
- *If Susie is listening at the door, she is breathing quietly. (non-consequential)*

Philosophers tend to divide conditionals into indicative and counterfactual based on the sufficiency criteria. This division is very similar to the indicative-subjunctive division thus it will be explained and exemplified later on.

Further classification involves the pragmatic, hypothetical and course-of-event conditionals and it is based again on causal dependency between the antecedent and the consequent. This division is favoured by Angeliki Athanasidou and Rene Dirven.

- *If she's divorced, then she's been married. (pragmatic)*
- *If I were to go bald, I would shoot myself. (hypothetical)*
- *If he goes on Fridays, I go too. (course-of-event)*

The classification that is based on the understanding of the previous knowledge of the world by the speaker and hearer involves factual, hypothetical and relevance conditionals.

- *If I skip class, I will be in trouble. (factual)*
- *If you are thirsty, there is a beer in the fridge. (relevance)*

Besides these previously mentioned types there are also predictive conditionals that may be seen as subtype of indicative conditionals, alternative conditional constructions and some cases of marginal conditional constructions which will be explained further in the text.

However, there is also a great overlap among these different classes of conditional constructions in respect to conditional forms they explain. This can be exemplified in the following image that shows their mutual similarity according to the verb forms used in the main and the subordinate clause:




Figure 3 - Overlap between different types of conditionals

All of these types and their subtypes will be further explained and exemplified in the chapters that follow.

2.5.1 Traditional division

As mentioned before, the most common division of conditionals is into three major types according to the verb phrase in the subordinate and the main clause. However, there are also two other types which are also quite common in the traditional division. They are so called

zero and mixed type conditionals. For the sake of better understanding of these traditional types, we will look at the most common three types of conditionals first.

To be able to understand properly all the variations of the verbal forms in the first type conditionals according to classical division, we may find the following table very useful. It is going to provide us with all possible combinations of the present tenses in the *if* clause and the *will* combinations in the main clause (Alexander 2007):

Table 4 – Basic forms of Type 1 conditionals

	If clause (condition to be satisfied)	Main clause (likely outcome)
Be	<i>If I am better tomorrow,</i>	<i>I will get up.</i>
Have	<i>If I have a headache,</i>	<i>I will take an aspirin.</i>
Simple present	<i>If she finishes early,</i>	<i>she will go home</i>
Present progressive	<i>If he is standing in the rain,</i>	<i>he will catch cold.</i>
Present perfect	<i>If she has arrived at the station,</i>	<i>she will be here soon.</i>
Present perfect progressive	<i>If he has been travelling all night,</i>	<i>he will need a rest.</i>
Can, must	<i>If I can afford it,</i>	<i>I will buy it.</i>

The use of first type conditionals is common when we want to describe something that will happen if there is probability for a future event.

The second and third type conditionals can be represented in a similar manner in the following two tables (Alexander 2007):

Table 5 – Basic form of Type 2 conditionals

	If clause (condition to be satisfied)	Main clause (likely outcome)
Be	<i>If I was taller,</i>	<i>I would become a policeman.</i>
Have	<i>If he had any money,</i>	<i>he would leave home.</i>
Other verbs	<i>If you took a taxi,</i>	<i>you would get there quicker.</i>
Could	<i>If you could see me now,</i>	<i>you'd laugh your head off.</i>

Type 2 conditionals are most commonly used to talk about unreal or imaginary situations referred to in the *if* clause and its imaginary possible consequence(s) in the main clause. However, despite the fact that we use the past tense forms, we do not have the past time reference.

Table 6 – Basic form of Type 3 conditionals

	If clause (condition to be satisfied)	Main clause (likely outcome)
Be	<i>If I had been taller,</i>	<i>I would have joined the police force.</i>
Have	<i>If I had had any sense,</i>	<i>I would have kept quiet about it.</i>
past perfect	<i>If we had gone by car,</i>	<i>we would have saved time.</i>
past perfect progressive	<i>If I had been trying harder,</i>	<i>I would have succeeded.</i>
could have	<i>If I could have stopped,</i>	<i>there wouldn't have been an accident.</i>

Type 3 conditionals are used in similar fashion to type 2 conditionals in respect that they refer to something completely imaginary in the *if* clause and to completely imaginary consequences in the main clause. However, type 3 conditionals refer to consequences that did not, could not ever happen because the condition to be satisfied did not happen in the past. Thus, they are sometimes called hypothetical conditionals.

Besides these three basic types, just as we have mentioned earlier in the text, we have two other types, zero and mixed type conditionals. In zero type conditionals we have present tense forms in both, the subordinate and the main clause and they are rather frequently used to express things that are generally or always true. Such examples may include general truth, scientific facts, etc. They can be best illustrated through the following examples:

48) *If she gets there before me, ask her to wait.*

49) *If you fly cheap airline, you have to pay for you meal and drinks.*

50) *If you heat water, it boils.*

When it comes to the tense form in zero conditionals, we should pay attention to the fact that in the conditional or the subordinate clause we may use variety of tenses, while on the other hand in the main clause we may use only the present tense or the imperative, as in the examples:

51) *If you visit Paris, go to Eiffel Tower.*

52) *If unemployment is rising, people tend to be afraid for their future.*

53) *If you have done that, go and have a coffee break.*

As we can see in the previous examples, there are the present simple tense, the present continuous tense or the present perfect tense in the conditional clause, while in the main clause there are present simple tense and the imperative.

Mixed type conditionals are a special subtype of conditionals in which the speaker makes a combination of the existing three basic types of conditionals in accordance with the text and context, such as (Alexander 2007:274):

Table 7– Mixed type conditionals’ variations

subordinate clause	main clause
type 1	type 3
<i>If I am as clever as you think,</i>	<i>I should have been rich by now.</i>
type 2	type 3
<i>If you knew me better,</i>	<i>you wouldn't have said that.</i>
type 3	type 2
<i>If I had had your advantages,</i>	<i>I'd be better off now.</i>
type 2	type 1
<i>If he missed the bus</i>	<i>he won't be here on time.</i>

2.5.2 Open vs remote conditional constructions




Figure 4 – Division of conditional constructions

We can see from this diagram that conditional constructions according to traditional grammarians can be divided into open and remote conditional constructions. Open conditionals are considered to be default conditional constructions of the type *if p (then) q* (regardless of the order of the clauses). It is also rather frequent for them to take the modal auxiliary verb in the apodosis although it is not obligatory.

On the other hand, remote conditionals are a bit more complex and they require that the verb in the apodosis is a modal auxiliary (*would, should, could or might*) and we should have the modal preterite or irrealis *were* in the protasis. The following examples from the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (CGEL) best illustrate this division:

54) *If you get it right, you will win \$100. (open)*

55) *If you got it right, you would win \$100. (remote) (CGEL 2010:739)*

Hudleston and Pullum (2002) use a binary division of conditionals into open and remote. However, they have actually merged the subjunctive and the counterfactuals into the category of remote conditionals. In their classification they also use the criteria of consequence which

includes *cause-effect*, *premise-inference* relationship between clauses and condition-related speech-act.

2.5.2.1 Open conditionals

The important aspect of understanding conditionals is the interpretation of the open conditionals and in that process we have four different qualities of conditional constructions that need to be taken into consideration (CGEL 2010):

- I. invariant meaning: truth values of *p* and *q* exclude combination in which *p* is true and *q* is false
- II. consequence implicature: *q* is consequence of *p*
- III. only-if implicature: if not *p* then not *q*
- IV. don't know implicature: the speaker doesn't know whether *p* and *q* are true or false

Interpretation of anything as such, not only conditionals, can be very intriguing because it involves a lot of subjective criteria. Therefore, these elements can also be very helpful in our task of interpretation of open conditionals.

When it comes to point II, apart from the case where *q* is the consequence of *p*, there is also a possibility where *q* follows from *p*. In this respect we can also have *cause-effect* relationship between *p* and *q* which is clearly seen in the example above in which *your touching a wire* is going to be the cause for you *to get an electric shock*. Besides *cause-effect* there is also an inference relationship according to which the truth of *q* is actually following from the truth of *p* such as:

56) *If the key is not in my pocket, I have left it in the door.*

Another possibility lies within the term Relevance protases (*q* is not the consequent of *p*) such as in the example (CGEL, p.740):

57) *If you need some help, Helen is willing to lend a hand.*

In this example – q is true regardless of the truth of p , p is a condition on the relevance of q , and the previous example can be paraphrased as *If you need some help you will be interested to know that Helen is willing to lend a hand.*

The point III indicates that this implicature brings *if* PPs in the domain of conditions in common sense of the word.

Point IV indicates that conditionals frequently relate to the future (also in other spheres - present and future) because at the time of speaking, the speaker cannot know whether the condition will be satisfied or not.

Finally, point I, which was not explained before, relates directly to logical equivalence relationships between p and q . Therefore, we can have the following relationships:

- *if p then q*
- *if not q then not p*
- *q or not p*

This can be illustrated with following examples (CGEL, p.742):

58) *If Jill is here she is in her office.*

59) *If Jill is not in her office then she is not here.*

60) *Jill is in her office or she is not here.*

There is no possibility for Jill to be here but not in an office. However, if we have examples as the following, we do not have all the conditions fulfilled for Jill to leave in every example (CGEL, p.742):

61) *If she leaves, I leave.*

62) *If I don't leave, she doesn't leave.*

63) *I leave or she doesn't leave.*

2.5.2.2. Remote conditional constructions

For the purpose of a better understanding of the difference between open and remote conditional constructions, the following examples will be used to illustrate it (CGEL, p. 748):

Table 8 – Open vs. Remote conditionals

Nr.	Open	Remote
1	If he tells her she will be furious.	If he told her she would be furious.
2	If you are under 18 you need parental approval	If you were under 18 you would need parental approval.
3	If he bought it at that price, he got a bargain.	If he had bought it at that price, he would have got a bargain.

These conditionals can be characterized as follows:

- a) Remote conditionals, just like open, exclude case where P is true and Q is false
- b) Remote conditionals implicate that Q is the consequence of P
- c) They possess *only- if* implicature

The important quality of the remote conditionals is that they satisfy a condition, requested in the protasis, in a world different from the actual one. However, the authors, such as Huddleston and Pullum (2010) also say that this condition is ‘potentially’ satisfied in a world different from the actual one which implies that it can also be satisfied in the real world.

2.5.2.3 The notion of time in remote conditionals

There are different possibilities when it comes to the notion of time in the protases of the remote conditionals. If we have past/present time remote conditionals we usually notice that the protasis is false or likely to be false. However, if, in addition, we have *only-if* implicature, then the apodosis is or is likely to be false as well. According to the claim (CGEL, p.749) that states that when in the remote conditional constructions the protasis sometimes holds both in the actual and in the imaginary world then we cannot use the term counterfactual conditionals for the grammatical class of remote conditionals.

In the case of the future time protases, the satisfaction of the condition is less likely in the actual world. The greater possibility for satisfaction of condition in these conditionals is in the imaginary world.

Very frequently, when we have to choose between open and remote conditional constructions we employ a principle of politeness due to the fact that remote conditionals are considered to be more polite than open conditionals which can clearly be seen in the following example (CGEL, p.750):

64) I would be most grateful if you would/could give me the benefit of your advice.

In this example we can see that the speaker uses remote conditional and especially modals that according to their nature tend to be used in the polite manner unlike open conditional which in this case would be more straightforward and could be considered even as offensive. This could result in not getting the advice, which is something the speaker of this sentence clearly does not want.

In the case of open and remote conditionals that have *only if* or *even if*, their contrast is completely the same as with *only if*. However, the *only if* cluster is used mainly to express something like a wish in the protasis and it appears more frequently in remote conditionals, though it is not uncommon in open conditionals (CGEL, p.751):

65) He will get a distinction if he will only buckle down to some hard work.

If only is also used with the past or the past perfect tense to refer to the present and the past respectively, suggesting a strong wish or regret as in the examples (Diaconescu, p5):

66) *If only I had more money! I could buy that TV set.*

67) *If only you hadn't told Mike what I said! Things would have been all right.*

As we can see in the previous example, the modal *would* can be used in a combination with *if only* if we want to refer to the future, or it can simply be used to express the willingness or intention for doing something.

Apart from the previously mentioned clusters of *if* with *only* and *even*, there is also a very frequent occurrence of *if* with *so* and *not*. 'After *if* we can use *so* and *not* instead of repeating or negating a clause that has come before' (Swan, p.251).

- *Are you free this evening? If so, let's go out for a meal.*
- *I might see you tomorrow. If not, then it'll be Saturday.*

2.5.2.4. Verb forms in the remote conditionals




Figure 5 – Verb forms in the remote conditionals

In the previous scheme we can see the form of the verbs that are common in the protasis and the apodosis of remote conditionals. We can see that the verb form quite common in the protasis is the irrealis form or *were* (in this case), and in the apodosis we should have a modal auxiliary. When it comes to the first and third person singular form *was*, it is considered to be more informal than *were*. The most common modal auxiliaries are *would*, *should*, *could* and *might*.

In the following table we can see the possible occurrences of time reference in the protasis and the apodosis of remote conditionals. Philosophers tend to deal with conditionals and very frequently when they discuss conditional constructions, they tend to use the terms indicative and subjunctive conditionals for open and remote conditionals, respectively.

Table 9 – Protasis and apodosis in remote conditionals

Nr.	Example	Protasis	Apodosis
1	If I went tomorrow, I would have more time in Paris.	Future	Future
2	If they didn't carry out tomorrow's inspection after all we would be wasting our time cleaning up like this.		Present
3	If tomorrow's experiment didn't work, the Russians' original prediction would have been wholly accurate.		Past

Due to the modal requirement in the apodosis we have to rule out a lot of remote counterparts of open conditionals as for instance with imperatives and declaratives in the example (CGEL, p.752):

- imperative: *If it rains, bring the washing in.* - no remote counterpart
- declarative: *If Ed's still here, he is in his office.* - no remote counterpart

Processing these examples would be rather difficult if we had to use the remote counterpart in these previous examples because both the imperative and the declarative would lose their illocutionary force if we used modal auxiliaries typical of remote conditionals.

We have seen so far examples of conditional construction that have the protasis introduced by *if*. However, there is also a possibility of having a conditional construction without *if* or, in

other words, a conditional with *omitted if*. In this case we also have a subject-auxiliary inversion because apart from the PP in the protasis with *if* as head, and the content clause as CP it can also have un-governed clause with S – AV inversion (CGEL, p.753):

68) *Had I had any inkling of this, I would have acted differently.*

69) *Were that to happen, we would be in a very different situation.*

As can be seen in these two examples, these constructions are usually used with *had* and *were*, and they exclude their negative counterparts. However, there is also a possibility with fronted *should* and the example would be (Diaconescu, p.3):

70) *Should anyone call, please take a message.*

Apart from “regular” remote conditional constructions, we can also have remote conditionals that are doubly remote. Within these conditional constructions remoteness is marked twice: with the preterite inflection and by the perfect *have* (CGEL, p. 754)

71) *If you had come tomorrow, you would have seen the carnival.*

2.5.2.5. Open vs. hypothetical conditionals

There are also different label problems when we talk about the non-temporal classification of conditionals. Authors usually agree upon two terms: open and hypothetical. However, open conditionals are also frequently known as the real factual or the neutral conditionals because the speaker makes no effort to predict the fulfilment of the condition in the conditional construction.

Hypothetical conditionals are also known as unreal, rejected, non-factual and counterfactual and unlike open, speakers do not believe in the fulfilment of the condition mentioned in this conditional construction. Open conditionals, if perceived in a temporal manner, usually refer to the future, while on the other hand hypothetical conditionals may refer to different periods of time which naturally results in different levels of hypotheticality.

Previously mentioned division due to its nature and problems is related to this temporal interpretation because these two definitions are defined in several different ways by different authors. Funk (1985) defines open conditionals as sentences ‘referring to non-manifested, unverifiable events, that is for conditionals with future reference whether hypothetical or not.’

2.5.3. Indicative vs. subjunctive

There is an interesting division of conditionals by Gilberto Gomes (2008). Namely, Gomes based his work on the difference between the indicative and subjunctive conditionals. It is also important to note that subjunctives are frequently referred to as counterfactuals. The example that Gomes (2008) uses as an example of subjunctive conditional is:

72) If he were here today, he would certainly help her.

Also the example of the subjunctive form of the verb *to be*, which is known to have a special form for the past subjunctive (*were*) makes it different from other verbs. It is also important to mention that despite the fact that we are dealing with the past subjunctive, we are actually referring to the present time. The subjunctive conditionals usually refer to unreal and imaginary situations which provide enough ground for them to be called counterfactuals.

There is also a possibility of having a present subjunctive which is a bit outdated because of its form, but it can still be found as in the following examples (Gomes, 2008):

73) If it be your will..., I will speak no more. (song by Leonard Cohen)

74) “It would make it more important if that be the case,” he said yesterday.
(NY Daily News, 5 February 2007)

When it comes to the indicative conditionals they are usually of the type illustrated below (Gomes, 2008):

75) If he was here yesterday, he certainly helped her.

Indicative form of the verb is used both in the protasis and the apodosis, however there is another option that can also be frequently found in everyday English which involves the use of the modal *would* in the apodosis:

76) *If he was here today, he would certainly help her.*

According to Dudman (quoted in Gomes 2008) there is no need for a differentiation between the subjunctive and the indicative conditionals because English counterfactuals use the indicative, not the subjunctive mood, despite of *If I/he/she/it were*.

Apart from English, Gomes uses also examples from Portuguese to illustrate the division he developed. Gomes (2008) states that conditionals *in which the speaker accepts or speaks as if she accepted that the antecedent is false or probably false, but imagines a situation in which it would be true, are often called counterfactual conditionals*. This definition of counterfactual conditionals is quite common.

However, Gomes introduces two new categories instead of indicative (Gomes, 2008) *those in which the speaker is or pretends to be or speaks as if she were uncertain about the truth of the antecedent are **uncertain-fact conditionals***. There are also those *in which the speaker accepts or speaks as if she accepted that the antecedent is true* which are termed as **accepted-fact conditionals**.

In other words, Gomes prefers terms *counterfactual* over *subjunctive* and *uncertain-fact* and *accepted-fact* conditionals over *indicative* conditionals which he based on the acceptance or as-if acceptance of the truth of the event mentioned in the antecedent.

The problem with the differentiation between uncertain-fact and accepted-fact is that there is no distinction in respect to the verb forms used in each of the conditionals i.e. in the antecedents. Gomes (2008) introduces a new criteria to prove his division. He states that

“*if* can usually be paraphrased with *in case* or *supposing* in uncertain-fact conditionals (but not in accepted-fact conditionals) and by *since* or *giventhat* in accepted-fact conditionals (but not in uncertain-fact conditionals. ... In an accepted-fact conditional the meaning of *if* is similar

to the meaning of *since* or *given that*, while in uncertain-fact conditionals it is similar to the meaning of *in case* or *supposing*.”

If we look at the following two examples (77 and 78) from Gomes (2008), following his distinction we may see that a) is an uncertain fact conditional because the speaker is not sure about the fact whether or not he/she is actually going to Mexico , while b) is an accepted-fact conditional because the speaker accepted or speaks as if he/she accepted the fact that she is Italian and thus concludes that she is European.

77) *If I go to Mexico, I'll visit the pyramids.*

78) *If she is Italian, she is European.*

Following the criteria that Gomes (2008) uses we may come up with examples 79) and 80) which in a way support Gomes' division because the meaning of the conditional clauses remains the same:

79) *In case/Supposing I go to Mexico, I'll visit the pyramids.*

80) *Since/Given that she is Italian, she is European.*

If we look at previous examples, and especially at the accepted-fact conditionals, which are according to Gomes (2008) frequently used with *since/given* instead of *if*, we can have a credible doubt whether accepted-fact conditionals are conditionals at all.

However, Gomes (2008) justifies accepted-fact conditionals by explaining four features that put them into the category of conditionals:

- I) They share the same overall linguistic structure with other conditionals (*if...then*, same pattern for building the compound sentence and similar intonation and prosody)
- II) They share many basic logical and cognitive properties with the other two types of conditionals:

- they may be used to draw a conclusion
- they may be used to make a prediction
- they may be used to indicate the subject's intention to do something

III) The subclause in accepted-fact conditionals is not merely an adverbial clause of reason (or cause), as might be thought from the possibility of paraphrasing *if* with *since* but a real *conditional* relative clause.

IV) Accepted-fact conditionals may in many cases supply an adequate contrapositive for counterfactual conditionals.

Gomes (2008) goes even further in the division and introduces a category of atypical conditionals for those conditionals which do not belong to any of the previously mentioned three categories. Those are conditionals of the type (Gomes, 2008):

81) *If he had taken arsenic, he would be showing signs of arsenic poisoning-but he isn't.*

82) *If he took arsenic, signs of arsenic poisoning are expected – but he is showing no such signs.*

These conditionals belong to typical counterfactual and typical uncertain-fact conditionals according to Gomes' classification, but they have they also have a comment introduced with *but*, which makes them atypical.

2.5.4. Epistemic, speech-act and content conditionals

2.5.4.1. Epistemic conditionals

Epistemic conditionals occur within the epistemic domain and involve the reasoning processes. The truth of the hypothetical protasis is a sufficient condition for concluding the truth of proposition in the apodosis. In this process the underlying cognitive reasoning process plays a crucial role.

83) *If she's divorced, (then) she's been married.* (Sweetser 1990)

This epistemic conditional should be understood in relation to our ability to understand that after we hear the fact that she's divorced, we are able to conclude that she's definitely been married.

2.5.4.2. Speech-act conditionals

Speech-act conditionals are such that the speech act represented in the apodosis solely depends on the fulfilment of the condition mentioned in the protasis as in example (Sweetser 1990)

84) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.

In this conditional there is no condition that needs to be fulfilled as in content conditionals, namely the speaker is simply stating the fact that there are some biscuits on the sideboard in case that the hearer may be hungry and would like to eat some. Of course, this would be relevant and will become relevant in case of the hearer being hungry.

The issue of content, the epistemic and the speech act domains is something Dancygier (2004) also dealt with. Namely, according to her understanding of conditionals and the relationship between p and q in these previously mentioned domains, she concludes that within the content domain, 'causal relation holds between the described event and situations.' (Dancygier, 2004)

On the other hand in the epistemic domain, the issue is a bit different and 'the construction links premises and conclusions.' Finally, in the speech act domain ps are used as comments on the speech acts performed in qs . Following examples taken from Dancygier (2004) best illustrate this claim:

85) If Mary goes, John will go.

86) If John went to that party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam.

87) If I haven't already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you go.

As we can see in example 85), there is definitely a causal relation between what is said in the protasis and the apodosis. Namely, the issue of Miriam's going (to the party) will directly cause John's going (to the party). Likewise his not going will also cause Miriam's not going.

This can also be verified through the insertion of *it means that* phrase in the apodosis and the conditional in example 85), becomes *If Mary goes, (then) it means that John will go*. We can also insert *only* before *if* and get a plausible construction: *Only if Mary goes, John will go*. However, if we inserted *only* after *if*, the example we would get would be somewhat different in meaning:

88) *If only Mary goes, John will go*.

In the epistemic domain, we may see that based on the fact we became aware of in the protasis we may draw a conclusion about the event that occurred in the apodosis. In other words, based on our understanding that John went to that party, although we may have known that he will not, maybe due to some agreement he had with Mary, we can conclude that he went there just to infuriate Miriam. In the example 87), the speaker is simply asking the hearer to do something. However in the protasis he is uncertain whether or not he has already done that before (i.e. asked the hearer before).

Sweetser (1990) also distinguishes between content, epistemic and speech act domain. She argues that there are different relations linking *p* and *q* depending on the domain they belong to. Therefore, we may say that clauses in the content domain are linked causally, in the epistemic domain there is more logical view, in which the protasis can be seen as a premise, while the apodosis can be seen as a conclusion. In the speech act domain, the protases express the conditions under which speech acts in the apodoses are relevant and satisfactory.

In his typology of conditionals Bernard Comrie suggests that there are two issues that need to be dealt with when it comes to conditionals. First, we need to consider the way in which we are to isolate the given construction and second, we need to think about how to identify the meaning of the construction. However, we also have to make a distinction between the meaning and the interpretation of the construction because the interpretation inevitably involves some conversational implicatures.

2.5.5. Consequential and Non-consequential conditionals

According to the view expressed by Barbara Dancygier and Eva Mioduszevska (1984) the greatest problem with conditionals is in the approach that uses the following assumptions:

- The meaning of a conditional sentence is non-factual or counter-factual, depending on whether the condition expressed in the if-clause can (with various degree of probability) or cannot be fulfilled;
- Although meanings of conditional sentences are varied, they can nevertheless be accounted for in terms of a uniform apparatus. The main criteria of classification are the following: the form of the verb, temporal reference of the sentence and the character of the condition (real or open and unreal) (Dancygier 1984)

If we pay attention to these assumptions we can see that conditionals have been classified according to their form and not their meaning. We can also clearly see that conditionals are classified according to the form of the verb, temporal reference of the sentence and the type of condition being real or unreal which further confirms this previous claim.

However, according to the semanto-pragmatic viewpoint, different criteria need to be created for the classification of conditionals. The meaning relationship between the main clause and the *if-clause* appears to be suitable for this purpose. In respect to this relationship between *p* and *q* (main and *if-clause* which in this case may also be referred to as antecedent (*p*) and consequent (*q*)) we can have two types of conditionals:

- a) Consequential
- b) Non-consequential

Consequential conditionals employ a principle of causality between p and q in which p is the cause of q or q is the result of p .

Non-consequential conditionals are quite opposite to consequential because p and q are not connected by the principle of causality, but they have such a relationship in which, if we want p to be true, we have to have q true as well.

The following examples will provide us with a clear depiction of the difference between consequential and non-consequential conditionals (Dancygier, 1984):

89) If I catch the train, I will come on time.

90) If Susie is listening at the door, she is breathing quietly.

As we can see in the first example there is a clear causal relationship between what is said in p and its result in q . Namely, the fact that we will arrive on time is simply a consequence of our catching a train or the cause for our not coming on time is that we did not catch the train. Based on this we may also quite reasonably use the negative counterpart of this sentence without having almost any change in meaning relative to the context:

91) If I don't catch the train, I will not come on time

The situation in the second example is slightly different. Namely, we do not have the cause-effect relationship between Susie's listening at the door and her breathing quietly as it is expressed in q . In this case for the speaker to accept p , in other words her listening to the door, the speaker also has to accept q , the fact that she is breathing quietly, out of which we may conclude that the relationship between p and q in non-consequential conditionals is based on speakers belief about what is true and what is not.

However, to prove the existence of this cause-result relationship between p and q we can use several tests according to Dancygier and Mioduszevska(1984). The first test includes the insertion of 'it means that' phrase for the purpose of showing that the situation described in p is the cause for the occurrence of the event in q .

92) *If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause. (AmE, corp.)*

As we can see in the previous example, there is a clear cause-result relationship between p and q , war mentioned in p being the cause for fighting mentioned in q . However, to be able to confirm this relationship we need to insert *it means that* phrase as follows:

93) *If we fight in a just cause, then (it means that) war is forced upon us.*

We can notice here that for us to be able to insert *it means that* phrase we had to reverse the order of p and q and do a tense adjustment because we wanted to preserve the same meaning. If we did not make the mentioned changes, then the sentence *If we fight in a just cause, war is forced upon us* would not have the same meaning as the sentence in the previous example due to the nature of the cause-effect relationship.

The second test that proves the existence of the cause-effect relationship between p and q with consequential conditionals involves the insertion of “*only*” before or after *if*, to show that p is not just the cause but also sufficient condition for q to be true.

94) *Only if war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause.*

95) *If only war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause.*

Based on these examples and particularly the one with *Only if...* we can see that p definitely is not just a cause for q to happen but also a sufficient condition, in other words, should this condition (p) be fulfilled, the effect in q will occur.

The third test includes the reversal of p and q which involves change of tenses in order for us to preserve the meaning, example of something similar we had in the example with *it means that* phrase insertion.

2.5.5.1. Non-consequential conditionals

Non-consequential conditionals are completely different compared to consequential - to reverse the clauses in this respect like with the consequential conditionals is not possible. Antecedent (p) is not the cause for q which means we do not have a cause-effect relationship. However, it does not mean that p cannot be the reason for q , and we can clearly see that in Susie example in which the reason for Susie's breathing quietly is the fact that she is listening at the door. Also one of the ways to further confirm the claim of lack of cause-effect relationship with non-consequential conditionals is by negating both p and q respectively.

96) *If she called yesterday, I was out (Dancygier, 1984)*

97) **If she didn't call yesterday, then I wasn't out.*

As we can see there is a difference in the meaning between the first and the second example and the result of negating p as with consequential is not instant negation of q . The remaining test used with consequential conditionals involves the insertion of *only* before or after *if* in non-consequential conditionals, which in this case results in a complete change in the meaning of the whole sentence

98) **Only if she called yesterday, I was out.*

2.5.6. Pragmatic, hypothetical and course-of-event conditionals

Pragmatic conditionals belong to a very controversial type of conditionals which are not so popular due to their characteristics. Namely, there are three major types of conditionals: hypothetical, course-of-event conditionals and pragmatic conditionals.

Hypothetical conditionals are the most representative members of this category and usually when we think about conditionals a hypothetical conditional will cross our mind. Course-of-events conditionals are rather vague and a little disregarded, but according to Angeliki Athanasiadou and Rene Dirven in their paper "Pragmatic conditionals"(2000), which provides important resource for understanding these conditionals, they are necessary for a proper

understanding of the pragmatic ones. Pragmatic conditionals and course-of-events conditionals share the same subcategory of inference conditionals and we have to be aware of both in order to understand them properly.

However, even the term pragmatic is a bit doubtful because people very often perceive it as mostly related to speech acts. The meaning that Athanasiadou and Dirven used in their work comes from Charles Morris who proposes a much wider use of the term pragmatic. Therefore, Morris 'specifies the relations between signs and their users....and there is a special emphasis on the presence of the use of the signs.' (Dirven, 2004).

One of the elements that differentiates conditionals is the causal dependency between antecedent and consequent and according to Dirven and Athanasiadou (2000):

The causal dependency between antecedent and consequent is absolute in hypothetical conditionals; causal dependency decreases considerably, but remains implicitly given in course-of-events conditionals; and dependency is reduced to purely logical, i.e. non-causal, relationship in pragmatic conditionals of the inferencing type as found in (2), and to a merely conversational point of relevance in pragmatic conditionals of the discourse type found in (3). But the dependency relation is never totally absent.

However, in some other examples that Athanasidou and Dirven use in their work, they show a difference between the types of hypothetical conditionals as well. Therefore, we may say that there are (A&D, 2000:1):

- potentially real hypothetical conditional:

99) *If it rains, we'll stay at home*

- unreal hypothetical conditional (counterfactual):

100) *If I was bald now, I would shoot myself*

When it comes to course-of-event conditionals, they may be further divided as follows:

- descriptive conditionals containing a description of two events:

101) If there is a drought, the eggs remain dormant.

- inference conditionals containing a descriptive protasis and an apodosis based on inference:

102) If a child has a fever with a skin infection...the infection is spreading seriously and should be considered a real emergency.

- instructive conditional in which the apodosis is an instruction which depends on the occurrence of what is said in the protasis:

103) If there is more than one contributor, either sort out separate responsibilities or pool the family income.

Pragmatic conditionals as superordinate category can be divided into two groups: logical and conversational conditionals. Furthermore, these two groups are divided into two categories. Logical conditionals are divided into identifying and inferencing conditionals and conversational conditionals are divided into discourse and metacommunicative conditional.

Logical conditionals, due to their nature of being reasoning processes, are such that the antecedent usually preposes the consequent. Conversational conditionals on the other hand depend on the choice of the speaker condition so that the antecedent tends to be postposed. However, despite these divisions they belong to the superordinate category of pragmatic conditionals which are mostly speaker or hearer oriented.

Previously mentioned dependency can be clearly shown in the following Table 1 taken from Athanasiadou and Dirven (2000):

Table 10 – Scale of dependency between antecedent and consequent in conditionals

High dependency		
Hypothetical conditionals	↑	<i>If it rains. we 'll stay at home</i>
Course-of-events conditionals		
Descriptive CEC		<i>If there is a drought, the eggs remain dormant</i>
Inferencing CEC		<i>If the soldier was coming, it was nearly time</i>
Instructive CEC		<i>You should call a doctor if there is a fever</i>
Pragmatic conditionals		
Identifying PC		<i>If there's one species to be put out to pasture it's Presidents</i>
Inferencing PC		<i>If she's divorced, then she's been married</i>
Discourse PC		<i>If anyone wants me, I'm downstairs</i>
Metacommunicative PC		<i>I've come to offer my congratulations, if that's the right word.</i>
Low dependency		

As we can see in Table 1, the highest degree of causal dependency between the antecedent and the consequent occurs with the hypothetical conditionals and the level of dependency decreases towards the metacommunicative pragmatic conditionals. Course-of-event conditionals are also above all types of pragmatic conditionals and therefore possess a greater dependency between the antecedent and the consequent.

Identifying conditionals are such conditionals in which the antecedent possesses an identifying function while the consequent is the identifier or the identified one. We can clearly see that in the example used in the previous table *'If there's one species to be put out to pasture, it's Presidents'* the antecedent clearly has the identifying function and the speaker clearly states that there is one species that should be put out to pastures and in the consequent we have the identified one that is 'the Presidents'.

Inferencing conditionals are mostly used to make inferences but also to emphasize the inferencing force of the utterance which is definitely a sign that they belong to the category of

pragmatic conditionals because there are also inferencing course-of-events conditionals. The example of inferencing pragmatic conditionals as mentioned in Table 1:

104) If she's divorced, then she's been married.

We can clearly see that there is some level of dependency between the antecedent and the consequent and that based on the fact that she is divorced; the speaker could reasonably conclude that she has definitely been married. *Then* is very frequent and can often be used to differentiate between the inferencing pragmatic and the inferencing course-of-events conditionals. However, there are many other epistemic expressions that may also be used with inferencing conditionals that include (Dirven, 2000):

‘from epistemic modal auxiliaries like *may, must, should, have to,* and paraphrasing constructions for modality such as *it is possible, surely, it seems likely* etc. to explicit lexical expressions denoting the truth-finding process, such as *(we) conclude, it follows that, is it any wonder, it stands to reason, you must admit,* or negative conclusions like *it does not follow, it is not necessary, it is strange, I see no reason,* etc. Even a certain rhetorical flavour may be present occasionally, especially through the use of rhetorical questions introduced by *why shouldn't, why not, how much less,* etc.’

Discourse conditionals are related to speech acts more than any other type of conditionals and they connect the consequent to some pragmatic factor in the conversation that is usually related to the hearer in the conversation.

105) If anyone wants me, I'm downstairs.

The most common feature of discourse conditionals includes their use of the present tense in both the antecedent and the consequent, the sentences are usually affirmative, the order of clauses is usually antecedent-consequent and in conversation there is usually a pause between the consequent and the antecedent, frequently referred to as 'caesura'. Further characteristics of the prototypical types of discourse conditionals include (Dirven, 2000):

- 1) *no possibility of using then*
- 2) *no hypothetical forms*
- 3) *no change of tenses*
- 4) *intonational 'caesura'*
- 5) *no explicit use of performatives*
- 6) *very great ambiguity of possible speech-act forces*
- 7) *preferred order: antecedent before consequent*

Metacommunicative conditionals are similar to discourse conditionals. However, they are, unlike discourse conditionals, more directed to the speaker. Their purpose is in a way to highlight some of the aspects of communication which need special emphasis, or to soften the effect of the consequent.

Metacommunicative conditionals usually refer only to the single word or expression as in the example *I've come to offer my congratulations, if that's the right word* in which the consequent referred to is only one word; in this case the word *congratulations* because the speaker is not certain that in the given context (s)he has used the proper word.

Further analysis done by Inchaurrealde (2005) is also directed to the logical inference of pragmatic conditionals. Namely, he bases his analysis on the graded-truth evaluation of conditionals (epistemic evaluation in terms of probability of occurrence) and claims that apart from the course-of-event and hypothetical conditionals that Athanasidou and Dirven (1997) mention to be the only analyzable in this respect, some pragmatic conditionals can be analyzed in epistemic terms as well. As an illustrative example he presents the table that Athanasidou and Dirven used and afterwards provides us with his formulation of the table for identifying and inferencing pragmatic conditionals.

Table 11 - Conditionals and (non-) commitment to reality (Athanasidou & Dirven, 1997:73)

Type of conditional	Commitment to the Realisation of the situation	Attitude towards likelihood		
Course-of-event conditional	REAL	Factual	1) If he goes on Fridays, I go too	
		Close to factual	2) If he goes, as is usually the case, I will go too.	
Hypothetical conditional	Unmarked	Distancing from factual	3) If I go bald, I will shoot myself.	
			4) If I do go bald, I will shoot myself.	
	Marked	POTENTIALLY REAL	Not likely	5) If I went bald, I would shoot myself.
			Less likely	6) If ever I went bald, I would shoot myself.
			A bit more likely	7) If I did go bald, I would shoot myself.
			Even less likely	8) If I should go bald, I would shoot myself.
			Highly unlikely	9) If I were to go bald, I would shoot myself.
				10) If I was bald now, I would shoot myself.
				11) If I had gone bald, I would have shot myself

As we can see in this table, just as mentioned, Athanasidou and Dirven used only course-of-event and hypothetical conditionals, while in the following Inchaurrealde presents the table for

assigning probability to identifying and inferential pragmatic conditionals. (Inchaurrealde, 2005:13)




Figure 6 - Assigning probability to identifying and inferential pragmatic conditionals

Pragmatic conditionals, as such, , stirred a great debate about their function and use. Namely, Alejandro López-Rousseau and Timothy Ketelaar deal with a satisfying algorithm for pragmatic conditionals using Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet as a source for their work. What is interesting about their work is the fact that they actually revise the taxonomic representation of social and communicative conditionals done by Evans (2005) and represented in the following algorithm:




Figure 7 - Taxonomic representation of social and communicative conditionals (Evans 2005)

However, López-Rousseau and Ketelaar were not satisfied with Evans' algorithm because they find it to be a bit complicated and they deal with the question of how people differentiate between the different types of conditionals in respect to a promise, threat or something else. Their answer includes both linguistic and non-linguistic cues and they afterwards managed to create the pragmatic cues algorithm presented in the following image. There is also a problem with the strength of inducement and advice, i.e. which of the two has more power over the listener. For the authors, the inducement does not necessarily have to be stronger than the advice but this should definitely be determined by the context.




Figure 8 - The pragmatic cues algorithm. Source: López-Rousseau A, Ketelaar T (2004) “If...”: Satisfying algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains.

The best way to understand this is to use an example which in a way is going to show that thanks to the content and context, we can actually determine the strength of a conditional, which is important if we want to achieve something. Therefore, if we take an example:

106) If you submit your paper to our journal, we’ll publish it. (López-Rousseau: 2)

We can track the previously mentioned algorithm and start with the first node and ask ourselves whether this (q) is a benefit for the listener or not, either yes or no, we will move to the second node, respectively. Since the answer is *yes*, we come to the second node where, again, we have a question whether q involves the act of a speaker of the conditional or not, and again the answer is *yes* and we get to see that we actually have a conditional expressing promise. Should the answer be different, at any level, we would actually reach a different result.

However, even this algorithm is limited only to six pragmatic conditionals and three linguistic clues. Therefore, Lopez-Rousseau and Ketelaar decided to create the pragmatic use algorithm

in image 3 and its upgraded version in image 4. As we can see, if we compare the two, the upgraded version of the algorithm in image 4 is different in almost all of the levels.

Therefore, should we apply the same example as with their initial algorithm, we could see that the speaker controls the *q* (publishing the paper), then we can conclude that by publishing the paper, the speaker rewards the listener and we end up at the same endpoint being the promise.




Figure 9 - The pragmatic cues algorithm for pragmatic conditionals. Source: López-Rousseau A, Ketelaar T (2004) "If...": Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains.




Figure 10 - The revised pragmatic cues algorithm for pragmatic conditionals. *Source:* López-Rousseau A, Ketelaar T (2004) “If...”: Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains.

There is also another group of conditionals which is directly related to the pragmatic conditionals but not necessarily put into this category. However, due to the meaning expressed, it is put in this chapter. This group involves so called commissive conditionals which involve both conditional promises and conditional threats. This group is differentiated by Franke (2009) as a part of his dissertation.

This division is mostly based on the semantic viewpoint but it may prove useful for our purposes as well. The importance of this group of conditionals is in the way they tend to influence the decision-making process of the hearer. This will be clearly visible in our corpus because political discourse is frequently used for similar purposes. Frank (2009) exemplifies these conditionals as follows:

107) If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars.

108) a) I'll lend you a book, if you lend me the bicycle tomorrow.

b) *If you don't stay away from my girl, I'll burn your record collection.*

c) *If Martha finds out about this, our friendship is over.*

In the example 107) and 108a) Frank exemplifies a conditional promise, while in the remaining two we have a conditional threat. These conditionals, which are also important, use consequents to express certain circumstances which may or may not be suitable for the hearer, thus trying to exert the influence over him.

2.5.7. Factual, hypothetical and relevance conditionals

Ian Lowe (1992) in his work presented during the International Summer Institute of Linguistics considers that conditionals should be studied from the discourse standpoint and that they should be understood as topics. Now, the term topic is actually sometimes referred to as the theme and it actually represents what the sentence or in this case conditional is about. Lowe also considers that the topic is actually the given information in conditional sentence.

However, in order for us to understand the term *given information* we need to perceive it as information available through our knowledge about the previous linguistic context that preceded the utterance of a conditional. In his analysis Lowe uses another perspective and that is the one concerning possible worlds.

Possible worlds is a theory that concerns the understanding of conditionals in such a way that we create a world apart from the actual in which the condition stated in the antecedent will be fulfilled for the consequent to be true.

Lowe used this theory as a background for his explanation of preceding linguistic context, stating that all the information coming from this context can actually originate from the actual or possible world, which enabled him to create an effective connection between his theory and the theory of possible worlds.

Lowe also introduced the distinction between conditionals with completely retrievable world information, those with incompletely retrievable world information, as well as factual conditionals. The interesting thing about this differentiation is the way in which world

information enters the preceding context of the conditionals and according to Lowe, the preceding context can contain:

- Modals that suggest possibilities
- Vocabulary that suggests options
- Maxims or ideals that suggest possibilities
- Plans that suggest things that might come to pass
- Purposes that suggest things that might be achieved
- Expressions of willingness that suggest things that could be done

The incompletely retrievable possible world conditionals are such that some new information is added in conditionals and usually this type of conditionals shows up when conditionals are a part of the direct speech quote.

Third group of conditionals involves factual conditionals which mainly deal with the actual world information and all the information in the conditional comes from previously arranged context. This clearly steps out of the rule concerning possible worlds that Lowe mentioned earlier but this was necessary due to the very nature of conditionals in question.

Apart from this, there are also different relationships that can occur between the main clause and the conditional clause: *premise-conclusion connection, proportionality connection, and contrast-concession connection.*

What is common for all these subtypes but also for all the three groups of conditionals is the fact that in order for them to be understood properly we need to be well aware of the context or the background of the entire conversation that preceded the utterance of conditionals.

Another author who also had a similar division of conditionals into three categories that depend, in some respect, on previous knowledge of the world of the speaker and hearer is Sabine Iatridou (1991). In chapter 2 of her work *Topics in conditionals* she reflects on three different types of conditional clauses and their differences and similarities including the syntactical analysis of certain elements as well.

Namely, she uses the term Relevance conditional (RC) or Conditional speech act for explanation of conditionals of the type (Iatridou, 50):

109) If I may be honest, you are not looking good.

110) If you want to know, 4 isn't a prime number.

111) If you're thirsty, there is a beer in the fridge.

Relevant conditional *if* clause, according to Iatridou, should contain some felicity condition for the use of the apodosis as a speech act. This claim is seen similar to Performative Hypothesis stated by Ross (1970) and Sadock (1974) according to which every sentence is embedded under the performative predicate of the form “I tell you that”.

One of the important things mentioned is also the difference between the hypothetical and relevance conditionals, and afterwards Iatridou also includes the tripartite comparison including factual conditionals as well.

The difference between hypothetical and relevance conditionals is that in the hypothetical conditionals as a part of the assertion we have both *if* and *main clause*, while within the relevance conditional only the consequent is the assertion. This can be easily confirmed if we try to negate the *if* clause, which is possible with the hypothetical clause, while it is not possible with the relevance conditionals. This can be clearly seen if we look at the previous example (Iatridou, 1991):

112) If I may be honest, you're looking awful.

113) That's not true. I look awful, if you may be deceitful.

After these claims it may be concluded that “relevance conditional *if* clause specifies some circumstances under which the consequent is relevant or appropriate as a speech act; it is not part of the assertion and therefore does not affect the truth-conditions of the sentence as a whole.” (Iatridou, 1991)

When it comes to factual conditionals, the important thing is that there is an assumption that somebody believes in the truth of what is said in the *if* clause. This somebody could be the hearer in the conversation but not necessarily. However, it is important to note that it cannot be the speaker. We can see it in the following example:

A: I haven't read this book, but John is reading it now and he says it is really stupid.

B: I haven't read it either, but if it's so stupid he shouldn't bother with it.

As we can see in this example, the person who believes that the book is really stupid is not the speaker, because it is rather obvious from the first part of the sentence in A, and it is neither the hearer, from the same reason. The only option is John.

There is also one similarity between factual conditionals and relevance conditionals. Neither of the two types of conditionals considers the reasons for the consequent of the conditional construction to be true. However, there are many more differences between factual and relevance *if* clauses.

Factual *if* clauses can be seen as giving a reason for the content of an assertion while relevance *if* clause does not give a reason for an assertion but rather provides an appropriate condition for the consequent to be seen as a speech act. Apart from this we may also say that factual conditional constructions unlike relevance conditional can use the conditional *then*.

There is also a possibility of having several *if* clauses in a final position in a sentence. In order to be able to understand this we may state that if we have:

FC (factual conditional), RC (relevance conditional), HC (hypothetical conditional), and the possible combinations may include:

- a) FC – RC while *RC-FC is ungrammatical
- b) HC – FC while *FC – HC
- c) HC – RC while RC – HC
- d) HC – FC – RC

The final solution d) follows logically from the previous options which can be illustrated through the following example (Iatridou, 191:67):

114) *You should invite her to tea if you see her again if you like her so much if I may say so.*

There is also a possibility of having several conditionals in the sentence initial position and in that case we may have the following combinations:

- a) RC – FC while *FC-RC
- b) FC – HC while *HC – FC
- c) RC – HC while *HC – RC
- d) RC – FC – HC

Option d) can be illustrated in the following example (Iatridou, 68):

115) *If I may say so if you like her so much (then) if you see her again you should invite her to tea.*

2.5.8. Predictive conditionals




Figure 11 – Predictive conditionals

Dancygier (1993, 1998) suggests that the causal meaning enters into interpretation of content conditionals through prediction. Prediction in conditionals is a type of reasoning which consists of setting up a hypothetical (typical future) mental space and an attempt to predict its consequences based on the knowledge of typical cause-effect chains and general world knowledge.

The most significant formal feature that differentiates English predictive conditional is actually a combination of verb forms in which we have present tense verb form in the *if* clause and modal *will* in the main clause. (Fillmore, 1990). Predictive conditionals assert causal dependency and correlation between the events or states of affairs described by its clauses.

In order to try and clarify this problem, Dancygier (2004) introduces predictive conditionals which include both future reference open conditionals and ‘hypothetical or distanced predictive conditionals. These predictive conditionals may be seen as a subclass of indicative conditionals, but they also may be referred to as content conditionals as seen in the division by Sweetser.

If we have predictive class, than we must have a non-predictive class of conditionals and according to Dancygier (2004) non-predictive are ‘all conditionals not marked with back shifted verb forms’.

Therefore, in order for us to be able to distinguish these two classes we must be aware of the term backshift that Dancygier used and it is ‘applicable to every case of language use such that the time marked in the verb phrase is earlier than the time actually referred to.’(Dancygier, 2004:37) This difference is further elaborated and can also be applied to examples from 1 -3 (p.10) we have mentioned previously.

If we look at these examples, we may see that in all three examples, in protases, we have non-modal verb phrases (*fail, failed, had failed*) and on the other hand we have the same modal in all of the apodoses (*will embolden, would embolden, would have emboldened*). Dancygier also introduces two types of backshift. *If*-backshift in which we have modal-erasing in protasis and hypothetical backshift due to the verb forms used that are named as hypothetical according to grammarians.

However, there is one thing that we should bear in mind and it is the fact that temporal reference despite different verb forms without proper time adverbials mainly relies on proper understanding of the context.

Previously mentioned predictive conditionals are represented through predictive reasoning and *if*-backshift, while on the other hand with non-predictive conditionals we have two

independent clauses joined together into a conditional construction. They can be characterized according to their relationship to the time and tense difference, the order of the clauses and the interpretation of the conditionality.

However, there are some conditionals that we cannot actually assign to any of the two categories (predictive and non-predictive) and they are called generic conditionals. In traditional classification of conditionals, this is the group of zero conditionals. This category is used to express general statements and both in the protasis and the apodosis we have present tense verb forms (Dancygier, 2004):

116) *If I drink alcohol, I get nausea.*

Dancygier also suggests several criteria for distinguishing epistemic conditionals. They involve non-predictive verb forms, relation between p and q and the ability to insert epistemic modal *must* and we can also replace *then* with *it means that*.

Speech act conditionals on the other hand are quite different. In these conditionals we have the protasis acting as a sufficient condition for the statement (speech act) of the apodosis. In other words, if the condition stated in the protasis is fulfilled, then the speaker will utter the apodosis. Speech act conditionals are also considered to be very polite in their nature because very frequently the speaker is asking for permission to say something as in *If I may ask, when did you get home?*

There are also no restrictions regarding the use of the verb forms and these constructions, just like the previously mentioned epistemic ones, they share certain features that enable us to distinguish them clearly: due to the content of the protasis and the apodosis we cannot use *then* in front of q ; both of the clauses are pronounced with sentence final intonation; order of the clauses is not fixed, which means that we can have both p and q in the initial position, though there exists certain prevalence for q to be sentence initial in order to express speakers uncertainty.

Metatextual conditionals, according to Dancygier (2004), are very much similar to speech act conditionals because they share many common features such as the fact that they both express conditions about appropriateness, they are not concerned with real world content in their

protases and apodoses and they do not use predictive verb forms. Apart from these, they share the fact that they are comments on the utterances and they can be used as comments on other conditionals such as (Dancygier 2004):

117) *I'd love to go if I didn't feel so lousy, if that's an appropriate expression.* (Metatextual)

118) *If I know my daughter, she'll go mad if you tell her.* (speech act)

However, they are also different in many points. There is a difference in their reference to their preconditions; speech act conditionals being more specific. However, the most obvious difference is in the order of clauses. Speech act conditionals usually have their *if* clauses in sentence initial position, not excluding the other order as well, while metatextual conditionals usually come as sentence final due to 'the fact that a metatextual comment must echo the text in question or refer to it anaphorically.' (Dancygier 2004:106)

2.5.9. Explicit or implicit conditional constructions

Conditional construction can also be explicitly (by the use of *if*) or implicitly marked for conditionality. Therefore, it is worth mentioning the constructions that are both explicitly and implicitly marked for conditionality. With the implicit constructions, *if* clause is frequently implied, not clearly stated, while conditional verbs are used in the main clause as in:

119) *I would have gone with him, but I had to study.* (Diaconescu, p.3)

120) *With luck, we'll be there by tomorrow.*

121) *Given time, they'll probably agree.*

122) *To hear him talk, you'd think he was Prime Minister.*

123) *I would write to her, but I don't know her address.*

124) *But for his pension, he would starve.*

125) *Without your help, I couldn't have done it.*

126) *In different circumstances, I would have said yes.* (Alexander, L. G., 2007)

In order to clearly prove that examples from 119) to 126) indeed represent conditionals, we'll paraphrase these examples with proper *if* clauses without any change in meaning:

119a) *I would have gone with him if I didn't have to study.*

120a) *If we are lucky, we'll be there by tomorrow.*

121a) *If they have time, they'll probably agree.*

122a) *If you hear him talk, you'd think he was Prime Minister.*

123a) *I would write to her if I know her address.*

124a) *If it wasn't for his pension, he would starve.*

125a) *If it wasn't for your help, I couldn't have done it.*

126a) *If there were different circumstances, I would have said yes.*

Reduction of the complement is the first case of changes within conditional constructions and it occurs when we have a conditional construction with *if* + content clause (usually), but there are also other possibilities as in the following examples (CGEL, p. 756):

127) *This product will/would stay fresh for two weeks, if kept refrigerated*

128) *There'll probably be vacancy in June; if so, we'll let you know.*

129) *We may be able to finish tomorrow; if not, it will certainly be done by Friday.*

130) *You won't get your money till next month, if then.*

131) *Some, if not all, of your colleagues will disagree with that view.*

132) *We'll get it finished by tomorrow, if necessary/possible.*

The protasis verb in the first example is in the past participial form and can be found in both open and remote conditionals. In the second and third example, we have a protasis as a pro-form standing for a clause with *so* being a positive and *not* being a negative counterpart. In 130) and 131), the protasis is used to cancel the implicature of the apodosis. Protasis in the last example is AdjP headed by either *necessary* or *possible* and cannot be replaced by any other adjective.

When we have a case that the protasis and the apodosis contain a related scalar predicative and the protasis is also negative, we can have both conditional and concessive interpretation of a single conditional. In other words, in the case of conditional clauses, one set of events depends on the other, while with concessive conditionals we have an implied contrast between two clauses.

In order to have a construction which is both conditional and concessive, sometimes it is necessary to have the subordinator *even if*, which due to its dual nature enables both. Therefore, a conditional of the type (CGEL, p.757)

133) *She is bright, if not a genius*

can have both concessive and conditional interpretation as follows:

Concessive: 133a) *She is bright, though she is not a genius.*

Conditional: 133b) *If she is not a genius, she is at least bright.*

If we look at the example with *even if*, we may also see concessive and conditional interpretation in the example (CGEL, p.750):

134) *You will have to repeat the whole year even if you fail just one exam.*

If...then combination appears frequently and it involves *if* at the front of the matrix clause and inferential connection between clauses as in the example (CGEL, p.757):

135) *If it wasn't Jill who left the gate open then it must have been Nat.*

2.5.10. Alternative conditional constructions

Another possibility with conditional constructions is to have coordinated and juxtaposed constructions with a conditional interpretation. These constructions convey their conditional meaning indirectly as in the following examples (CGEL, p.759):

136) *Say that again and you're fired.*

137) *Ask them to stay after five, they'll demand 50% overtime.*

138) *One more remark like that and you're fired.*

139) *Hurry up or we'll miss the train.*

140) *Either you agree to my terms or the deal is off.*

141) *Suppose I had the same number of peas as there are atoms in my body, how large an area would they cover?*

In example 136, we have an *and* coordination with an imperative which could be paraphrased so as to become a common conditional construction as *If you say that again, you are fired.*

The second example (137) is similar to the first with the difference that the clauses are actually juxtaposed. Originally it would be *If you ask them to stay after five, they'll demand 50% overtime.*

In the third example (138) we have the case that the first coordinated part is NP and originally it would be *If you make one more remark like that, you are fired.*

The fourth example (139) shows us that *or* is used as a coordinator and in order to have a conditional construction we must negate the first part of the construction such as *If we don't hurry up, we'll miss the train.*

In the fifth example (140) the first part of the coordinated construction is declarative and as in the previous example, if we want to get a proper conditional, we must negate it as follows *If you do not agree to my terms, the deal is off.*

The last example (141) gives us the construction that corresponds to the special use of the verb *suppose*. Namely, the *suppose* clause on its own is often regarded as interrogative.

Apart from previously mentioned coordinated and juxtaposed constructions we can also have NPs functioning as subjects while clauses are interpreted as conditionals as in the example (CGEL, p. 759):

142) The appointment of his nephew as finance minister will/would be a mistake.

Stacking is another interesting feature of conditional constructions according to which conditionals can appear in successive layers as in the following example (CGEL, p.760):

143) If the proposal is adopted prisoners will be entitled to a personal TV set if they enrol for a course at the Open University.

Exhaustive conditionals belong to a category of conditionals consisting of an exhaustive set of two conditionals, out of which one must be satisfied, which is the cause for calling these conditionals exhaustive (CGEL, p. 761):

144) I am buying it regardless of whether you can really afford it (or not).

However, if these conditionals have a subordinate clause as a complement of a preposition, then it is categorized as governed. If it has a subordinate clause as an adjunct then it is ungoverned.

The previous example is very similar to *alternative conditions: whether...or, whatever etc.* mentioned by Diaconescu and apart from these conjunctions we may also have other *wh*-words such as: *whatever, whoever, wherever*. This can best be seen in the following examples:

145) *Whether we win or lose, the match will be enjoyable.*

146) *I'll buy those shoes, whatever the cost.*

Conditional a) can be paraphrased as *If we win or even if we lose, the match will be enjoyable* to make a proper conditional. When it comes to the second example, it can be paraphrased as: *I'll buy those shoes even if they cost a fortune.*

Finally, we have seen that the process of describing conditional constructions is a rather complex task and that it requires the use of knowledge of almost all linguistic disciplines to be performed properly.

2.6. Meaning in conditional constructions

Apart from this difference related to the cause-effect relationship between clauses, it is also important to mention the connection between the meaning and conditional sentences and in that respect we may also see some differences among different conditional sentences. In this respect, three most common types of meaning are factual, theoretical and hypothetical.

Conditional clauses expressing factual meaning express facts and factuality and as such may also be found both in the antecedent and the consequent. There can also be both consequential and non-consequential conditionals and the major precondition for the use of these conditionals that express factual meaning is the proper context. The major issue that limits the use of these factual conditionals is that they should be truth committed and can only have present or past time reference, excluding future time reference.

Conditionals expressing theoretical meaning unlike factual conditionals should not be truth committed and the truth or the fulfilment of the condition is not important for the speaker who utters these sentences, or the speaker does not have the necessary knowledge about the possibility for the fulfilment of the condition. The interesting thing is that examples for ‘theoretical’ conditionals can be the same as those for the factual conditionals but the difference is only in the context.

Conditionals expressing hypothetical meaning will mostly be used by speakers who believe that the assumptions expressed by condition “will not, does not, or did not take place” (Dancygier, 1984). This will definitely be relevant in the research part of this dissertation to the nature of political discourse which favours these expressions. The relationship between these three types of meaning is best displayed in the following diagram created by Dancygier and Mioduszewska (Dancygier, 1984):




Figure 12 – The relationship between three types of meaning in conditional construction

There are also particular types of conditional clauses which are syntactically rather short but also very frequent in everyday use of conditional constructions.

Namely, as the first category we may have conditional clauses expressing politeness of the speaker and they involve conditionals such as (Quirk et al.):

- *if I may say so,*

- *if I may put it bluntly,*
- *if I may be personal,*
- *if you can be serious for just this once,*
- *if you can keep a secret,*
- *if we can be practical for a moment,*
- *if I may put the matter as simply as possible,*
- *if I may interrupt,*
- *if I may change the subject*

In the second category there are conditional clauses that act as metalinguistic comments such as (Quirk et al.):

- *if I may put it so,*
- *if that's the correct term,*
- *if that's the word for it,*
- *if you see what I mean,*
- *if I may phrase it delicately/loosely/crudely/figuratively,*
- *if you will,*
- *if you like*

In the third category there are conditional clauses expressing uncertainty about the extralinguistic knowledge required for the interpretation of the utterance (Quirk et al.):

- *if I'm correct,*
- *if I understand you correctly,*
- *if we can believe the experts,*
- *in case you don't remember,*
- *if you remember,*
- *if you know what I'm referring to,*
- *in case you don't know*

2.7. Degrees of hypotheticality

Another interesting aspect that Comrie (1986) mentions in his paper is the aspect of hypotheticality. He perceives it as 'a continuum, with (perhaps) no clear-cut divisions, and that different languages simply distinguish different degrees of hypotheticality along this continuum, the choice of form often being determined by subjective evaluation rather than by

truth-conditional semantics'(Comrie, 1986). In this respect, he defines hypotheticality as a 'degree of probability of realization of the situations referred to in the conditional, and more especially in the protasis'.(Comrie, 1986)

Further in his work, it is interesting to note that he completely denies the existence of counterfactual conditionals in English, or as Comrie says, 'conditional construction from which the falsity of either protasis or apodosis can be deduced logically.' This is a very interesting claim, especially considering the fact that there are many works written about counterfactuals although some authors also agree with the previous claim.

Therefore, following these claims, there are only two potential types of counterfactuals in English involving conditionals with past tense in the protasis and conditional in the apodosis as the first and conditionals with pluperfect in the protasis and conditional perfect in the apodosis. However, Comrie manages to cancel both showing that it is very hard for these constructions to have counterfactuality as a part of their meaning.

However, the hypotheticality as such according to Comrie can be represented as




Figure 13 – Degree of hypotheticality

As we can see in the previous diagram, the degree of hypotheticality rises when we move on to conditionals with past time reference, while it is much lower when it comes to conditionals with future time reference. Comrie also distinguishes between lower and greater hypotheticality in the English language conditionals and as he claims 'lower hypotheticality involves the indicative without any backshifting in tense...greater hypotheticality involves

backshifting in tense, so that with future time reference one finds the past tense in protasis and the conditional in the apodosis' as in the examples (Comrie, p.92):

147) LH: - *If you come tomorrow, you'll be able to join us on a picnic.*

148) GH: - *If you came tomorrow, you'd be able to join us on a picnic.*

2.8. Mental spaces

One of the things that should also be mentioned and which is very important for the proper understanding of conditionals is the theory of mental spaces developed by Gilles Fauconnier. Mental spaces are “constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions” (Fauconnier, 1985). This theory in its essence talks about mental spaces construed between the speaker and the listener in a discourse through the use of specific linguistic expressions called space builders. These spaces are embedded in reality space and usually directly connected to it and common to both participants in the communication. In the process of creation of mental spaces we may have different domains such as geographical, time or domain of activity. The importance of this theory for our understanding of conditionals is especially evident in the fact that *if p* as linguistic expression builds specific mental space in which we can have *q* as well. The relationship between meaning and mental spaces is best described by Fauconnier (1996):

...as discourse unfolds and mental spaces are set up, the recovery of meaning fundamentally depends on the capacity to induce shared structures, map them from space to space, and extend the mappings so that additional structure is introduced and exported.

Therefore having this in mind, we may say that *if* as such is a space builder for conditional constructions, it is also the sign of unassertiveness and of course it introduces one of the clauses of a conditional construction.

Space builders are grammatical expressions that open a new space or shift focus to another space; they comprise prepositional phrases (in London, in 1989), adverbials (certainly, hopefully), conjunctions (if, when, while, since),

subject-verb constructions (I think..., Mary hopes...), etc. (Inchaurrealde, 2005).

Inchaurrealde (2005), in his work, apart from the previously mentioned space builders also mentions names, descriptions, presuppositional constructions, trans-spatial operators and identification of elements as other instances of spaces builders. Apart from these he also refers to the use of tenses and moods which are also important for space building.

In his summary of several authors and chapters about mental spaces, Inchaurrealde (2005) draws the following conclusions:

- There exists some background knowledge that is available to both speaker and hearer in any communicative exchange. This background knowledge may have the form of frames, idealized cognitive models, cultural models, folk theories etc.
- There is information available that allows us to frame locally and pragmatically the content of the linguistic message. This information has to do with the genre of the exchange, as well as with the setting (when and where it takes place) and the participants of the exchange (who talks and to whom).
- Discourse construction starts from an “origin” or “current discourse” in the form of a base space, from which different spaces related to each other are created.
- The new spaces that are created are used to set up information and cognitive structure pertaining to many different kinds of things: time periods, beliefs, points of view, geographical locations, cultural constructions, as well as quantifications and hypothetical and counterfactual situations.
- The currently activated space is said to be “in focus”. Only one space is allowed to be in focus at a given time. Focus is switched by means of several grammatical and pragmatic devices.
- There are two main ways of connecting spaces:
 1. By means of an ordering relation, in which each space is introduced relative to another,
 2. By means of connectors linking elements across spaces.

When two spaces are connected by means of the procedure mentioned in 1., the space that is in focus introduces a new space, the old space then becomes a “father” space and the new one a “child” space. On the other hand, the usage of connectors in 2., should be made in accordance with the Access or Identification Principle.

- Structure is transferred across spaces in many ways, such as optimization, access, projection of frames, matching conditions for certain spaces, or upward floating of presuppositions.

According to the interpretation by Akatsuka and Strauss, Fauconnier (1985) characterizes counterfactuality as a case of "forced incompatibility between spaces" (i.e. it is irrelevant which is the real world “R” and which is hypothetical "H"). Space builders (a term coined by Fauconnier) include various linguistic elements: conditionals (*if...*), verbs like *wish* and negatives such as *not*. All these elements due to their semantic properties are able to create a counterfactual mental space in order to realize certain relation that was not possible in parent space. Subjective statements such as those in the following example actually demonstrate this claim (Akatsuka, 2000):

149) If Lucky had won, I would be rich.

150) I would have moved to Tahiti. I wish Lucky had won. I would be rich.

In example 124) *wish* is used to actually create a counterfactual space. Fauconnier did not take into account the mental attitude of the speaker because these are subjective statements, nor did he pay attention to adverbials as overt markers. *Not* and *prevent* are the strongest creators of counterfactual space because as such they negate the reality, i.e. factuality. Therefore, the space they create is counterfactual, while on the other hand, *if* and *wish* also do the same but they are not inherently negative like the previous two. However, if we have an example such as (Akatsuka, 2000):

151) Luckily, the fire was prevented from crossing the highway. My house would have been destroyed.

If we delete "luckily" we have an issue in which both counterfactuality and Fauconnier's claim are put to test. However, to find a solution different from Fauconnier's claim that counterfactuality stems out of negative lexical elements, we must, apart from that, also add a speaker's attitude of DESIREABLE and UNDESIREABLE. As Akatsuka and Strauss (2000) claim there exists "prototypical conditional reasoning".

- It was undesirable that p (fact) happened. If not p (counter – to – fact) had happened, it would have led to desirable consequences (not q).
- It is desirable that p happened. If "not p" had happened, it would have led to undesirable consequences (=not q).
- It is undesirable that p happened. If "not p" had happened it would have led to desirable consequences.

So the speaker invokes counterfactual thinking as a line of reasoning and not the lexical units that according to Fauconnier create a counterfactual space.

Counterfactual conditionality formula for Akatsuka and Strauss is *if not p then not q*.

2.8.1. Mental spaces and conditional conjunctions

Dancygier and Sweetser also deal with mental spaces and their practical use in the interpretation of conjunctions. Dancygier and Sweetser (2000) deal with the analysis of causal and conditional constructions with *if*, *since* and *because*. When it comes to the use of the three, we may say that they overlap in their use, in other words




Figure 14 – Relationship between conjunctions

you may use one instead of the other which is graphically portrayed in the picture on the left.

Sweetser and Dancygier outline the mental spaces relevant for their interpretation of the conjunctions in order to explain how these three types correspond to the interpretation of constructions such as in

152) *If his computer gets repaired, he'll finish this paper by Friday.*

In this example we have a space of mental content leading to reference to the possible state of affairs and eventually to a computer getting repaired. In other words we have content and domain space including speaker's and hearer's knowledge about the person in the previous example.

Furthermore, it is interesting to see the scheme of **predictive conditional** according to Dancygier and Sweetser in which we can see that if there was no alternative space, there would be no relevant predictive conditional:




Figure 15 – The scheme of predictive conditional

The previous scheme should be contrasted with the scheme of **speech-act conditional**

153) *If I don't see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving.*

In this conditional we do not have a possibility for alternative space despite the fact that the speaker may see the listener even after the speech act but before Thursday. The possible alternative speech-act conditional would be as follows:

154) *If I see you before Thursday, don't have a good Thanksgiving.*




Figure 16– The scheme of speech-act conditional

Speech-act conditionals can be differentiated from the content conditionals through the use of theory of mental spaces and without this theory, it would be a very difficult task.

According to Sweetser (1990), in content conditionals the paper's (from the previous examples) being finished is not a condition for the computer's being repaired but rather the opposite. However, in the epistemic world (epistemic conditionals) the knowledge of effects limits the possible conclusions about the cause and the sentence

155) If he finished the paper by Friday, his computer must have gotten repaired

can be possibly paraphrased as:

156) If I know (or we know) that the paper was finished than I (we) must conclude that the computer was repaired.

2.8.2. Metalinguistic space

- *Chris wants you to meet her fiancé, if that's the right word for him.*




Figure 17 – Metalinguistic space

Metalinguistic conditionality concerns mappings between the content space and the form space within a particular context. In this case the speaker creates form-content mapping (fiancé as a name for Chris' partner) which is afterwards set into metalinguistic space by calling it explicitly (if that is the right word). This is possible because a conditional construction involves setting up a mental space (through *if* clause) and requesting construal of something (*then* or main clause) within that space. The conjunction *if* is not lexically causal, but in the content domain, *if* sentences typically express causal or enablement relations among events as in the example (Dancygier, 2004):

157) *If you use this conditioner (cause), your hair will feel much softer.*

2.8.3. Epistemic stance

The central difference between *if* and *when* is that *when* commits the speaker to the reality of the space described in the *when* clause, even if that reality will only take place in the future. *If* maintains a neutral stance while *since* takes a positive one. Context and speaker's evaluation of the situation also affect the choice of *since* or *if*, such as (Dancygier, 2004):

158) *If/? Since it is not rude to ask, what made you get interested in linguistics?*

Therefore, in order for a speaker to be able to use *since* (hence the ? mark) it is necessary for the speaker to know that the hearer has already complied and doesn't think it is rude to ask.

2.9. Sufficient Conditionality Thesis

The main issue that creates trouble with the understanding of the conditionals is the necessity for clauses to be mutually connected and interrelated. Very frequent understanding of this issue involves *Sufficient Conditionality Thesis* according to which *p* is the sufficient condition of *q*. This is even more evident with *if p then q* conditionals which prove that the fulfilment of the condition in the protasis is sufficient for the fulfilment of the apodosis.

One frequent remark about the conditional marker *if* is that it is frequently understood as *if and only if (iff)* which in respect to our previous claim about the protasis being sufficient condition for the apodosis means that the protasis is not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition for the apodosis. This, according to Comrie (1984) is due to conversational implicature that results from *iff* understanding and sufficient conditionality.

2.10. Philosophical view of the conditionals

Being very a fruitful topic, conditionals have stirred a lot of debate not only among linguists but also among philosophers, who have found conditionals to be fertile soil for discussion. They distinguish ordinary language conditionals and material conditional interpretation of the ordinary language conditionals.

Natalie Schapansky and Rani Lill Anjum in their work on classification of conditionals take the categories mentioned above and base their research and analysis on them. In their research they refer to the ordinary language conditionals as natural conditionals and to material interpretation of conditionals as material conditionals.

Schapansky and Anjum deal with *If A then B* conditionals and with the truthfulness embedded in the antecedent and the consequent. According to their study, natural conditionals can be (Anjum & Schapansky):

- true when the antecedent and consequent are both true

159) *If Socrates is mortal, then he is a man.*

- false whenever the antecedent is false and consequent is true

160) *If Socrates is a man, then he is a cat.*

- true when the antecedent is false and the consequent is true

161) *If Socrates is a cat, then he is mortal.*

- true when the antecedent and the consequent are both false

162) *If Socrates is inanimate, then he is a stone.*

As we can see from this division the truthfulness of the natural conditionals mostly depends on the truthfulness of the consequent. In these examples we may see that natural conditionals are true when the consequent is true and only one is false when the consequent is true. An interesting thing is that the antecedent is in most cases false and has very little influence on the truth of the entire natural conditional.

If we look at these examples from a linguistic point of view, we may see that in both, antecedent and consequent, the verb form includes present tense, thus making it resemble zero type conditionals according to classical division of conditionals. However, if we try to go into further comparison, these examples may fall into many other linguistic categories, such as factual, speech-act, generic, etc.

Philosophers further distinguish between indicative and counterfactual conditionals. This division is rather similar to linguistic division into indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though some authors question the possibility that these types are the same.

Furthermore, they comment on the problems raised by the very nature of counterfactuals and their being true or not. One of the principles they used for determining the logical properties of natural conditionals is the dependence relation.

Dependence relation between the antecedent and the consequent is usually marked by *if*. However uses of *if* are also limited in respect to previously mentioned dependence relations and logical properties. Therefore, we can have

- Sufficient *if* – when antecedent is sufficient condition for the consequent
- Non-sufficient *if – if* with negation is used to deny sufficient relation
- Doubt *if – if* is used to express doubt about the antecedent
- Relevance *if* – where antecedent makes the consequent relevant

Other divisions of natural conditionals include ordinary conditionals, generic conditionals, existential conditionals, rhetorical conditionals, contra-conditionals, pseudo-conditionals, doubt conditionals and relevance conditionals.

Ordinary conditionals are those in which the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the consequent or the consequent is a necessary condition for the antecedent.

163) If it's sunny, we'll go out.

Generic conditionals are such in which the dependence relation between the antecedent and the consequent is universal whenever the conditions for the relation are satisfied. They are most commonly used to express general statements, thus resembling the use of zero conditionals. These conditionals have the logical form 'If an x is in the state G, it will, as a result, be in the state H.' (Anjum & Schapansky) as in the examples:

164) If an iron bar is heated up, it expands.

165) If a flower doesn't get water, it will die.

Existential conditionals are conditionals in which dependence relationship between the antecedent and the consequent is more related to specific context as in the example (Anjum & Schapansky):

166) If you go over and talk to that handsome doctor, your husband will get jealous.

Rhetorical conditionals are constructions in which the dependence relationship is used to achieve a certain effect such as doubt, irony, warning etc. and can be divided into contra-conditionals and pseudo-conditionals.

Contra conditionals are a special class of conditionals in which the negation in the consequent takes scope over the entire conditional and can be represented as ‘not (if A then B)’ as in the example (Anjum & Schapansky):

167) If you gave me a million, I wouldn't do it.

Pseudo-conditionals are such conditionals in which the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent is not of sufficiency or necessity relation. They are also interpreted only existentially.

Doubt conditionals involve the usage of ‘if’ for expressing the doubt about the antecedent.

In relevance conditionals modus ponens is used to make important for assertion, illocution or non-factuality while *if* is used to mark the importance as in the examples (Anjum & Schapansky):

168) If you are the inventor of thumbtacks, then I'm the pope.

169) If she is intelligent, then I'm Einstein.

2.11. Conditionals in Logic

Due to the nature of their research interest, logicians introduce two different terms: protasis becomes an antecedent and apodosis becomes a consequent. According to this view, *if* is not considered as a preposition but rather as a subordinating conjunction and as a forming part of the protasis.

As we have seen, conditionals are indeed a fertile ground for different research activities and they can be understood differently depending on our standpoint. Therefore, the views that we hold today may be completely different from the ones that existed in the past, which will be the topic of the next chapter.

Conditionals are a frequent topic in logic and they are considered as material implications defined as a relation between p and q such as follows:

- a) p is true \implies q is true
- b) p is false \implies q is true
- c) p is false \implies q is false
- d) p is true \implies q is false

However, this last option d) must be excluded from the natural language. A language also should not have a construction with the meaning *p if and only if q* but we should rather use the expressions *provided that* and *unless* which would provide us with the biconditionality of the construction. Therefore one/first characteristic of conditionals in logic is that they need to follow the truth table of the protasis and the apodosis without any further request (Comrie, 1986):

170) If Paris is a capital of Spain, two is an even number.

In this example we can see that the protasis and the apodosis clearly satisfy the truth values of the previous list, in other words, both the protasis and the apodosis may or may not be true. Therefore, *p* is false, because Paris is not the capital of Spain and *q* is true because two indeed is an even number which again is clearly in accordance with the claim b) above.

However, despite the logic and its requirements, the problem appears in the natural language which requires a stronger link between *p* and *q* and in most of the cases, this link is causal, i.e. *p* is the cause of *q*. This is the second requirement for the characterization of conditional constructions in the natural language. Precisely because of this requirement we cannot approve the above sentence because there is no causal link between *p* and *q*.

The common relationship in respect to causality is that almost always *p* is the cause and *q* is the effect. However, we can also have the reverse situation as in the following sentence (Comrie, 1986):

171) If it will amuse you, I will tell you a joke.

In this construction, my *telling a joke* is actually a cause for *your amusement*, but then again the cause for my *telling a joke* is actually my *wish to amuse you* which clearly shows that we have the case of bicausality in this example.

Despite previously stated criteria of causality being very important, we can still find the counterexample to the causal link which can be shown through the example with *even if* (Comrie, 82):

172) *Even if you pay me, I still won't do it.*

In this example we can clearly see that the part of its meaning is the denial of the causal link between the protasis and the apodosis. Namely, the hearer will not do the requested regardless of the fact that he is paid for it

There is also the possibility of turning some of the clauses that are not naturally conditional, with some modifications, into completely conditional such as (Comrie, 83):

173) *When(ever) he came late, he was scolded.*

Namely, in this example we had temporal clause with *when* and we simply inserted indefinite *ever* and we got the clause which is very similar in its meaning to the conditional clause:

174) *If he came late, he was scolded.*

One important thing we should not forget is the attitude towards conditional constructions or in other words towards the fulfilment of conditions stated in the protasis. Therefore, if participants believe that there is a possibility for the realization of conditions stated in *p*, these conditional constructions are named as *potentialis* by classical philosophers who dealt with conditionals. Conditional constructions are labelled *realis* conditional. Here the speaker has no particular opinion or attitude towards the fulfilment of the condition. If speakers find the conditions impossible to be fulfilled they call these conditionals *irrealis*.

2.12. What is political discourse?

In order for us to be able to understand what a political discourse is, let us first try and define its constituent parts. In other words, we should define words politics and discourse.

There are many definitions of politics available today and they are mostly dependent on the political theorist who defines politics. However, since the purpose of this dissertation is not to delve into the realms of political theory we may be satisfied even with a simple definition found in a dictionary on-line. Thus in a free dictionary available on the web we may find a definition of politics as follows (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/politics>):

a. The activities or affairs engaged in by a government, politician, or political party: *"All politics is local" (Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.) "Politics have appealed to me since I was at Oxford because they are exciting morning, noon, and night" (Jeffrey Archer).*

b. The methods or tactics involved in managing a state or government: *The politics of the former regime were rejected by the new government leadership. If the politics of the conservative government now borders on the repressive, what can be expected when the economy falters?*

As we can see this term covers reality area and thus the texts used in our research definitely belong to this realm, i.e. being political texts.

The other term that needs a bit of clarification despite the fact that it may seem fairly simple is the term discourse. This term is widely used today in many contexts but its basic definition is rather precise in the respect of its meaning (<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/discourse>):

- 1. Verbal expression in speech or writing.*
- 2. Verbal exchange; conversation.*
- 3. A formal, lengthy discussion of a subject, either written or spoken.*
- 4. Archaic - The process or power of reasoning.*

From this definition we can see that it covers verbal expression or discussion in either writing or speaking on a certain topic. Therefore, when we combine the two previously defined terms politics and discourse we get a compound political discourse that is a bit more complicated to define and explain. Namely, one of the most notable experts in the area of political discourse,

Teun A. Van Dijk, defines political discourse not as a genre but as “a class of genres defined by a social domain, namely that of politics” (Van Dijk, 1998).

Therefore, having this in mind, we may claim that government debates, press releases from political institutions, politicians’ speeches and many other forms of political expression definitely fall into the realm of political discourse. However, we need to bear in mind that this type of discourse must be related only to the professional performance of the politicians, or people dealing with politics while their utterances that are not directly related to their profession cannot be considered as a part of this discourse (e.g. their conversations with their family members).

The next important feature of political discourse is that it is rather hard to describe properly and with the intention to encompass all of its features because there are many different variations of political actions and discussions that further complicate the matter. The topic of political discourse can be virtually anything because we, as humans, tend to arrange and determine everything around us and in respect to a definition of politics it is evident that it must necessarily cover all spheres of human life.

However, if we want to limit it to a certain extent we may determine political discourse related to those events coming from the public sphere of life and involving government decisions, policies etc.

The style of political discourse is also hard to define because when it comes to lexical choice, there are no particular sets of expressions reserved for politicians in particular, and they mainly use everyday expressions with occasional prevalence of bureaucratic terms.

The political discourse in respect to genre is mainly determined by the institutions it comes from and thus it should largely be described in terms of context it comes from. This is also explained by Van Dijk (2002):

These and many other characteristics of political discourse obviously are defined in terms of contextual and not 'textual' categories, such as:

A. The global domain: politics

B. The global act(s) being implemented: legislation, policy making, etc.

- C. The global setting (House of parliament, session of parliament, etc.)
- D. The local political acts being accomplished: Tabling a motion, 'doing' opposition, etc.
- E. The political roles of the participants: MP, representative, party member, member of the opposition, etc.
- F. The political cognitions of the participants: Political beliefs and ideologies; aims and objectives, etc.

These (and some other) categories form a schema that defines the structure of the communicative events represented by participants in their context models, as defined above. In other words, the 'political' nature of debates, speeches, meetings, campaigns, advertising, etc. is defined in terms of their context characteristics, and not primarily by structural properties of the text itself.

Until recently, the area of political discourse from cognitive perspective was not the topic of many research papers. However, through the works of Brdar, Berberovic, Delibegovic-Dzanic etc. this area is becoming more and more the field of intensive research and the topic for many scientific papers and articles.

3. Research analysis

The research done for this dissertation involves the processing of political texts encompassing speeches and press releases including both those made in the White House and in the Parliament of the European Union. When it comes to speeches, they involve presidents Barrack Obama, George Bush and Bill Clinton, while on the other hand we have EU officials.

It is also worth mentioning that sometimes, it was only possible to get a written transcript of the speech by some of the American presidents after it had undergone certain filtering by the political administration offices, in case they would address current and sensitive issues.

Press releases were much more numerous and they come from both of the sources. Texts were gathered in the period of 3 years, from September 2009 to December 2012 and they frequently involve common topics related to world politics. During the process of data collection, the corpus came to comprise the following:

Table 12 – Corpus structure

Pages	Words	Characters	Lines	Sentences (~)
814	421,836	2,511,634	36,354	20,361

In the process of the text analysis, the use of online text analysis tool at <http://www.usingenglish.com/resources/text-statistics.php> was very helpful. Afterwards, the analysis showed that out of the total number of approximately 20,361 sentences, there were 577 conditional sentences of the type *if p,q*. This limitation was taken into consideration due to practical reasons. However we can see that even in an ordinary language when it comes to conditional conjunction, *if* tends to be the most frequent, thus making it suitable for our research. This can be clearly seen in the following table showing the percentage of most common conditional conjunctions in ordinary language (Narayanan et al. 2009):

Table 13 – Percentage of sentences with some main conditional conjunctions

Conjunction	% of sentences
If	6.42
Unless	0.32
Even if	0.17
Until	0.10
As (so) long as	0.09
Assuming/supposing	0.04
In case	0.04

The preliminary analysis showed that out of this total number the distribution of conditional sentences according to traditional classification is as follows in the chart:




Chart 1 - Distribution of traditional conditionals

The expectancy at the beginning of this research, having in mind that we are dealing with politicians and their 'promises', was that there would be much more type III and mixed type conditionals. Namely, these types tend to sound more formal, in everyday speech they are not heard quite often and may be very useful for avoiding direct address on certain important issues. These types are also very useful for giving vague promises, rather frequent in dishonest political campaigns. According to the theory of political discourse, we have seen that in respect to lexical choice, they prefer everyday expressions and bureaucratic terms. However, as we can see in the chart, we have the prevalence of zero and first type conditionals summing up to around 60% of all conditional types.

Another research done at the beginning was directed towards different distribution of conditional types in relation to the difference between American English (AmE) and English used in the institutions of European Union (EUEng). The difference is best illustrated in the following chart:




Chart 2 – Traditional conditionals' distribution among speakers

As we can see in this chart, the number of conditionals is 337 to 240 in favour of EUEng. The percentage is clearly visible in the chart as well. However, if we look at the individual categories, the situation is diverse. When it comes to the category of 0 type conditionals, EUEng is prevalent by some 14%, while on the other hand, in the category of I type conditionals AmE is ahead with about 25%.

In the case of the II type conditionals, as well as in the Mixed type conditionals, the difference is again on the side of EUEng, such that in the former we have a difference of 7% and in the latter of 12%.

The category of III type conditionals is the least frequent, thus the difference is insignificant in respect to our research and it amounts to about 1,3%.

Following this analysis if we have in mind the use of individual type of conditional clauses we may come up with several conclusions. If we bear in mind that we use the first type conditionals when we express a condition in the *if* clause and we express a likely outcome which we believe is going to be fulfilled in the future, we may conclude that due to greater frequency, AmE speakers seem to express greater belief in the possibility for the condition to be satisfied in the future. While on the other hand, the EUEng speakers due to lower frequency appear to express less belief in the possibility for the condition to be fulfilled.

If we look at the example of a conditional from the speech of president George Bush, we may see that the speaker, i.e. the president, is quite certain in the outcome, if the condition is not met by Saddam Hussein.

1) If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.

With zero type conditionals, we talk about things which are certain to happen under certain conditions. In the previous chart we may see that EUEng speakers use these conditionals when they talk about conditions they are sure will be fulfilled. Therefore, if we compare these two types, we may conclude that EUEng speaker tend to 'play on the safe side' when it comes to their use of conditionals. This can be illustrated in the following example taken from EU press release:

2) If, Alexei Leonidovich [Kudrin], you disagree with the course of the president, there is only one course of action and you know it: to resign.

It is clearly visible through the use of zero type conditional that the speaker is quite certain about the political appropriateness of the consequences of the act expressed in the *if* clause, thus the use of zero conditional.

Further analysis was based on the positioning of *if* clause within a conditional construction. As explained earlier in this dissertation, the common position for the *if* clause is initial, medial or final. In the research, the emphasis was put on the group of 351 conditionals consisting of mostly zero and first type conditionals. When it comes to the distribution of *if* clauses according to this criterion, the outcome is as follows:

- initial *if* clause: 238 instances such as:

3) *If I am elected president, I will negotiate, renegotiate this deal to include what is missing today.*

4) *If in certain circumstances that requires a referendum, then we'll have a referendum.*

5) *If NATO did kill Gaddafi, it will be grist for the mill of its critics, such as Russia, which has complained since the western war effort began in March that the West is exceeding its UN mandate of protecting civilians.*

- final *if* clause: 110 instances

6) *The deal concludes an opt-out clause allowing individual member states to lift the ban for up to a year at a time if market conditions allow.*

7) *In the future, historians who got their education through the national service loan will look back on you and thank you for giving America a new lease on life, if you meet this challenge.*

8) *Our grandchildren will find such things unthinkable tomorrow if we have the courage to change today.*

- medial *if* clause: 3 instances

9) *And this commitment, if we keep it, is a way to shared accomplishment.*

10) *So I think the fact that we actually have the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreeing that it's time to take this question off the enlistment form, that there ought to be a serious examination of how this would be done, even though they haven't agreed that it should be done; that the Senate, if they vote for the motion advocated by Senators Nunn and Mitchell, will agree; Senators who don't agree that the policy should be changed are agreeing that we ought to have a chance to work through this for 6 months and persuade them of that, I think, is very, very significant.*

11) *There is some talk that Mr Rösler, if he moves up, could replace Reiner Brüderle, another FDP man, as Germany's economy minister.*

The most frequent purpose of medial *if* clauses is to act as a comment, as can be visible in the previous examples.

Another aim of this research was to determine the verb phrase form both in the antecedent and the consequent. The overview of the verb phrase form in the conditionals can be seen in the following table

Table 14 – Verb phrase forms in conditionals

Verb phrase	If clause	Main clause
Present tense	321	173
Present tense+modal verb	296	145
Modal+present passive	∅	19

However, this simple division does not provide enough insight into the forms that exist within each of these categories because there are many present tense forms. In the research the first variant involving the present tense includes the present simple tense in either *if* clause or in the main clause.

12) *If you get a situation where people get the right to vote but no other change, no jobs, then two or three year down the line other people will say that Islam is the answer.*

13) *We will reward the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the principle that if you work 40 hours a week and you've got a child in the house, you will no longer be in poverty.*

14) *If you currently get your health insurance through your job, under our plan you still will.*

As the examples illustrate, all the verb forms (*get, work, get*) in the *if* clause are in the present simple tense. There is also a possibility for present simple tense to be found in the main clause as is the case in the following examples:

15) *My fellow Americans, if we're going to build that bridge to the 21st century we have to make our children free, free of the vies grip of guns and gangs and drugs, free to build lives of hope.*

16) *If the euro fails then Europe fails, and we want to prevent and we will prevent this, this is what we are working for, because it is such a huge historical project.*

17) *If we are ready to bring about more Europe, we have to seize this opportunity and use non-conventional methods.*

There is also a possibility to differentiate between present tense with common verbs and present tense of the verb to be which is quite frequent, both in the *if* clause and in the main clause. The complete set of variations of present tense occurrences can be seen in the following table

Table 15 – Present tense occurrences

Present tense form	If clause	Main clause
Present tense (common verb)	226 (occurrences)	80
Present tense (<i>to be</i>)	36	45
Present tense (passive)	25	9
Present Perfect (Passive)	7	0
Present continuous tense	8	3

The following examples will illustrate the present tense with the verb to be, passive and present perfect active and passive both in the *if* clause and the main clause.

18) *If it is set up in an asymmetrical way, where Belgrade has to accept everything Pristina demands, then it is no longer a dialogue, it is a blackmail.*

19) *If you want to reduce your heart disease risk, there are much better places to start than at the bottom of a box of chocolate.*

20) *If the fiscal compact is agreed by early next year, then the summit may be seen as an important step forward in the integration process, perhaps even a historic leap towards 'an even closer union' (unless the agreed budgetary targets place so much pressure on growth that they destroy euro).*

21) *If you go back to the beginning of this country, the great strength of America, as de Tocqueville pointed out when he came here a long time ago, has always been our ability to associate with people who were different from ourselves and to work together to find common ground.*

22) *If you haven't been personally affected by this recession, you probably know someone who has: a friend, a neighbour, a member of your family.*

The issue of modal verbs within a conditional construction is also an interesting matter for discussion. Namely, within the corpus the majority of modals can be found in the main clause while *if* clauses with modals are rather rare and amount up to only 17 out of 230 examples with modals.

23) *We can only go forward, if we all go forward together.*

24) *If any of the dissenters votes against, it cannot be held, and there is still plenty of dissent.*

25) *I have a huge amount of sympathy for the Greek people but you can't really expect other people to help, other people to show solidarity if you can't sort yourselves out internally.*

26) *We know from long experience that if they can't find work or a home or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and return to prison.*

The distribution of modal verbs in conditionals from the corpus, both in the *if* clause and the main clause, can be illustrated in the following table.

Table 16 – Modal verbs distribution

Modal type	If clause	Main clause
can	11	24
will	4	157
may	1	11
could	0	8
should	1	1
might	0	2
must	0	8

Previous examples involving conditionals with modals included only *can*, since it is relatively frequent, compared to others that have very low frequency in our corpus. Examples with *can* and *will* are left out because they are more common than other modals.

27) *If your family has separated, you must pay your child support.*

28) *If we don't cooperate, in 20years' time we may have just four countries in Europe with credible defence systems – Russia, Germany, France and the UK.*

29) *Merkel tried to assure her coalition that German taxpayers' money would not be wasted by voting a new bailout for Athens – but she could not rule out that the money might be written off if, as financial markets increasingly fear, Greece defaults.*

30) *These people shouldn't be kept in transit camps if it is possible to take them back to their home.*

31) *If the lower house completes its vote on Saturday, President Napolitano could accept Mr. Berlusconi's resignation as early as Saturday evening.*




Chart 3 –Speeches vs. Press releases distribution

The difference between speeches and press releases, in respect to written and spoken language production can be clearly seen in the previous chart. The total number of conditional occurrences in speeches amounts to about 40% of the total number of conditionals while in press releases this number rises up to about 60%.

However, this total number distribution does not reflect on the distribution of individual types of conditionals. Thus, in the first category with zero type conditionals we have 104 conditionals in press releases and only 37 in speeches. The situation in the case of first type conditionals is almost reverse because we have 121 first type conditionals in speeches and 88 in press releases. Second type conditionals have higher frequency in press release and amount to 63 examples while there are only 27 examples of second type conditionals in speeches.

Third type conditionals have very low number of occurrences and can be neglected at this point. Whereas, mixed type conditionals with 100 examples in press releases and 44 in speeches definitely favour written word.

Mixed type conditionals are more frequent in press releases. This shows that when it comes to oral production of conditionals, people do not want to use them, or they want to be more straightforward rather than with the use of mixed type conditionals, which are more indirect and usually not directly related to current issues.

However, they may be very useful in certain analysis or revision of certain issues, thus they seem to be appropriate for written texts.

32) If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional process(AmE)

This example proves that this conditional is used to be an analysis of the current issue in the judiciary system. Namely, the American president is talking about the problems that may arise from the arbitrary will coming from the court and the possible solution, should that continue.

33) "If Greece had defaulted, there would have been a domino effect carrying everyone away," Mr Sarkozy said. (EUEng)

This is Mr. Sarkozy's analysis of the current (at the time) problems in EU and the effect that the Greece crisis might have on the entire European Union.

However, if we cross compare all these types, we may see that conditionals in general, are more frequent in press releases rather than in speeches or transcripts.

3.1. Discourse conditionals in the corpus

One of the aims of this dissertation was to research the occurrence of discourse conditionals within political corpus. They belong to a category of pragmatic conditionals with clear cut features in respect to prototypical categories, but in more marginal categories there are many other features which seem to be common to other types of conditionals as well. One of the features of discourse pragmatic conditionals, as we have seen earlier in the text, is that they are very low on the dependency scale, i.e. the dependency between the antecedent and the consequent is rather low and only metacommunicative pragmatic conditionals have lower dependency.

Prototypical discourse conditionals involve all the 7 features referred to earlier on, but we have to bear in mind that these marginal cases also comprise the discourse conditionals in the

interrogative form, mostly involving *why not* questions in the main clause; imperative form in the consequent which is frequently in initial but can be found in final position as well. Apart from the most common tense combination for discourse conditionals (present + present) there is also a possibility to have past + present, past + past and past + past perfect tense combination which depends on the time referred to in the protasis and the apodosis.

Having in mind all these criteria, especially those about the prototypical cases, we may see that in accordance with the criteria about no possibility of using hypothetical forms and the most common use of present + present combination, we may conclude that within the corpus the only category meeting all these criteria is the category of 0 conditionals with 126 occurrences. Some of the examples include the following:

34) If lenders do not agree to the change in repayment terms, or if the restructuring results in an obvious loss to lenders, then it is generally considered a default by the borrower.

35) If France and Germany are preparing something, we are not aware of that.

36) ...You only walk away from the table if you know the others will come to get you back.

However, we need to take into consideration other criteria as well, thus if we think about the criterion number 1, about the lack of possibility of using *then*, we may see that previous example, (34) should be excluded and we may only use examples without *then*, which further cuts the number of possible occurrences by 8 occurrences such as (apart from the previous example 34):

37) If the euro fails, then Europe fails, and we want to prevent and we will prevent this, this is what we are working for, because it is such a huge historical project.

38) And if this is how the reporting is made, then how can we trust it?

39) If we act decisively, then we have nothing to fear from the 21st century.

40) *Because if you don't have any fresh ideas, then you use stale tactics to scare the voters.*

41) *If you don't have a record to run on, then you paint your opponent as someone people should run from.*

42) *And if the Republican leadership is going to insist that 60 votes in the Senate are required to do any business at all in this town – a supermajority – then the responsibility to govern is now yours as well.*

43) *'If they (Nato) are really interested in protecting civilians ... then we call upon them to stop and start talking to us,' Ibrahim said.*

The next criterion narrows down the spectrum of occurrences even further, thus if we have in mind that the preferred order of conditional clauses is if p, q, i.e. antecedent before consequent, we get to 85 occurrences and example 36 has to be left out as well. This brings us to the examples such as the following:

44) *If he succeeds in framing the issue as being one of remaining in the euro zone, obviously he is going to get a huge yes.*

45) *If Berlusconi loses, he has to die.*

46) *...if they can't find work or a home or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and return to prison.*

Another quality states that discourse conditionals mostly involve affirmative clauses, while negative should be left out. The issue of interrogative clauses in discourse conditionals is explained earlier in the chapter. If we bear in mind this request for being affirmative then we have to narrow down our occurrences to 112 being affirmative in both the antecedent and the consequent. These occurrences include examples such as:

47) *If we speak about human rights, Tibet is also part of human rights.*

48) *If I have to die, I want to die with my wife and kids, and masses of people will do the same as me.*

49) *And if the shipper puts down the wrong numbers (of the size of the order) this is taken at face values by Malta and by the EU.*

One of the elements necessary to describe discourse conditionals is also the issue that states that there are no changes of tenses in case of antecedent-consequent order reversal. However, before elaborating on this issue we will first conclude the discussion about the criteria so far. Namely, if we combine all these requirements then we get to the number of 68 occurrences which should be prototypical discourse conditionals. These conditionals are affirmative, there is no use of *then*, and the preferred order is antecedent before consequent. In the further explanations we will deal with these examples.

As far as the tense change is concerned, as explained at the beginning of the previous paragraph, we will show it in the following examples taken from our corpus:

50) *If you want to reduce your heart disease risk, there are much better places to start than at the bottom of a box of chocolates.*

51) *If he succeeds in framing the issue as being one of remaining in the euro zone, obviously he is going to get a huge yes.*

52) *If it's confirmed, it is a good outcome.*

If we reverse the order of clauses, we should have no change of tenses and preserve the same meaning as we have in the previous clause and we get the following:

50a) *There are much better places to start than at the bottom of a box of chocolates if you want to reduce your heart disease risk.*

51a) *Obviously he is going to get a huge yes if he succeeds in framing the issue as being one of remaining in the euro zone.*

52a) *It is a good outcome if it's confirmed.*

If we pay attention to each of these examples, we may see that they indeed belong to the class of discourse conditionals and they satisfy the criteria of tense preservation. Thus in the example 50 and 50a we understand that in case of our desire to preserve our health and to avoid heart disease we should avoid eating too much chocolate. In both of the examples we have the same tense in both, the antecedent and the consequent, i.e. present tense respectively. In example 51a and 52a, the situation is exactly the same, the tense combination is preserved despite the reversed order of the clauses and the meaning remains the same.

There is another condition that needs to be met if we want to talk about discourse conditionals. Namely, condition number 4 includes intonational caesura or pause in conversation after the antecedent and before the consequent.

Therefore, if we look at the previous examples, i.e. (50,-52), we may see that there is a comma separating the antecedent and the consequent. Comma usually marks a pause in speech or reading certain text apart from grammatical rules that determine the position of comma within a sentence.

However, if we look at the reversed examples, i.e.(50a), (51a) and (52a), we may also conclude that there is definitely an intonational caesura or pause when we pronounce these three examples, which further confirms that these examples belong to the category of discourse conditionals.

Another point is important to be stressed with respect to discourse conditionals and it involves the meaning expressed through the use of these conditionals. If we bear in mind the statement that (Athanasidou & Dirven, 2000) '*Discourse conditionals link the consequent to some or other, usually hearer-oriented, pragmatic factor in the conversation.*' we may find it necessary to provide the analysis of our group of discourse conditionals in this respect as well.

Namely, according to the previously mentioned criteria, there is a group of 68 conditionals that satisfy all the requirements. For the sake of current analysis we will discuss half of this group for practical reasons.

53) If Alexei Leonidovich [Kudrin], you disagree with the course of the president, there is only one course of action and you know it: to resign.

When we look at this example we see that the tone of this conditional is a bit threatening of the type: if you don't do A, there is B, or in other words, if you don't disagree, you should resign. However, the consequent is also hearer-oriented and is definitely related to some pragmatic factor in the conversation. The current political issue at stake in this conversation, as we can see from the broader context, involves disagreement between Mr. Kudrin and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev.

However, this issue is also raised at the time when there were many rumours about the possibility of switching positions between president Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. Alexei does not share the same political views with the president and being in a position which requires him to do so, he has two options, either to resign his position or to accept current presidential politics.

This is precisely what Medvedev wanted to do and this conditional construction is used to express an ultimatum for Alexei to either agree with the current politics or to resign. However, even the deadline for making the decision is rather short, till the end of Monday, thus making this statement really discourse significant. What further intensifies its importance is the fact that it comes from the man in power and it is addressed directly to Alexei Kudrin.

54) "If we want to stabilise the situation, if we want to avert default, if we want to remain in the core of the eurozone, if we want the country to stop being blackmailed and humiliated - because no citizen should have to put up with humiliation of their country - we have to make three large strategic decisions as part of our national strategy."

This example provides us with four coordinated antecedents and a single consequent. In this conditional, we do not have a single hearer as in the previous example, but we may definitely say that this is also a hearer-oriented conditional. If we look at the consequent we see that it is definitely addressed to the audience, probably of the some political decision-making

institution, and it in a way suggests actions that need to be undertaken if we want to avoid the consequences of actions that may follow from the events stated in the antecedents.

The broader context confirms previously stated claims about the audience and its nature. Namely, this statement is pronounced by Greek finance minister as a part of his address in front of the European and International Monetary Fund officials on behalf of the national debt issues in Greece. Minister Venizelos wants to stress the importance of their national strategy and the problems they need to solve, thus he uses coordinated *if* clauses. This conditional is definitely hearer-oriented because the Greek minister needs approval from the political institutions for another debt-restructuring program.

55) If you want to reduce your heart disease risk, there are much better places to start than at the bottom of a box of chocolates.

The previous example is not strictly related to political discourse in its narrow meaning, but we can perceive it as such in a broader sense of the term. Namely, in the consequent, the speaker is definitely expressing a suggestion to the hearer, and in this case, the suggestion can be of vital importance for the health and consequently the life of the hearer. This conditional can also become a part of political discourse if it is part of a health promotion pamphlet issued by an international health organization. The consequent in linguistic terms can also be perceived as an extended and deliberate metaphorical statement embedded in political discourse.

Namely, the speaker suggests the hearer to avoid eating too much chocolate, in order to reduce the risk of having a heart disease. Compared to the actual context we see that this recommendation was said by Victoria Taylor from the British Heart Foundation and it is related to the study about heart health benefits coming out of eating chocolate. Namely, despite some controversial results of this study, chocolate still contains a lot of fat and sugar and can be very bad for our health if it is eaten excessively. Therefore, this conditional is perceived as a warning but also a sort of limiting responsibility for chocolate abuse due to the previously mentioned study.

56) If we compare the unrest in London with riots on Moscow's Menazhnaya Ploschad square (in December 2010), the situation here is different, though visually they are alike.

The situation in this example is definitely hearer-oriented and the speaker, basing his deliberations on current and clearly obvious reasons, provides the hearer with this opinion about the events in the antecedent. Namely, the speaker is comparing the unrests in London and Moscow and is making a conclusion based on what he can see during the unrest in question. This conditional is part of a press reaction to riots occurring in London suburbs. Namely, the situation obviously resembles the situation in Moscow, but the nature and nationality of protesters varies significantly.

Moscow riots had the same nature when it comes to violence but the population protesting is significantly different. People protesting in London come from various backgrounds, many of them are immigrants protesting against police brutality, while in Moscow people protested against the police being too passive. All these provided the possibility to comment and compare riots through the use of conditionals.

57) If the oppression continues, Turkey is ready for any scenario.

The speaker is again addressing some political audience or media and is expressing the attitude (of the government of Turkey) that if there is a continuing oppression, they are willing to undertake all the necessary measures to stop it. The consequent is directly oriented towards the hearer, though the hearer is not directly named, which is quite common in political speeches.

The actual context further clarifies the issue raised by the unrest occurring in Syria. This political problem is very important for neighbouring Turkey, thus Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated this conditional as a comment on current problems for people in Syria. This is also provoked by many refugees trying to find a safe place in Turkey. Therefore, this reaction by Minister is simultaneously a warning to Syria government, and also the expression of Turkish military power and readiness to react.

58) Nevertheless, he rejected early elections, saying however, that if the government proposal is rejected in the referendum, the country must be led to other developments, adding that: 'elections will take place sooner or later.'

This example definitely belongs to the political domain and is addressing the election issue. The consequent is expressing an attitude of a politician(s) currently in power and they are directing their statement toward a public audience through the media. Thus this conditional is clearly hearer-oriented and in some form of providing a consequence to negative response from a referendum. Contextual evidence provides us with a lot of support to the previous statement.

Namely, Greek Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos is commenting on the new loan procedures and the necessity of referendum to approve this loan. This conditional expresses the attitude towards the possible referendum results and the behaviour of the government in power, should that happen. The possibility of elections though ruled out at the beginning of the statement, still remains a possibility.

59) If (it is) true, it amounts to an act of war against the US and EU's main Arab ally in the Middle East.

In this conditional there is an incomplete antecedent, while on the other hand the consequent is providing us with consequences of an act supposedly to occur in the antecedent. Namely, this act/decision, should it be true according to the speaker's opinion, is directly causing a war with the US. The speaker is again addressing the hearer in an occasion which in this case can be from party meeting to public address in the media and thus it definitely belongs to the domain of politics.

The context related to this conditional provides us with valuable information to understanding this conditional properly. Namely, this is a statement by an unnamed US official and it is related to the alleged Iran's hiring Mexican drug cartel for killing Saudi Arabia's ambassador while visiting the US. This act, if true, just as it is stated by the speaker, would prove to be an act of war against the US and Saudi Arabia, US's ally. However, using this short antecedent, the speaker expresses a certain level of doubt into Iran's involvement and further in the text we find out from a CIA official that it is not likely that the Iranian government would

undertake such a move, due to consequences, i.e. the threat of war with the US and Saudi Arabia.

60) French defence minister Gerard Longuet noted: 'If it is confirmed, it's a good outcome.'

By the introduction to this conditional we clearly see that this conditional belongs to the public domain since it is pronounced by the minister in the French government. It is addressed again to an undetermined audience and it deals with an issue which can be clarified only if we know the full context. However, based on the example we may see that in the consequent, the speaker is expressing his belief that the outcome will be good, in case the condition from the antecedent is fulfilled.

As previously mentioned, full context provides us with the background to this conditional. Namely, after fearsome fights in Libya, rumours spread about the alleged death of Muammar Gaddafi. Thus, among many other world politicians, French defence minister Longue reacted to the news and under the condition from the antecedent fulfilled, he expressed his satisfaction with the news.

61) 'If the Euro fails, Europe fails, but we shall not allow this to happen, ' Merkel said.

The speaker and the topic of this conditional are rather clear. German chancellor is addressing the issue of current European currency problems. She is addressing the audience and suggesting that if they lose common currency they will also lose the EU. This is stated in some sort of a prediction based on the evidence from everyday political matters, but in the rest of the sentence the speaker diminishes the ominous effect of this prediction by saying that they shall not allow this to happen.

In this respect, this attitude, stated by Merkel, is not only her attitude but rather an attitude of major European institutions. The strength of this conditional is heightened even more by the fact that it is uttered after the meeting of the contemporary EU leaders. However, despite the 'predictive' nature of this conditional, the consequent is used to soften the tension during the EU crisis and to convince the public that there is the solution to the problem.

62) If we are ready to bring about more Europe, we have to seize the opportunity and use non-conventional methods.

The political issue referred to by this conditional is the issue of Europe and its influence. The speaker is probably in a meeting of a European institution addressing decision-making hearers. He suggests the use of different things in a consequent, in order to achieve the goal expressed in the antecedent. However, the look at the context reveals the necessary explanation of the meaning conveyed through both, the antecedent and the consequent. Namely, this conditional is related to the previous one, in respect that both examples refer to the issue of a crisis within the EU.

The question posed in the antecedent, is immediately answered in the consequent and Merkel's purpose was not to ask, but rather to ,through the use of conditionals for the purpose of asking a rhetorical question, provides a suggestion that all traditional methods used to solve the problem and unite Europe even more, failed. Therefore, the solution, suggested in the consequent will demand from the EU to turn to non-conventional methods of crisis management.

63) "If the European Union gives an absolutely clear No, the possibility of reorientation to the Customs Union is very high" he told the Den newspaper, referring to the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia alternative to EU integration.

A political statement expressed through conditionals in this sense definitely set this sentence into the realm of political relationships. The speaker is addressing a hearer, in this case a newspaper, but indirectly he is also addressing the EU, in other words, the consequent of the conditional is sort of a warning for the EU representatives. The insight into context of this statement confirms the previously stated claims.

This conditional was said by the Ukrainian leader Viktor Janukovych after the meeting with Russian president Medvedev. However, the thing that preceded these talks was the trial and sentence of Julia Timoshenko which stirred a lot of debate and denial of hospitality for the Ukrainian president in Brussels. Probably, after seeking support from Russia, Janukovych uttered this conditional as a sort of political strike against the EU and to show his prevalence towards Russia. This statement achieves its real importance if we bear in mind the fact that

the EU and the Ukraine have many unsettled issues regarding gas supply and of course the Timoshenko trial.

64) If Berlusconi loses, he has to resign.

This very brief conditional, concerning the presidential elections in Italian, actually expresses the prediction or the possible outcome of Berlusconi's loss of the elections. The consequent in this case is not directly related to any particular hearer. However, with more insight into the context, our perception of the conditional changes in respect to the possible outcome of the election. In this conditional, the context provided background information about Berlusconi's attendance to confidence vote at the lower chamber of Italian parliament.

Thus having this in mind, the speaker is able to pronounce this antecedent and to make a perfectly correct conclusion about the action that should follow, should Berlusconi lose the vote. However, in the following text, the speaker also provides an analysis of the political situation, stressing the lack of support for Berlusconi, even with those who proved to be his supporters in the past thanks to the support he provided for their activities.

65) Berlusconi made clear in a 15-minute address Thursday that he has no intention of stepping down – and that if he loses, the only alternative is new elections, not a government of non-political 'technicians' as some have proposed.

This conditional clause which is a part of a complex sentence, as a part of a political statement by a politician, belongs to the political domain. Its purpose, in this case is sort of a warning providing the only possible solution, given by the current president. The speaker is addressing the hearer, but in this case towards a wide group of people.

This conditional is uttered by the Italian president Berlusconi in response to the request for his stepping down. His conditional, though in an antecedent he accepts the possibility to lose - transferred to use in indirect speech form, still shows his wish to preserve certain level of decision-making powers and limits the possibilities in the consequent. The only option he accepts is the alternative of new elections.

66) If the referendum fails, he said, we have a very big chance that the country would go into disorderly default.

The discourse conditional in this example, presenting the possible consequences of the referendum failure, is again indirectly addressed to the audience and in the consequent we have a prediction about certain events. This conditional is also special because we have an insertion of the reporting phrase between the antecedent and the consequent which in a way makes a pause or intonational caesura between the two even greater.

Namely, if pronounced, the intonational pattern is definitely interrupted with the insertion of 'he said'. This conditional comes from a review of a current political issues by Alexis Papahelas, editor of daily newspaper Kathimerini and he is addressing the issue of a possible referendum in Greece regarding the crisis they faced at the time. If we look at the example conditional again, we may see that this conditional is used to predict what is going to happen should the referendum fail.

In other words, the country would get into bigger trouble than it was at the moment. This statement is further intensified by the information we find out from the context and all the fuss created even by the announcement by President Papandreou about the referendum at all.

67) If the Palestinian side goes ahead, pro-Palestinian member states such as Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are expected to show support, while pro-Israeli EU countries such as the Czech republic, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands are likely to come out against.

This conditional is particular in a sense that it has two consequents and a single antecedent. The antecedent provides a sort of prediction while the consequents, each of them respectively, provide the outcome of the action referred to in the antecedent. Both of the consequents are again public oriented and present a reaction which is going to follow should Palestinians decide to go ahead.

These consequents and antecedent are in a way providing an evaluation of the current political discrepancies that exist in the EU in respect to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian issue is a big problem for the international institutions and very frequently, despite their

effort, they cannot find a common solution which would be acceptable to both the Palestinian and the Israeli side. The conditional is based on this previous knowledge, stating the consequences of the Palestinian intention to seek UN recognition. In the consequent we actually see how big the discrepancy is regarding this issue among the EU countries.

68) If you want to have a debate about the direction of Europe, it seems to me very hard to have that on a European-wide basis unless you have some means by which people elect something which is Europe-wide in nature.

The antecedent and the consequent in this conditional deal with the EU issue and the possibility of having a debate in the entire area of the EU, which according to the speaker, who is definitely addressing the hearer(s), is very difficult to perform. In the consequent he is expressing his evaluation of the possibility to have this debate, unless there is some special tool for this purpose.

The issue raised in this conditional deals with the power that the EU has when it comes to its competitiveness with other world powers such as the US and rising markets of India, Russia and China. However, this conditional is expressing some ideas indirectly which may lead to the election of a single leader and a creation of some sort of federation which would greatly influence the power and the decision making process within the EU.

Thus through the use of a conditional, Blair would suggest something of the type (paraphrase) that if we want to talk about the EU and its direction, the best way is to form some sort of centralized European government, but thanks to the nature of the conditional he was able to say it indirectly and to avoid any possible criticism.

69) The vast majority of existing studies have not found a link between phones and cancer and if such link exists, it is unlikely to be a large one.

The context in this example is quite familiar from the preceding sentence and we may see that in the antecedent the speaker doubts the existence of the link, The consequent is directed to the hearer and is some sort of evaluation of the possibility that there is a link between phones and cancer. This conditional comes from a WHO report on the use of mobile phones and their connection to brain cancer. This is only a part of a larger report which did not manage to

confirm or deny the link between the two. The position of the conditional at the second part and the reference of the *if* clause to the previous sentence prove that the speaker actually wanted, in a way, to dissociate himself from the possible mistake by ruling it out.

However, even the tone of the antecedent is a bit questioning the existence of the connection between cancer and mobile phone use, while the consequent is definitely confirming the openness to new findings by the speaker. In other words, the speaker leaves enough room for himself to be wrong about the issue.

70) If Europe is to be competitive on the global scale, it must not concentrate solely on public finance and limiting budget deficits.

The discourse conditional in this example is referring to the European economic policy and in the consequent we have some sort of advice to the European institutions and politicians. In the similar way to the previous examples it is addressed to multiple audience involving media, politicians, etc. This is an address by the Polish representatives in an EU institution during their presidency.

This conditional serves as a medium for representing their problem-solution plan. Namely, they used the antecedent of the conditional to present a problem that they will try to solve and in the consequent they provide the solution to the problem. However, thanks to the nature of the conditional constructions, through the use of negative clause in the consequent they have managed to avoid providing a final solution but they have merely said what should not be done, instead of saying in what way it should be done instead.

71) If we speak about human rights, Tibet is also part of human rights.

This example is used to express the speaker's attitude towards human rights and their violation in Tibet. However, this is probably used as a sort of reproach to the hearer because of avoiding the discussion about Tibet. The consequent in this respect is the bearer of the reproach while the antecedent is mainly used as an introduction to the consequent. This conditional is an example of the perfect use of conditionals to avoid answering sensitive questions directly, thus avoiding any bad political consequences.

The context of this conditional involves an issue about problems between Tibet and China, and the attitude of the EU official Van Rompuy. Namely, the relationship between Tibet and China is very important for the EU because of the enormous market and the increasing power of China, but there is also an issue of violating human rights in Tibet which in respect to territory belongs to China.

Thus, in order to avoid directly taking sides, Van Rompuy's spokesperson Dirk De Backer skilfully avoided directly answering this question raised by one of the reporters through the use of our example conditional. Therefore, if we look at our example once again, we can see that the conditional is used to say that they will probably discuss the human rights at the meeting, as we can conclude from the antecedent, while the consequent simply includes Tibet saying that Tibet cannot be excluded from the human rights issue.

72) If you are pre-indicating possible decisions, you are fuelling speculation on the financial markets, throwing into misery mainly ordinary people whom we are trying to safeguard from this.

The consequent is expressing some sort of judgement directed towards the hearer. Namely, through his actions, probably clear from the previous context or everyday world knowledge, the hearer is trying to predict certain decisions that may be negative for the wider population and thus the speaker uses the consequent to reproach him for doing that.

This example comes from the text on possibility for Greece to leave the EU due to the crisis which stirred a lot of debate among the public, and the media in particular. Therefore, many officials reacted and scolded Juncker for commenting on this issue. Thus, in order to avoid being punished, Juncker wanted to say that he just pre-indicated a possible decision of Greece leaving the EU, though this was promptly denied by Greek officials. In the consequent, he in a way admitted his mistake and tried to diminish the importance of his words, especially stressing the fact that this is something from what they want to protect everyday people.

73) If I have to die, I want to die with my wife and kids, and masses of people will do the same as me.

The antecedent in this clause has a really strong message, the one of dying. In other words, the speaker is expressing his sort of agreeing to die, but under certain conditions which are further elaborated in the consequent. Therefore, if we bear in mind that the function of the antecedent is to actually provide us with conditions under which the speech-act is relevant, we may see that the speaker is addressing the hearer, who probably informed him that he has to die, and saying that he wants to die with his family.

However, if we look at the context behind this conditional, we may see that the meaning is slightly different. Namely, the speaker of this conditional is a waiter, Fabio Mengarelli, who commented the earthquakes in Italy for international news agencies. The conditional indeed expresses his readiness to die, should it come into question, but with his family.

74) If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region.

This conditional construction is providing some sort of evaluation of certain circumstances. Namely, in the antecedent we have the assessment of the situation and the speaker is probably addressing some sort of audience, either his boss or colleagues at the meeting, and thus in the consequent we have the some sort of prediction of what could happen, should the criteria in the antecedent be fulfilled.

This conditional is pronounced by Peter Wittig, the German representative in the United Nations, during his speech in a response to possible German involvement in Libya. Further in the text, we have evidence that Germany will not get involved in this conflict for the reasons stated in the consequent of the conditional. Therefore, the speaker expressed his doubt in the effectiveness of the steps in the antecedent and then he justified his doubts in the consequent.

75) If we want to protect the environment, we need new technologies and we should spend money together with the EU for their development, because they are a great European added value” Mr. Buzek argued.

Mr. Buzek, who is addressing his colleagues politicians, uses this conditional construction to invite them to cooperation with the EU institutions. Namely, the antecedent is used as some sort of unifying factor for all of them. They are there to talk about the environment protection

and Mr. Buzek in the antecedent skilfully uses that fact and in a way influences the mindset of his listeners even before stating his argument in the consequent. Afterwards, in the consequent, he just further strengthens his position through his suggestion in the consequent, even further stressing the importance of the EU in the clause following the consequent. This example could be masterfully used by a skilled speaker who could really use up the caesura between the antecedent and the consequent to raise suspense among the listeners.

76) If this tax relief is good for Americans three, or five, or seven years from now, it is even better for Americans today.

This conditional construction is a part of the address of the American president and it is definitely used to invite his member of the congress to actually accept his proposed bill on the tax relief. Therefore, we may see that in the antecedent, the speaker is actually preparing ground for what he is about to say in the consequent.

In other words, for the hearers, the greater impact is the one coming from the antecedent than from the consequent. The conclusion provided by the consequent is definitely a strong one, but without the antecedent, there would be no possibility of pronouncing it with the same effect on the listeners.

77) If there are people inside our country who are talking with Al-Qaeda, we want to know about it, because we will not sit back and wait to be hit again.

A conditional clause of this type has become almost inevitable after the war on terror declared by Americans, following the 9/11 attacks. The antecedent is being some sort of a question, while the consequent is providing an answer. However, the speaker did not wait for the listener to reply, but provides both. The speech-act force of it is definitely intensified by the circumstances which caused it to be pronounced, though there was still a possibility to further strengthen it through the use of imperative which the speaker avoided.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Research questions

4.1.1 – What is the frequency of conditional clauses in political discourse?

Answering this question was one of the first tasks in this dissertation. Namely, we have started with the assumption that due to the nature of political discourse and all the elements that it involves, it was to be expected that the frequency of these occurrences will be at least moderate.

Politicians in their common discussions regarding political issues tend to use many persuasive devices needed for accomplishing their goals. One of the most common tactics is persuasion through conditioning. In other words, if we want our hearers to do something we can either offer something to do and expect them to do something in return. We may also anticipate possible consequences and provide possible outcomes or we may simply threaten someone into doing something.

As we have seen earlier on in the chapter about corpus results, the frequency of conditional sentences is not as high as expected. Namely, the percentage of conditional clauses of the type *if p,q*(the focus of this research) in the total number of sentences can best be illustrated in the following chart:




Chart 4 – Number of conditional sentences in the corpus

As we can see in the chart, the percentage of *if p,q* occurrences amounts only up to around 3% of the total number of sentences in the corpus. If we compare it to the percentage of conditional sentences in ordinary language which ranges from 5 to around 9%, depending on the source of language, we may see that this percentage is rather low. However, generally, the percentage of conditionals is not very high as we can see in the following table (Narayanan et al, 2009):

Table 17 – Percentage of conditional sentences in ordinary language

Source	% of cond. (total # of sent.)
Cell Phone	8.6 (47711)
Automobile	5.0 (8113)
LCD TV	9.92 (258078)
Audio Systems	8.1 (5702)
Medicine	8.29 (160259)

Another criteria, directly related to the previous analysis, which at the beginning of our research proved very valuable was the common traditional division of conditional constructions into 4 distinct types with their distinct features. In order to illustrate this we may use the chart from the previous chapter.




Chart 5 Distribution of traditional conditionals

We see that there is the prevalence of the zero, first and mixed type, while more complex types are rather scarce. Out of this distribution we may conclude that politicians tend to avoid the use of conditional forms which are not directly influencing their audience in the current time and place. When they use conditional constructions to refer to the future, it is mostly

used in the form of promises and analyses of consequences of the current acts. Even the speech act force of zero, first and mixed type conditionals is far greater than that of the second and third type conditionals which is also very important for the political discourse.

4.1.2 What is the difference in the frequency of conditional clauses in American and European political discourse?

At the beginning of the research this criteria was not taken into consideration, but it cropped up only afterwards. There is a significant difference between the frequency of *if p,q* occurrences in the American and in the European political discourse. It is previously illustrated in chart 2. We can see in chart 3 that there are significant differences in the use of different types of *if p,q* conditionals. If we look at the chart, we may conclude that European speakers tend to use zero type conditionals more than their colleagues in the US.




Chart 6– Zero conditionals distribution among speakers

This can be attributed to the nature of population, or in other words to the difference in mentality between Americans and Europeans. This also provides us with the answer that the difference between AmE and EUEng is rather significant in respect to this criterion.

If we move to the next group, the first conditional, the situation can be illustrated as follows:




Chart 7 – First conditional distribution among speakers

We can see that in this case, the prevalence is on the side of American English, but still the difference is very high, because we have 63% of first type conditionals used by American speakers compared to only around 37% used by European speakers.

In the case of the second group, the second type conditionals, their common frequency is very low, but there is still a difference between AmE and EUEng.




Chart 8 – Second conditional distribution among speakers

This chart shows us that again, the prevalence is on the side of EUEng speakers and the difference is again rather high, around 40% in favour of the EUEng speakers.

In the third type conditionals, the difference between AmE and EUEng is again in the favour of EUEng speakers, while being rather low on the scale of frequency, they do not appear to be of importance for the current issue.

Thus we will look at the last group of mixed conditionals which comprises a rather large proportion of conditionals used in political discourse.




Chart 9 – Mixed conditional distribution among speakers

4.1.3 - What types of conditionals can be found in political discourse and what are the most common ones?

The answer to this question is rather complex and despite all the effort we will be able to provide only partial response to this question. Namely, political discourse contains many different types of conditionals and thus it is hard to name them all. The reason why there is an if p, q limitation in this dissertation is precisely to try and avoid this complexity. As far as the most common ones are concerned, we have seen from the previous charts that according to the traditional division and distribution, there are all five types of conditionals represented in the political discourse.

We have seen in chart 2 that the most common and the most frequent are the first, mixed and zero conditionals. As far as these three types are concerned we have seen in the previous chapters that there is also a difference between the speakers in the percentage of zero, first and mixed type conditionals that they use and thus the EUEng speakers use zero conditionals more frequently while the AmE speakers use first type conditionals more frequently. When it comes to mixed type conditionals, we could see that the EUEng speakers tend to use them more than the AmE speakers.

Apart from this traditional classification, there is also a division of conditionals into hypothetical, course-of-event and pragmatic conditionals. However, at times these three types are not clearly distinguished and more details about each of these types could be found in Chapter 19. It is important to mention that these hypothetical conditionals are those that are prototypically described as conditionals while the other two are a bit more distinct categories. However, when it comes to these two other groups, they share one sub-category of inferencing conditionals.

As far as political discourse is concerned, the larger frequency, at least in our research is attributed to pragmatic conditionals. This is mainly assigned due to the fact that into the category of pragmatic conditionals, apart from previously mentioned inferencing, we also include identifying, discourse and metacommunicative pragmatic conditionals. The most important one of these all types are discourse conditionals which are the object of this research and which were explained earlier in the text.

4.1.4 - What type of conditionals are the most influential ones in political discourse and why?

Discourse conditionals may be seen to be the most influential in political discourse, if for nothing else than because of the shared name. Namely, if we look back at a definition of discourse conditionals from chapter 19 '*Discourse conditionals are related to speech acts more than any other type of conditionals and they connect the consequent to some pragmatic factor in the conversation that is usually related to the hearer in the conversation.*', we may conclude that these are some of the most important conditional types because of the very nature of political discourse to influence the hearer through the use of discourse conditionals.

4.1.5. – What is the use of conditionals in political discourse?

This question may be seen as directly related to the previous one because it is directly dependant on the type of conditionals used in political discourse. One of the purposes of political discourse may be to influence the participant in the conversation and in the final terms to convince him/her into doing something that the speaker wants. Conditionals, as such, can be very skilfully employed in achieving this goal because they may be used to convey many different meanings.

These conditionals may convey threats, warnings, ultimatums, offers, invitations, requests and many other means used for persuasion or convincing someone into doing something. Precisely this feature makes conditionals a very useful tool in the domain of political discourse and skilful politicians tend to use them in all of their varieties, though as we have seen, those referring to present and future events are the most common, while those referring to the past are frequently used simply for the purpose of background or reference for some event or for strengthening some statement.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The starting point of this dissertation was a statement that conditionals stirred a lot of debate and hopefully, the elements of the debate are sufficiently presented. The task of explaining all these elements was rather complex because of the multiple interpretations of the single item labelled conditionals.

The traditional approach was unavoidable in the description of conditionals, but in this dissertation this approach was extended and an attempt was made to provide a detailed analysis of all possible forms of conditional structure with special attention paid to the marginal and unmarked cases of conditionals which frequently escape the common chapters in grammars and student's books.

Frequently conditionals are perceived through the prism of only three or four types and only introduced by *if*, but we have seen that there are many different conjunctions and expressions able to introduce conditionals either explicitly or implicitly.

The relationship between the protasis and the apodosis and their order and dependence were also under the scope of review and we have seen that the order is far from fixed, and that apart from pure grammatical rules there are many other elements setting them in a proper order. There are also many other elements that make them dependent from one another, many of them being non-linguistic.

In the first section of the present dissertation we have seen that conditionals have raised a great interest with philosophers as well, because of their ability to work in different plains and because of the ability to try and figure out the way our minds operate.

The logicians also contributed a lot to the understanding of the structure of conditionals and the way they are combined thanks to the research about natural language, material implications, and causality.

The historical overview provides the insight into the historical development of the conditionals and we have been able to see that they date back to old and Middle English and that those times' terminology has changed a lot over time. From the simple division into open and rejected condition we have come to many different types of conditionals.

The issue of meaning in conditional constructions was also a point of interest and we have seen that linguistics, semantics in particular, pays a lot of attention to the importance of meaning for proper understanding of the use of conditional. Thus we have seen that we have factual, theoretical and hypothetical meaning, including several different degrees of hypotheticality.

Understanding the conditionals from the discourse standpoint is also one of the key features explained in this dissertation because this proved to be very worthy for the understanding of the conditionals in general and their role in the political discourse because they definitely prove to be quite suitable means for information transfer.

Special attention was paid to the pragmatic conditionals due to their undisputed importance for the topic of this dissertation. Through their analysis we have come to see the features of discourse conditionals as well, which have been taken as a landmark for the further analysis of the conditionals from our corpus.

The corpus was assembled and analysed both by the computer programs and manually because of certain limitations of the modern computers, especially in the segment of understanding the meaning and its ambiguities. The sources for the corpus were two most representative political institutions in the world and this stresses the importance of this topic even further.

The conditionals from the corpus were analysed from the traditional perspective and we have seen that there are many differences in the frequency and in the type of the conditionals that speakers of AmE and EUEng use. They have also been further strengthened by further analysis and we may conclude that there are significant differences between conditionals coming from these two sources and that they are evident on several levels.

What is also very important to conclude is that we have shown that conditionals in political discourse are also used as a subtle but powerful tool to transfer ideas and attitudes toward a wider population. Furthermore, without going into much details about politics and its characteristics, it was shown that conditionals are used by skilful politicians to intimidate, persuade, threaten or even scare their opponents into doing something for them, be it some political decision or some personal favour.

As far as the political discourse is concerned, the larger frequency, at least in our research is attributed to pragmatic conditionals. This is mainly assigned due to the fact that into the category of pragmatic conditionals, apart from previously mentioned inferencing, we also include identifying, discourse and metacommunicative pragmatic conditionals. The most important type of conditionals are the discourse conditionals because of the very nature of the political discourse that influences the hearer through the use of discourse conditionals. These conditionals may convey threats, warnings, ultimatums, offers, invitations, requests and many other means used for persuasion or convincing someone into doing something. Precisely, this feature makes conditionals a very useful tool in the domain of political discourse and skilful politicians tend to use them in all of their varieties.

At the end we may say that conditionals in political discourse indeed present a great and interesting topic to write about not only from the linguistic perspective, which was prevalent in this dissertation, but also from the perspective of political and social sciences. There is still a lot of work to be done because this paper covered only one fraction of if p, q conditionals while there are numerous other types that need to be studied.

6. APPENDIX

This part of the dissertation contains sample texts from the corpus taken from both of the sources to illustrate the political discourse dealt with in the research, as well as all the examples of zero and the first conditionals used for detailed analysis. Samples are grouped and numbered according to the number of the example sentence they are referred to, thus making it possible for the reader to find contextual insight into the example discussed in the research part of this dissertation.

1. The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country and our friends and our allies. The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February 5 to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraq's legal—Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups.

We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.

Tonight I have a message for the men and women who will keep the peace, members of the American armed forces: Many of you are assembling in or near the Middle East, and some crucial hours may lay ahead. In those hours, the success of our cause will depend on you. Your training has prepared you. Your honor will guide you. You believe in America, and America believes in you

2. Mr Kudrin ruled out serving under a new government headed by current President Dmitry Medvedev

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has told long-serving Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin that he should resign.

Mr Kudrin had earlier said he would not serve in a new government next year if, as expected, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Mr Medvedev switch roles.

Mr Kudrin said he had disagreements on economic policy with Mr Medvedev and would consider resigning after consulting Mr Putin.

On Saturday, Mr Putin announced he would run for the presidency in March.

He served two terms as president before Mr Medvedev took over in 2008. He was barred by the constitution from running for a third consecutive term.

Mr Medvedev reacted angrily to Mr Kudrin's comments, saying they were "improper.. and can in no way be justified".

He gave the internationally respected finance minister until the end of Monday to resign.

"Nobody has revoked discipline and subordination," Russian news agencies quoted Mr Medvedev as saying, at a meeting of officials in the central Russian city of Volgograd.

"If, Alexei Leonidovich [Kudrin], you disagree with the course of the president, there is only one course of action and you know it: to resign. This is the proposal I make to you."

"You need to decide quickly what to do and give me an answer today," Mr Medvedev said.

'Differences'

Mr Kudrin won plaudits for saving much of Russia's oil revenue in a special fund that helped the country weather the international financial crisis of 2008.

He has opposed plans to achieve higher economic growth through increased government spending.

3. Meanwhile, French presidential candidate Francois Hollande has said that he would seek to renegotiate the deal on the euro agreed last week.

Mr Hollande, who is the Socialist Party's challenger to President Nicolas Sarkozy at next year's elections, said the agreement was not the right solution for the European Union.

Francois Hollande is the Socialist Party's candidate for next year's elections

He said he wanted greater powers for the European Central Bank (ECB) and for member states to issue joint eurobonds.

Germany is opposed to such measures.

Speaking to RTL radio, Mr Hollande said: "This accord is not the right answer, nor does it have the urgency.

"If I am elected president, I will negotiate, renegotiate this deal to include what is missing today."

Members of Mr Hollande's party have accused President Sarkozy of bowing to German pressure on the issues of the ECB's power and eurobonds.

France is holding its presidential election in two rounds of voting on 22 April and 6 May.

President Sarkozy has yet to declare his candidacy but is widely expected to stand.

Polling organisations currently predict that Mr Hollande would beat Mr Sarkozy in the second round of voting.

4. Meanwhile in Ireland, Hollande's ideological counterpart, the head of the Labour Party, Eamon Gilmore, sits in a coalition government that has signed up to the new deal.

For his part, on the weekend, he said that Dublin will hold a referendum IF this is needed, but that it is too early to say whether this is the case.

"The issue here isn't about whether we have a referendum or not, the first priority is that we take the steps that are necessary to secure the euro," Gilmore told RTE Radio. "IF in certain circumstances that requires a referendum, then we'll we have a referendum."

The government needs further legal analysis to assess whether the deal can escape the need for such a plebiscite, he said.

However, in a hint at the possible line the government could take should it decide against a referendum, he noted that the fiscal compact was contained in an intergovernmental agreement rather than via a change to the EU treaties.

5. Initial reports indicate that Gaddafi was hurt by a Nato air strike against a convoy of cars trying to leave his home town of Sirte. He was later found trying to hide in a concrete pipe, in an end reminiscent of the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. But it is unclear IF he died from Nato-inflicted wounds or from rebel bullets.

A ministry of defence spokesman in London told the BBC: "The convoy was targeted on the basis that this was the last of the pro-Gaddafi forces fleeing Sirte."

If Nato did kill Gaddafi, it will be grist for the mill of its critics, such as Russia, which has complained since the Western war effort began in March that the West is exceeding its UN mandate of protecting civilians.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Thursday at a press briefing with visiting Dutch leader Mark Rutte in Moscow: "We hope that there will be peace in Libya, and that all those who are governing the [Libyan] state, different representatives of Libyan tribes, will reach a final agreement on the configuration of power and Libya will be a modern democratic state."

6. Meanwhile, member states and MEPs earlier on Tuesday reached agreement to permanently ban trading in "naked credit default swaps" across the union from November 2012 onward. The deal includes an opt-out clause allowing individual member states to lift the ban for up to a year at a time IF market conditions allow.

Naked credit default swaps are a complex financial instrument in which an investor bets on a drop in the price of an asset without taking on financial exposure IF he gets the bet wrong - a form of trading widely blamed for aggravating the eurozone debt crisis.

7. A generation ago when President Kennedy proposed and the United States Congress embraced the Peace Corps, it defined the character of a whole generation of Americans committed to serving people around the world. In this national service program, we will provide more than twice as many slots for people before they go to college to be in national service than ever served in the Peace Corps. This program could do for this generation of Members of Congress what the land grant college act did and what the GI bill did for former Congressmen. In the future, historians who got their education through the national service loan will look back on you and thank you for giving America a new lease on life, if you meet this challenge.

8. Forty years from now, our grandchildren will also find it unthinkable that there was a time in this country when hardworking families lost their homes, their savings, their businesses, lost everything simply because their children got sick or because they had to change jobs. Our grandchildren will find such things unthinkable tomorrow if we have the courage to change today.

This is our chance. This is our journey. And when our work is done, we will know that we have answered the call of history and met the challenge of our time.

9. But the stakes for America are never small. If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led. If we do not turn the hearts of children toward knowledge and character, we will lose their gifts and undermine their idealism. If we permit our economy to drift and decline, the vulnerable will suffer most.

We must live up to the calling we share. Civility is not a tactic or a sentiment. It is the determined choice of trust over cynicism, of community over chaos. And this commitment, if we keep it, is a way to shared accomplishment.

America, at its best, is also courageous.

10. The President. Well, I haven't given up on my real goals. I think this is a dramatic step forward. Normally, in the history of civil rights advancements, Presidents have not necessarily been in the forefront in the beginning. So I think the fact that we actually have the Joint

Chiefs of Staff agreeing that it's time to take this question off the enlistment form, that there ought to be a serious examination of how this would be done, even though they haven't agreed that it should be done; that the Senate, if they vote for the motion advocated by Senators Nunn and Mitchell, will agree; Senators who don't agree that the policy should be changed are agreeing that we ought to have a chance to work through this for 6 months and persuade them of that, I think, is very, very significant.

Now, I would remind you that any President's Executive order can be overturned by an act of Congress. The President can then veto the act of Congress and try to have his veto sustained if the act stands on its own as a simple issue that could always be vetoed. But I always knew that there was a chance that Congress would disagree with my position. I can only tell you that I still think I'm right; I feel comfortable about the way we have done this; and I'm going to maintain the commitment that I have.

11. It is not clear to what extent either the trio or its ideas will prevail. Mr Rösler, who was born in Vietnam and adopted by German parents, may, at a stretch, be senior enough to take over the party and become Mrs Merkel's number two. But neither Mr Lindner nor Mr Bahr, although possible party chairmen, are, yet, vice-chancellor material. Mr Lindner, one of the party's cleverest leaders, is in charge of rewriting the FDP's programme to bring about the hoped-for philosophical and political renewal.

There is some talk that Mr Rösler, if he moves up, could replace Rainer Brüderle, another FDP man, as Germany's economy minister. That job is a more promising political platform than the health portfolio, which swarms with special-interest groups and makes unpopular demands of patients. Mr Bahr could then become health minister.

But Mr Brüderle will surely resist. He laid down a marker with an article of his own today, calling for a return to "liberal bread-and-butter issues": markets, competition and the regulatory order that make them possible. "One of the biggest economies in the world can't react with its gut" to events such as the nuclear catastrophe in Japan, he wrote. That was a slap at Mr Lindner, who had called for making permanent the temporary shutdown of seven nuclear plants ordered by Mrs Merkel following the Japan disaster. The old guard is not finished yet.

12. On recent events in the Arab world, Blair said he strongly supports the intervention in Libya, and by implication the efforts of Britain's current Conservative leader David Cameron.

A special envoy of the 'Quartet' in the Middle East - the EU, Russia, the UN and the US - Blair said the West must formulate a clear plan on dealing with the current unrest, despite what some critics perceive as his relative silence in the area.

"This is a situation in which you definitely need a plan," he said.

"If you get a situation where people get the right to vote but no other change, no jobs, then two or three years down the line other people will say that Islam is the answer. So our task is not to be spectators."

13. If we believe in jobs and we believe in learning, we must believe in rewarding work. If we believe in restoring the values that make America special, we must believe that there is dignity in all work, and there must be dignity for all workers. To those who care for our sick, who tend our children, who do our most difficult and tiring jobs, the new direction I propose will make this solemn, simple commitment: By expanding the refundable earned-income tax credit, we will make history. We will reward the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing the principle that if you work 40 hours a week and you've got a child in the house, you will no longer be in poverty.

14. If you currently get your health insurance through your job, under our plan you still will. And for the first time, everybody will get to choose from among at least three plans to belong to. If you're a small business owner who wants to provide health insurance to your family and your employees, but you can't afford it because the system is stacked against you, this plan will give you a discount that will finally make insurance affordable. If you're already providing insurance, your rates may well drop because we'll help you as a small business person join thousands of others to get the same benefits big corporations get at the same price they get those benefits. If you're self-employed, you'll pay less, and you will get to deduct from your taxes 100 percent of your health care premiums. If you're a large employer, your health care costs won't go up as fast, so that you will have more money to put into higher wages and new jobs and to put into the work of being competitive in this tough global economy.

15. My fellow Americans, if we're going to build that bridge to the 21st century we have to make our children free, free of the vise grip of guns and gangs and drugs, free to build lives of hope.

I want to build a bridge to the 21st century with a strong American community, beginning

with strong families, an America where all children are cherished and protected from destructive forces, where parents can succeed at home and at work.

16. But in her one-hour address, Dr Merkel offered no new ideas for resolving the crisis that has forced bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and has raised fears about the survival of the 17-state currency zone.

"IF the euro fails then Europe fails, and we want to prevent and we will prevent this, this is what we are working for, because it is such a huge historical project," Dr Merkel said.

In high drama in Rome, the president of Italy asked former European commissioner Mario Monti yesterday to form a government to restore market confidence in an economy whose debt burden is too big for the euro bloc to bail out.

17-59-60. Contemporary EU leaders at the Frankfurt event - German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Trichet himself, EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy and EU commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso - spoke out in favour of joint EU economic governance and the creation of a new quasi-finance ministry for the eurozone as a response to the crisis.

"IF the euro fails, Europe fails, but we shall not allow this to happen," Merkel said. "IF we are ready to bring about more Europe, we have to seize this opportunity and use non-conventional methods. [EU] Treaty changes for me are certainly not ruled out, they are certainly not taboo."

18. Djelic argues that Serbia accepted EULEX's presence as part of a six-point UN plan for the region. The agency's mission to strengthen the rule of law "is something that is in the interest of the Republic of Serbia, the region and Europe, and we support that," he told EurActiv Serbia. However, he said that EULEX should at the same time carry out its mission "in a status-neutral manner" that respects both sides, suggesting that this was not currently the case.

"We have been calling for dialogue to be resumed. We initiated that dialogue, hence it is important not to turn the dialogue into grounds for blackmailing Serbia."

"If it is set up in an asymmetrical way, where Belgrade has to accept everything Pristina demands, then it is no longer a dialogue, it is blackmail."

19-48-53. Victoria Taylor, from the British Heart Foundation, said: "Evidence does suggest chocolate might have some heart health benefits but we need to find out why that might be.

“We can’t start advising people to eat lots of chocolate based on this research.

“It didn’t explore what it is about chocolate that could help and if one particular type of chocolate is better than another.

“If you want to reduce your heart disease risk, there are much better places to start than at the bottom of a box of chocolates.

“You can still eat chocolate as part of a balanced diet but moderation is key because this sweet treat is usually packed with saturated fat and calories.”

Libby Dowling, from Diabetes UK, said: “On no account should people take away the message from this study alone that eating chocolate can reduce the risk of developing Type 2 diabetes or cardiovascular disease, which can also be a complication of diabetes.

“Chocolate is high in fat and sugar, which adds to weight gain, so this would outweigh any health benefits associated with eating it.”

20. David Cameron’s decision to veto changes to the existing EU treaties at last week’s European Council summit in Brussels generated a wealth of newspaper headlines and once again put the spotlight on that troubled relationship.

Although the initial preference in Paris and Berlin was to reach an agreement among all 27 member states, French President Nicolas Sarkozy had made it clear he was prepared to conclude a new fiscal compact with the 17 Eurozone countries. The result of the summit is far from certain and success is far from guaranteed.

In fact, agreement on closer budgetary alignment without both further fiscal union and monetary easing guarantees nothing. Moreover, not even Germany respected the existing 3% budget rule during the flush 2000s, so there’s no reason that markets will trust the same nations to keep to those targets now, especially facing the headwinds of reduced GDP growth forecasts.

As with all previous EU treaty revisions and negotiations, the devil is in the details - furthermore, it remains unclear how an intergovernmental treaty will work in practice alongside existing EU frameworks. IF the fiscal compact is agreed by early next year, then the summit may be seen as an important step forward in the integration process, perhaps even an historic leap towards ‘an ever closer union’ (unless the agreed budgetary targets place so much pressure on growth that they destroy the euro).

At first glance, the outcome indicates more power, not less, for the Council of Ministers, at the expense of the Commission and, therefore, the summit could be an important victory for those pushing for ‘less Europe’, like France (to a degree, the UK’s veto can be seen as a boost

to Sarkozy at German Chancellor Angela Merkel's expense and a mischievous nudge in Franco-German unity).

21. Most of us in politics haven't helped very much. For years, we've mostly treated citizens like they were consumers or spectators, sort of political couch potatoes who were supposed to watch the TV ads either promise them something for nothing or play on their fears and frustrations. And more and more of our citizens now get most of their information in very negative and aggressive ways that are hardly conducive to honest and open conversations. But the truth is, we have got to stop seeing each other as enemies just because we have different views.

If you go back to the beginning of this country, the great strength of America, as de Tocqueville pointed out when he came here a long time ago, has always been our ability to associate with people who were different from ourselves and to work together to find common ground. And in this day, everybody has a responsibility to do more of that. We simply cannot want for a tornado, a fire, or a flood to behave like Americans ought to behave in dealing with one another.

I want to finish up here by pointing out some folks that are up with the First Lady that represent what I'm trying to talk about—citizens. I have no idea what their party affiliation is or who they voted for in the last election. But they represent what we ought to be doing.

22. I know that for many Americans watching right now, the state of our economy is a concern that rises above all others, and rightly so. If you haven't been personally affected by this recession, you probably know someone who has: a friend, a neighbor, a member of your family. You don't need to hear another list of statistics to know that our economy is in crisis, because you live it every day. It's the worry you wake up with and the source of sleepless nights. It's the job you thought you'd retire from but now have lost, the business you built your dreams upon that's now hanging by a thread, the college acceptance letter your child had to put back in the envelope. The impact of this recession is real, and it is everywhere.

23. The new government will have little time to show results and people are bracing themselves for a new wave of spending cuts, our correspondent adds.

Over the past week, borrowing rates have risen to the 7% level which is regarded as unsustainable. Unemployment stands at five million.

PP leader Mariano Rajoy: "We can only go forward IF we all go forward together"

Miguel Arias, the Popular Party's campaign co-ordinator, said Spain was "going to make all the sacrifices".

24. Six senior members of Greece's ruling PASOK socialists, angered by Papandreou's decision to call a referendum, said he should make way for a "politically legitimate" administration.

During the cabinet meeting that wrapped up around 3 a.m., some ministers questioned the timing of the popular vote and criticized the fact they had been kept in the dark -- even the finance minister had not been told by Papandreou -- and a handful were openly against it, government sources said.

"I think this was the wrong decision and we must take it back," one minister was quoted as saying. "We must not risk our position in the euro."

A leading PASOK lawmaker earlier quit the party, narrowing Papandreou's slim majority to 152 of 300 seats, and several others called for a government of national unity followed by a snap election, which the opposition also demanded.

Papandreou needs 151 votes to enact the referendum. If any of the dissenters votes against, it cannot be held, and there is still plenty of dissent.

"For the first time we are admitting publicly that our policy lacks legitimacy," one minister said he told the meeting, speaking to reporters on condition of anonymity.

25. Juncker, for his part, said that the EU-IMF-ECB troika had forced opposing political parties to back the same positions on bail-outs in other countries and expected Greek factions to fall into line as well.

"In the case of countries with difficulties, it would be wise for the principle political forces of those countries to agree on the path to follow. That's what we did in Portugal. That's what happened in Ireland and that's what we would like to happen between the political parties in Greece."

He called on the various political parties to "sort themselves out".

"You do, after all, have to be concerned about your external image. I have a huge amount of sympathy for the Greek people but you can't really expect other people to help, other people to show solidarity if you can't sort yourselves out internally. This isn't a matter of party politics. It is about Greece."

Juncker also told MEPs that a Greek exit from the euro has never been discussed at any Eurogroup meeting.

In passing, the Luxembourgish prime minister mentioned that he had been the object of Greek death threats in the post.

26-44. In the past, we've worked together to bring mentors to children of prisoners and provide treatment for the addicted and help for the homeless. Tonight I ask you to consider another group of Americans in need of help. This year, some 600,000 inmates will be released from prison back into society. We know from long experience that if they can't find work or a home or help, they are much more likely to commit crime and return to prison. So tonight I propose a four-year, \$300 million prisoner reentry initiative to expand job training and placement services, to provide transitional housing, and to help newly released prisoners get mentoring, including from faith-based groups. America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.

27. We must end the deadly scourge of domestic violence in our country. And I challenge America's families to work harder to stay together. For families who stay together not only do better economically, their children do better as well.

In particular, I challenge the fathers of this country to love and care for their children. If your family has separated, you must pay your child support. We're doing more than ever to make sure you do, and we're going to do more. But let's all admit something about that, too: A check will not substitute for a parent's love and guidance. And only you—only you can make the decision to help raise your children. No matter who you are, how low or high your station in life, it is the most basic human duty of every American to do that job to the best of his or her ability.

28. Mr Stoltenberg told EUobserver that his plan is a reaction to major geopolitical changes. "We live in a world where 'far away' does not exist any more. When I was growing up, you talked about places that are 'far away.' This is no longer a reality ... the problems are bigger than before," he said. "I would not use the word 'compete,' but we must be able to meet our responsibilities," he added, on the challenges of an increasingly ice-free Arctic. "Today we cannot alone meet the need for search and rescue in this area. On the military side, the price of high technology is rising so fast that either we co-operate or we watch the degradation of our defence systems. If we don't co-operate, in 20 years' time we may have just four countries in Europe with credible defence systems - Russia, Germany, France and the UK."

He explained that a Nordic alliance is "natural."

"It's a question of geography, culture, values. We speak the same language. We feel closer to each other than most other people," he said. "There is already a very good co-operation between intelligence services in the Nordic countries. It was like this even in the Cold War.

29. "We are working to convince people," CDU second-in-command Hermann Groeche told Reuters. He said "it will be close" but the government would not put itself in the humiliating position of depending on the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens.

Merkel tried to assure her coalition that German taxpayers' money would not be wasted by voting a new bailout for Athens -- but she could not rule out that the money might be written off if, as financial markets increasingly fear, Greece defaults.

Merkel often is accused in Europe and at home of dithering on the euro crisis and if she does not win the EFSF vote on her own terms, it would damage her hopes of taking the conservative bloc she has led for 11 years into the next elections in 2013.

International auditors return to Athens on Thursday to deliver their verdict on whether Greece's tougher austerity measures qualify for further aid.

The chancellor has told Greece she wants to wait for the results of an audit by the "troika" of the European Union, European Central Bank and IMF to see whether its findings "tell us we will have to renegotiate or not".

30. Announcing the airlift in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister said that the Royal Navy destroyer HMS York, which has been delivering medical supplies to the rebel-held port of Benghazi, also stood ready to help with the relief operation.

"These people shouldn't be kept in transit camps if it is possible to take them back to their home," he told MPs.

"We will go on doing everything we can to ease the problems at the border and make sure this emergency doesn't turn into a crisis."

The first British flights - a Thomas Cook Airbus A321 and a Titan Airways Boeing 757-200 - arrived tonight at Djerba airport in Tunisia where they picked up a total of 406 adults and seven children. They will be joined by a second 757-200 chartered in Italy.

31. The Italian president has made Mr Monti a senator for life, meaning he will be eligible to take part in Friday's vote.

President Giorgio Napolitano said he wished to "dispel any doubt or misunderstanding" on when Mr Berlusconi would fulfil his promise to resign.

IF the lower house completes its vote on Saturday, President Napolitano could accept Mr Berlusconi's resignation as early as Saturday evening.

He could then formally ask Mr Monti to form a government of technocrats.

On Wednesday, the interest rate on 10-year Italian government bonds touched 7%, the rate at which Greece, Ireland and Portugal were forced to seek bailouts from the EU.

An EU team has begun work in Rome, monitoring how Italy plans to cut its crushing debt burden, 120% of annual economic output (GDP).

The Italian economy has grown at an average of 0.75% over the past 15 years.

32. A situation in which a borrower renegotiates the terms of its debts, usually in order to reduce short-term debt repayments and to increase the amount of time it has to repay them. If lenders do not agree to the change in repayment terms, or if the restructuring results in an obvious loss to lenders, then it is generally considered a default by the borrower. However, restructurings can also occur through a voluntary debt swap, in which case it can be very hard to determine whether it counts as a default.

Meanwhile, emergency talks over the future of Franco-Belgian bank Dexia added to market fears that a Greek default could spark a banking crisis.

The bank's board called an emergency meeting late on Monday as rating agency Moody's announced it was reviewing the bank's credit rating for a downgrade because of its exposure to Greek debt.

33. EU economy spokes Amadeu Altafaj-Tardio told this website: "This is a big salad, mixing different rumours we have seen in Washington and Athens. We have no information on such a thing. The figures sound massive to me."

"We have heard discussions from our international partners on how to leverage further the EFSF, but I would not call these negotiations on this issue. For the time being there are no formal discussions on such a possibility," he added.

"If France and Germany are preparing something, we are not aware of that. The French and German ministers in Washington did not raise it."

However, a contact familiar with the talks confirmed to EUobserver: "The numbers are undecided, but the parameters [in the media reports] are roughly correct."

The plan could involve a threat to the credit rating of those countries that contribute to the EFSF, notably triple-A-rated France.

34. Former Belgian prime minister and Liberal MEP Guy Verhofstadt (left) jokes with Joseph Daul, leader of the centre-right European People's Party. Mr Verhofstadt said of Cameron's veto: 'In politics there is one golden rule: you only walk away from the table IF you know the others will come to get you back'

Mr Verhofstadt said the Prime Minister's approach had worked for Margaret Thatcher in her tussles with the then leaders of France and Germany but not this time

And, to catcalls and jeers, UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage declared: 'We are going to get out of this union - the first EU country to get its freedom back.'

35. But in her one-hour address, Dr Merkel offered no new ideas for resolving the crisis that has forced bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and has raised fears about the survival of the 17-state currency zone.

"IF the euro fails then Europe fails, and we want to prevent and we will prevent this, this is what we are working for, because it is such a huge historical project," Dr Merkel said.

In high drama in Rome, the president of Italy asked former European commissioner Mario Monti yesterday to form a government to restore market confidence in an economy whose debt burden is too big for the euro bloc to bail out

36-47. Rete Disarmo director Francesco Vignarca said: "Without the Maltese mistake we would not have had any clue of this shipment in the EU documents. And if the shipper puts down the wrong numbers [of the size of the order] this is taken at face value by Malta and by the EU. This is very bad. We only know what is happening in the EU arms market on the basis of official reports. And if this is how the reporting is made, then how can we trust it?" He added: "What kind of knowledge of the world does the little local authority in Brescia have? What does it know about what is happening in Libya or Yemen? And how can the Italian government say the shipment went to the right hands if it got the Libyan confirmation only 10 months later?"

"If this is what is happening in the official and legal arms trade, I can only imagine what is happening in the illegal arms trade."

37. When we deal with our every day problems, we sometimes lose perspective and forget our achievements. A peaceful and successful transition to a European Union that has doubled in size and is negotiating further accessions. A sound currency, the euro, that is a major currency

of the world. A strong partnership with our neighbourhood that strengthens us all. If we act decisively, then we have nothing to fear from the 21st century.

38. I know there are those who dismiss such beliefs as happy talk. They claim that our insistence on something larger, something firmer and more honest in our public life is just a Trojan Horse for higher taxes and the abandonment of traditional values. And that's to be expected. Because if you don't have any fresh ideas, then you use stale tactics to scare the voters. If you don't have a record to run on, then you paint your opponent as someone people should run from. You make a big election about small things.

39-40. To Democrats, I would remind you that we still have the largest majority in decades and the people expect us to solve problems, not run for the hills. And if the Republican leadership is going to insist that 60 votes in the Senate are required to do any business at all in this town—a supermajority—then the responsibility to govern is now yours as well. Just saying no to everything may be good short-term politics, but it's not leadership. We were sent here to serve our citizens, not our ambitions. So let's show the American people that we can do it together.

41. Moussa Ibrahim, the Libyan spokesman, suggested the ministry was targeted because it contained files on rebel leaders in Benghazi, the de-facto capital of the eastern half of the country, which is under opposition control.

"If they (Nato) are really interested in protecting civilians ... then we call upon them to stop and start talking to us," Ibrahim said.

After the airstrikes, sporadic gunfire could be heard near the Tripoli hotel where reporters are staying. Police closed off a road nearby but the reason for the gunfire wasn't clear.

Libyan TV said Nato airstrikes also hit Tajoura, a neighborhood in Tripoli, and Zawiya, about 30 miles (50 kilometers) west of the capital. State TV said a number of people were killed and wounded. It did not elaborate.

42. Takis Michas, a political analyst with Forum for Greece, an Athens research institute, said posing the question this way was “a master stroke on behalf of Papandreou in the sense it is forcing the various parties to take a very responsible position.”

“IF he succeeds in framing the issue as being one of remaining in the euro zone, obviously he is going to get a huge yes,” Mr. Michas added. “But it depends on whether he can frame the

question in those terms.”

Under the Greek Constitution, the government must propose the language of the referendum, which would need to be approved by Parliament and then by the president.

43-62. Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi sits at the lower chamber to attend a confidence vote, in Rome, Friday, Oct. 14, 2011. Italy's Parliament has begun debating before a confidence vote that will determine the political future of Premier Silvio Berlusconi. The vote will be held later Friday. IF Berlusconi loses, he has to resign. With an electorate weary of the scandals engulfing the premier and worried about Italy's economy, Berlusconi is facing repeated calls for his resignation from his political rivals, labor unions and parts of the business community that once considered him their savior.

45-69. Asked by EUobserver if he will mention Tibet this weekend, Van Rompuy's spokesman Dirk De Backer declined to give details. "We will speak about human rights, of course," he said. "If we speak about human rights, Tibet is also part of human rights."

Asked if Van Rompuy is concerned about the crackdown in Tibet, he added: "Going to China, you are asking a very sensitive question. It's a very, very sensitive question ... How shall I say it? There are meetings that are foreseen and we will see what is the outcome."

46-71. Thousands of Romans fled the city and shops were shuttered over quake fears, despite officials insisting they cannot be predicted and special programmes running on Italian state TV calling for calm.

"I'm going to tell the boss I've got a medical appointment and take the day off," said barman Fabio Mengarelli. "If I have to die, I want to die with my wife and kids, and masses of people will do the same as me."

Over 20 tremors did strike Italy on Wednesday, but it was in Spain, around 800 miles to the west, that a devastating quake struck.

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Under the Greek Constitution, the government must propose the language of the referendum, which would need to be approved by Parliament and then by the president.

Some analysts said the referendum was an invitation for instability. "When the debate is very passionate and things are tense, holding a referendum

50-58. Top EU officials Herman Van Rompuy and Jose Manuel Barroso have unequivocally welcomed reports that former Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi is dead.

Often criticised for reacting late to world events and mired in the gloom of the euro crisis, the two men in a joint statement published amid breaking news of the killing said: "The reported death of Muammar Gaddafi marks the end of an era of despotism and repression from which the Libyan people have suffered for too long" and called for a process of national "reconciliation."

They were pipped to the post only by Gaddafi's one-time friend, Italian leader Silvio Berlusconi, who one hour earlier said: "The war is over" and quoted a latin proverb "sic transt gloria mundi", meaning "so passes the glory of this world."

British leader David Cameron later added: "I'm proud of the role Britain has played and I pay tribute to the bravery of the Libyans who helped liberate their country."

French defence minister Gerard Longuet noted: "IF it's confirmed, it's a good outcome."

The confirmation came at around 5pm Tripoli time from the leader of the rebel council, the TNC. "We have been waiting for this moment for a long time. Muammar Gaddafi has been killed," Mahmoud Jibril told a press conference in the Libyan capital.

The Qatari-based TV station Al Jazeera also published video footage of what looks like Gaddafi's half-naked and blood-stained corpse being tugged left and right by rebels in the street.

51. Mr Kudrin ruled out serving under a new government headed by current President Dmitry Medvedev. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has told long-serving Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin that he should resign.

Mr Kudrin had earlier said he would not serve in a new government next year if, as expected, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Mr Medvedev switch roles.

Mr Kudrin said he had disagreements on economic policy with Mr Medvedev and would consider resigning after consulting Mr Putin.

On Saturday, Mr Putin announced he would run for the presidency in March.

He served two terms as president before Mr Medvedev took over in 2008. He was barred by the constitution from running for a third consecutive term.

Mr Medvedev reacted angrily to Mr Kudrin's comments, saying they were "improper.. and can in no way be justified".

He gave the internationally respected finance minister until the end of Monday to resign.

"Nobody has revoked discipline and subordination," Russian news agencies quoted Mr Medvedev as saying, at a meeting of officials in the central Russian city of Volgograd.

"If, Alexei Leonidovich [Kudrin], you disagree with the course of the president, there is only one course of action and you know it: to resign. This is the proposal I make to you."

"You need to decide quickly what to do and give me an answer today," Mr Medvedev said.

'Differences'

Mr Kudrin won plaudits for saving much of Russia's oil revenue in a special fund that helped the country weather the international financial crisis of 2008.

He has opposed plans to achieve higher economic growth through increased government spending.

52. Greece has been "blackmailed and humiliated", the country's finance minister has said. Evangelos Venizelos said that to stop the situation, the country had to move ahead with its deficit reduction work so it could meet its financial targets.

He is expected to speak to European and International Monetary Fund officials later about the release of the next round of bailout funds.

Greece needs this money by next month to avoid defaulting on its debt.

Mr Venizelos said: "If we want to stabilise the situation, if we want to avert default, if we want to remain in the core of the eurozone, if we want the country to stop being blackmailed and humiliated - because no citizen should have to put up with humiliation of their country - we have to make three large strategic decisions as part of our national strategy."

The three strategic decisions he highlighted were:

Greece achieving its 2011 and 2012 fiscal targets

Achieve annual budget surpluses "as soon as possible"

Carry out structural changes to allow Greece to become more competitive and productive

We should not be the scapegoat or the easy excuse that will be used by European and international institutions in order to hide their own lack of competence to manage the crisis”

54. Riots that began in London on the night of Sunday 7 August are spreading across the British capital... "There is real agitation in London's outskirts where ethnic youth groups from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan live... They lack any structure; this is just a boiling cauldron... If we compare the unrest in London with riots on Moscow's Manezhnaya Ploshchad square [in December 2010], the situation here is different, though visually they are alike. These ethnic groups in London... are shouting out that the police treat them in an extremely tough way. In Russia, the ethnic majority came out on the streets to protest against the police's inaction... In the UK, the police need a consolidated political will despite its strength. The authorities should say that 'if you want to live in England, you should work and become Englishmen or go away'... Years will pass before the UK authorities venture to take tough measures in the immigration policy. But these measures will nevertheless not resemble methods used by [Libyan leader Muammar] al-Qadhafi. So, London suburbs will keep burning," says director of the Institute of Political Studies Sergey Markov.

55. Turkey does not want to consider a military option for intervention in neighbouring Syria as Damascus cracks down on popular protest, but it is ready for any scenario, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said on Tuesday.

Davutoglu also said the international community may decide a buffer zone is needed in Syria IF hundreds of thousands of people try to flee the violence there.

Syria is facing growing economic sanctions and condemnation over what the United Nations calls "gross human rights violations", but President Bashar al-Assad shows no sign of buckling under pressure to end his military crackdown on protesters calling for his overthrow. Davutoglu told Kanal 24 TV that the Syrian government needed to find a way to make peace with its own people, adding that Damascus still had a chance to accept international observers proposed by the Arab League.

"IF the oppression continues, Turkey is ready for any scenario. We hope that a military intervention will never be necessary. The Syrian regime has to find a way of making peace with its own people," he said.

A regime which tortures its own people had no chance of survival, he added.

56. Government Vice President & Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos, speaking to another private television station, essentially pointed to January for the holding of any referendum. Venizelos said such a referendum will be held after the finalisation of the loan agreement's details and completion of the exchange of the Greek bonds (PSI).

Also according to the minister, the people will be called on to reply with a "yes" or a "no" to the new loan contract's ratifying law.

Nevertheless, he rejected early elections, saying however, that IF the government proposal is rejected in the referendum, "the country must be led to other developments", adding that: "elections will take place sooner or later."

Meanwhile, in an AMNA dispatch from Brussels, EU spokeswoman Karolina Kottova, replying to a question over the Greek prime minister's sudden announcement, laconically replied "no comment on both issues (referendum and confidence vote). We are in contact and we are awaiting an official briefing from Greek authorities."

57. The US says Iran used the five suspects as go-betweens to hire a Mexican drug cartel to kill Saudi Arabia's ambassador on American soil for \$1.5 million. IF true, it amounts to an act of war against the US and EU's main Arab ally in the Middle East.

Baer and other experts have poured scorn on the accusations.

"[Iranian leaders] Suleimani and Khomeini understand how to do political murder ... IF they were in on this, they've either lost their minds, or they've lost control, or they're committing suicide. Those are your three choices. There isn't a fourth choice," Baer told the New York Times.

"I would say it just doesn't feel right ... It's hard to imagine why the Iranians would sign on to that. And the tradecraft seems amateurish and sloppy. It's crazy", Charles Faddis, a former CIA counter-terrorism chief told the New York-based news service ProPublica.

61. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has told Ukrainian leader Viktor Yanukovich he can jail his political rivals as far as Moscow is concerned, after the EU made him persona non grata. Speaking to press following talks on gas in Yanukovich's home town of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine on Tuesday (18 October), Medvedev said the decision to jail former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko last week is "Ukraine's internal affair."

He voiced "respect" for Ukrainian "sovereignty" and its "independent" courts, while indicating that EU criticism of the verdict is bad manners. "I was taught at university to try not to comment on court rulings, whether Russian or foreign, until they take effect," he noted. The Russian dignitary did warn his host not to question a gas supply contract agreed by Tymoshenko in 2009. But following the Donetsk event, which also involved energy ministers

and the CEOs of gas companies Naftogaz and Gazprom, officials from both sides said Moscow and Kiev are close to reaching a new deal on prices.

For his part, Yanukovich kept cool after the EU embarrassed him earlier the same day by saying he is not welcome in Brussels on 20 October, as previously planned, because of Tymoshenko. "We will always do everything that agrees with our national interests," he told press when asked IF he is still open to future EU talks.

His deputy prime minister, Serhiy Tigipko, was more outspoken.

"IF the European Union gives an absolutely clear No, the possibility of reorientation to the Customs Union is very high," he told the Den newspaper, referring to the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia alternative to EU integration.

63. The failure of the measure prompted opposition lawmakers to demand Berlusconi's immediate resignation and the country's ceremonial president to urge the premier to prove his government still retained a parliamentary majority. The confidence vote will test that, and IF the vote fails the 75-year Berlusconi will have to resign.

Berlusconi made clear in a 15-minute address Thursday that he has no intention of stepping down — and that IF he loses, the only alternative is new elections, not a government of nonpolitical "technicians" as some have proposed.

"The government asks for a confirmation of confidence because it is deeply aware of the risks facing the country and because the deadlines imposed by the markets are not compatible with those of certain political rituals," Berlusconi told lawmakers.

Berlusconi has steadfastly hung onto power even as his leadership has been weakened by personal sex scandals that have even brought thinly veiled criticism from Pope Benedict XVI. In addition, he's facing four criminal trials and Italy's increasingly precarious financial position. Three ratings agencies have downgraded the country's public debt, citing Italy's political gridlock as a key reason.

64. Takis Michas, a political analyst with Forum for Greece, an Athens research institute, said posing the question this way was "a master stroke on behalf of Papandreou in the sense it is forcing the various parties to take a very responsible position."

"IF he succeeds in framing the issue as being one of remaining in the euro zone, obviously he is going to get a huge yes," Mr. Michas added. "But it depends on whether he can frame the question in those terms."

Under the Greek Constitution, the government must propose the language of the referendum, which would need to be approved by Parliament and then by the president.

Some analysts said the referendum was an invitation for instability. "When the debate is very passionate and things are tense, holding a referendum could be risky," said Alexis Papahelas, the editor of the center-right daily Kathimerini.

IF the referendum fails, he said, "we have a very big chance that the country would go into a disorderly default."

A spokesman for the center-right New Democracy Party, Yiannis Michelakis, said a referendum was dangerous. Mr. Papandreou, he said, "has tossed Greece's future in Europe in the air like a coin."

65. The EU faces what could be a more ugly split on the question of Palestinian independence in the coming months, however.

The Quartet - the EU, Russia, the UN and the US - at a high-level meeting in Washington on Monday began looking for ways to encourage the Palestinians to drop their plan to seek UN recognition in September.

If the Palestinian side goes ahead, pro-Palestinian member states such as Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are expected to show support, while pro-Israeli EU countries such as the Czech republic, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands are likely to come out against.

A senior EU official recently described the potential diplomatic fallout as a "train crash."

66. At a time when the eurozone debt crisis and rising nationalism across the region appear to be threatening many of the EU's most ambitious projects, the former Labour leader urged the bloc to move closer together and form common policies in areas such as energy, defence, immigration and crime.

He warned his more eurosceptic compatriots, who have traditionally favoured Britain's 'special relationship' with the US over 'more Europe', that the island nation has little chance of wielding influence if it acts alone.

"We won't have the weight and influence a country like Britain needs unless we're part of that European power as well," he said.

But more European integration to combat the rising powers of China, Brazil and India, must be accompanied by greater democratic legitimacy, Blair added.

"If you want to have a debate about the direction of Europe it seems to me very hard to have that on a European-wide basis unless you have some means by which people elect something that is Europe-wide in nature."

European federalists have frequently touted the idea of an elected European leader to lead the 27-member bloc, while more statist politicians fear such a post would greatly undermine their own authority.

In the interview, Blair himself conceded that the idea had "no chance of being accepted at the present time".

67. "The vast majority of existing studies have not found a link between phones and cancer, and if such a link exists, it is unlikely to be a large one.

"The risk of brain cancer is similar in people who use mobile phones compared to those who don't, and rates of this cancer have not gone up in recent years despite a dramatic rise in phone use during the 1980s.

"However, not enough is known to totally rule out a risk, and there has been very little research on the long-term effects of using phones."

The WHO estimated that there are five billion mobile phone subscriptions globally.

Christopher Wild, director of the IARC, said: "Given the potential consequences for public health of this classification and findings it is important that additional research be conducted into the long term, heavy use of mobile phones.

"Pending the availability of such information, it is important to take pragmatic measures to reduce exposure such as hands free devices or texting."

68. The Polish Presidency will work to foster economic growth through further development of the internal market (including the electronic market) and using the EU's budget for building a competitive Europe.

Following the economic crisis, the EU has concluded that new rules on economic governance are required, including new tools preventing return waves of the crisis, such as the European Stabilization Mechanism. The Polish government takes a view that the European Union has to move to the next stage: it is the time to introduce a new model of economic growth, one that would allow the Union to secure appropriate level of economic development for the coming decades and guarantee the well-being of EU citizens. If Europe is to be competitive on the global scale, it must not concentrate solely on public finance and limiting budget deficits. Additional action is required.

70. Juncker's denial was all the more consternating given that the SPIEGEL ONLINE report also cited German government sources that Greece was considering withdrawing from the euro zone. Athens promptly denied the report. But with Juncker's denial quickly proving to be inaccurate, the Greek denial was also called into question. The confusion resulted in a 2 percent drop in the euro-dollar exchange rate.

The Luxembourgian prime minister has also come under fire for a quote brought to light by the news agency DAPD. "When it becomes serious, you have to lie," Juncker reportedly said during a meeting in Brussels just before Easter. Explaining himself, Juncker said: "If you are pre-indicating possible decisions, you are fuelling speculation on the financial markets, throwing into misery mainly ordinary people whom we are trying to safeguard from this." But he has been unable to safeguard himself from criticism this week. Martin Schulz, head of the Social Democrat block in the European Parliament, told SPIEGEL ONLINE on Monday that "those who organized the meeting (on Friday evening) managed to create quite a disaster. The way it was handled is another indicator for the fact that the euro zone is primarily suffering from political mismanagement."

72. "We welcome Resolution 1973 approved tonight by the United Nations Security Council ... The European Union is ready to implement this resolution within its mandate and competences," they said in a joint statement, despite Ms Ashton's previous opposition to military action and despite divisions within the bloc.

For his part, the German ambassador in New York, Peter Wittig, issued a dire warning and said Germany will not contribute resources.

"We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated," he told the council meeting. "If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved."

Libya's Mediterranean Sea neighbour, Italy, has in the run-up to Thursday's vote voiced similar objections.

73. Mr Buzek is set to meet EU leaders on Friday during a summit formally dedicated to energy and innovation, but with discussions likely to revolve around the situation in Egypt and Franco-German plans for the eurozone. "If we want to protect the environment, we need

new technologies and we should spend money together with the EU for their development, because they are a great European added value," Mr Buzek argued. He cited the 10,000 wind turbines installed last year in China and the estimates by the EU commission that it will take a few hundred billion euros in energy infrastructure investments in the coming years.

While admitting that budgets are under pressure, as governments try to cut down their deficits, Mr Buzek said that "this sum can only be generated with the help of the public sector."

74. The tax relief is for everyone who pays income taxes, and it will help our economy immediately: 92 million Americans will keep, this year, an average of almost \$1,100 more of their own money; a family of four with an income of \$40,000 would see their federal income taxes fall from \$1,178 to \$45 per year; our plan will improve the bottom line for more than 23 million small businesses. You, the Congress, have already passed all these reductions and promised them for future years. If this tax relief is good for Americans three, or five, or seven years from now, it is even better for Americans today. We should also strengthen the economy by treating investors equally in our tax laws. It's fair to tax a company's profits. It is not fair to again tax the shareholder on the same profits. To boost investor confidence and to help the nearly 10 million seniors who receive dividend income, I ask you to end the unfair double taxation of dividends.

75. Previous Presidents have used the same constitutional authority I have, and federal courts have approved the use of that authority. Appropriate members of Congress have been kept informed. The terrorist surveillance program has helped prevent terrorist attacks. It remains essential to the security of America. If there are people inside our country who are talking with Al Qaeda, we want to know about it, because we will not sit back and wait to be hit again.

In all these areas—from the disruption of terror networks, to victory in Iraq, to the spread of freedom and hope in troubled regions—we need the support of our friends and allies. To draw that support, we must always be clear in our principles and willing to act. The only alternative to American leadership is a dramatically more dangerous and anxious world. Yet we also choose to lead because it is a privilege to serve the values that gave us birth. American leaders—from Roosevelt to Truman to Kennedy to Reagan—rejected isolation and retreat, because they knew that America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.

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